

Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry

Witness Statement of

Hugh RUSSELL

Support person present: No.

1. My name is Hugh Russell. My date of birth is [REDACTED]/58. My contact details are known to the inquiry.

Background

2. My dad was born [REDACTED]. He was a Scottish Episcopalian. He had been brought up by his grandparents. Because of that he was classically Edwardian in his outlook on life. When he was a child he was sent away to boarding school. He later became a [REDACTED] in the Second World War. He was shot down and ended up in a [REDACTED].
3. My dad came back to the UK in 1945. When he came back he married his childhood sweetheart. She was a TB nurse called [REDACTED]. She was a Catholic. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] because she was ill with TB. She was admitted to a sanatorium and later died.
4. My dad met my mother whilst [REDACTED] was in the sanatorium. My mother was an Irish Catholic. My mother was working at the [REDACTED] and that's where she met my dad. She was a [REDACTED] he was a [REDACTED].
5. [REDACTED] was born in 1955 whilst my father was still married to [REDACTED]. My mother had two options when [REDACTED] was born. It was either the Magdalene

laundries or being kicked out of the house by her family. With great courage she decided to change her name and flee to Canada.

6. When my mother got to Canada she worked for the [REDACTED] in Ontario. During this time [REDACTED] died. She died in 1956. My dad tracked down my mother. He thought that, because [REDACTED] had died, he was free to do the appropriate thing. My dad ultimately married my mother.
7. I was born in 1958. When I was born my dad was back in the RAF. He was serving down south but very soon moved up to Edinburgh. His last job was in the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We lived in [REDACTED]
8. My mother's faith had driven her out of her family and the country yet she was one of the most devout Catholics I ever met. My dad acknowledged my mother's faith and understood what the rules were. Throughout my childhood my dad was always very good with my mother's faith. He would come to mass with us. That said, I was always sensitive to the fact that he was really just going through the motions. As soon as [REDACTED] old enough to allow him to move beyond the responsibility of [REDACTED] as Catholics he went back to the Episcopalian church. He was much happier there.

Life before being placed into the care of Carlekemp Priory School, North Berwick

9. My dad came out of the RAF in 1964. That's when we moved down to [REDACTED] My dad became a [REDACTED] instructor. He became an examiner on the [REDACTED] programmes. It was a fantastic place to grow up.
10. I initially went to [REDACTED] primary school. When I got to the age of seven it was decided that I needed to go to prep school. Given my background that was just what happened. It was also partly justified given the geography of the west of

Scotland. It was a long way to the local school. We were about an hour and a half [REDACTED] It was, for those reasons, decided that I would be sent to Carlekemp Priory School in North Berwick. [REDACTED] was already there and the onward plan for [REDACTED] was to go to Fort Augustus School after Carlekemp.

Carlekemp Priory School, North Berwick

Background and structure of Carlekemp

11. I went to Carlekemp in September 1966. I was nearly eight years old. The age range at the school was seven to thirteen. It was all boys. There were only about sixty or seventy kids in the whole school. It was quite small. You didn't have a first name in Carlekemp. You were referred to by your surname. You also had a number. I was number 11 OSB (OSB stands for Order of St Benedict).

Staff - priests

12. There were four Catholic priests. Father [REDACTED] MFD (Father [REDACTED] MFD) was the [REDACTED] SNR. He taught [REDACTED]. Father [REDACTED] MFA (Father [REDACTED] MFA) was the [REDACTED] SNR. I think he taught [REDACTED]. I can't remember what Father [REDACTED] MEY (Father [REDACTED] MEY) taught. There was also Father [REDACTED] MEV (Father [REDACTED] MEV). He was the youngest of the four priests.

Staff - other

13. There were three lay teachers - a Latin teacher called Miss Greco, a [REDACTED] teacher called Mr [REDACTED] MFB and a young guy who I can't remember the name of or what he taught. Other than the odd skelp across the back of the head with a table tennis bat from Mr [REDACTED] MFB I wasn't hit at school (other than the torse which I will talk about later). I don't mean to trivialise that but Mr [REDACTED] MFB giving me the odd whack was fairly minor. There was also a matron. I can't remember her name. She was a nice enough Irish woman.

First day at Carlekemp

14. I remember we went by train down to North Berwick. I remember standing by the front door in the big entrance porch at Carlekemp. I remember my mother walking away back up the drive past the stable block towards North Berwick. That's the only memory I have of my first day.

[REDACTED]

15. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It was not 'the done thing' for people from different years to mix at prep school so I didn't really see [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Routine*Daily routine*

16. Every morning, before breakfast, you had mass. A bunch of kids, including myself, used to faint from hunger during mass. I think, because of that, they later moved mass to after breakfast. You would gather in the chapel and mass would be held. Originally mass was in Latin but later it was done in English. You would then have breakfast before going into the teaching day. There would then be prep in the early evening.

Sleeping arrangements

17. Each class was in a different dormitory. As you got older, you were moved up through the dormitories in a linear pattern along the school building. You started at one end of the school and worked your way up to the other end of the school.

Holidays and breaks

18. You couldn't go home at weekends. There were half term holidays which must have lasted a week. I would quite often go to my aunt's in Northumberland during the half terms because I was quite a long way from home.

Friends and free time

19. You started to seek comfort from anybody who would take notice of you because of the bullying and the abuse. You developed very strong relationships with your fellow survivors. [REDACTED] and I were pretty close. In a way we kind of relied on each other.
20. I don't really remember there being much free time. I do remember that there were wonderful woods around the school where we used to disappear and play. I played in the woods with [REDACTED]. I particularly remember constructing amazingly intricate models and alternative reality worlds in amongst the roots of trees with [REDACTED]. We would make farms, buildings and wee figures with sticks and moss. I suppose, in retrospect, we were creating another world to escape into. We were making somewhere different to go. We were making somewhere different where we could project our lives.

Visits / Inspections

21. I don't remember anyone coming to inspect the school. However, I have talked to [REDACTED] about whether [REDACTED] remembers inspections. [REDACTED] remembers academic inspections but agrees that the inspectors only looked at teaching and not things concerning 'duty of care'.

Medical care

22. I remember visiting the dentist. I walked into town on my own, had four teeth removed, vomited from the gas and then walked back to school. It was a long walk.

Writing home and contact with outside world

23. Your contact with home was a weekly letter written after mass on a Sunday. You would essentially write "Dear Mum and Dad, everything fine. Absolutely loving it. It's all brilliant." You wrote that because your letters were censored. Your letters would go in front of the duty priest before they were sent out.
24. I don't think there was ever a construct to stop you telling the truth. You just knew that if you wrote about the truth then it wouldn't get past the censor. It was a self-regulating system. I do remember letters being handed back. It was usually with a cry of "you shouldn't say that" or "your mum won't want to hear that." It was far more natural to comply. Compliance was the easier way. You just went through the motions.
25. Other than your letter home you had absolutely no contact with the world outside the walls of the school. You arrived at the school at three times during the year and didn't escape. There were two forms of reality. There was home and then there was the school. You would very occasionally get off the grounds but I remember that only really happening when I went to the dentist and later on when I started visiting the beach.
26. If you remove all contact with the outside world then the outside world becomes an unreal construct. It means that you end up having no frame of reference to compare the form of 'reality' in the school with anything else. Going home felt completely different because it was so different. It was completely removed. It was the west of Scotland and [REDACTED] It was a very different form of reality that couldn't really be compared with life in the school. My life at home was diametrically opposed to the constraints of school.

Abuse

Physical abuse by Father MFD

27. At some stage, after you had gone to sleep and in the dark, a random selection of children would be taken out of their beds, put in their slippers and dressing gowns and taken down to a long narrow corridor. I would have no idea what time of night it would be. It would always be way after bedtime though. The corridor ran from the backdoor at the kitchens, beside the refectory, to the matron's room, the sickbay and the headmaster's office. I remember kneeling in silence in the corridor in the dead of night. I would be in a row with the other children. There may be five or six of you but there could be as many as ten or twenty. You would be kneeling there for what seemed like hours. This was a process or ritual known as 'kneeling out'.
28. Kneeling is part of the whole contrition thing so you would think to yourself that you had done something wrong. However, you would have no idea what it was that you had done wrong. You would then, one by one, be hauled into Father MFD office and given the strap by him. It was a big thick leather strap. He was the only person who administered it. He would always tell you how many it was going to be. Six on each hand was the maximum. He would say "this is going to hurt me a lot more than it is going to hurt you" before administering the strap.
29. I don't remember ever being told why I was given the strap. I remember there almost being a sense of relief when you got called into Father MFD office because you would think that you would soon be back in your bed and out of the cold.
30. There was much debate amongst the children whether it was better to keep your thumb in or out. If you kept your thumb out it could not hurt as much (unless it got wrapped around your thumb). Working out the best way to receive the strap was normal conversation amongst wee lads up to the age of thirteen at Carlekemp.

31. I remember Father [MFD] administering the strap all the way through school. It happened from day one. I couldn't enumerate the number of times I found myself down there. In memory it feels like it was done endlessly. Weirdly all of this became normalised to me. Because it was normalised it became unsurprising. That was the culture. The psychological and physical abuse of the event was choreographed and ritualised.
32. From the time I began at Carlekemp I never trusted Father [MFD]. He was the deliverer of punishment and the indoctrinator of the catechism. As far as I was aware he was never involved in any sexual abuse. Father [MFD] was always known as [MFD]

Bed wetting and bullying

33. The strap may have had something to do with the fact that I continued wetting my bed until I was in my early teens. On the flipside, the bed wetting may have been the reason why I was getting the strap. It was if you were trapped in some sort of spiral.
34. You were massively stigmatised if you wet the bed. A massive pantomime would be made of taking off your mattress and putting on evil smelling rubber sheets. It was made incredibly public. It was "look at Russell. He's wet his bed again." It was almost an operational attitude by the school. They were essentially saying "well, this will learn you." Of course, the approach the school took did not resolve the problem. It just exacerbated it.
35. When you're trying to be part of a small community, and you've been stigmatised, it doesn't half leave you open to the opportunity for bullying. Bullying is endemic in all schools. There was the usual 'Lord of Flies setup' at Carlekemp. There was a ring leader, a thug follower and victims. There was no great attempt by the school to ever stamp that out. The bullying was both physical and mental. There was the usual subjugation usually led by the wee nippy ring leader with his thug follower.

36. The bullying was wrong but it was just a circumstance of the environment we were in. From my knowledge of schools, the staff must have been aware of the bullying. I cannot imagine how they wouldn't. I'm not aware of the staff ever doing anything about it.
37. The bed wetting continued into the next school I went to. Bed wetting was dealt with totally differently there and it soon stopped as I became more happier.

Targeting by priests

38. A relationship was there with all the priests. It was a small community. You got to know them quite well. You had trust and faith in them. I guess that during the early period of my time at Carlekemp there was a degree of targeting going on. They took out the vulnerable members of the herd.
39. I recall seeing a BBC Scotland documentary where someone talked about his experiences at Carlekemp. He was a couple of years younger than me. His name was [REDACTED] I am sure. When I saw him being interviewed I thought to myself that he was a similar sort of beast in the herd to me.

Sexual abuse by Father [REDACTED] MEV

40. Father [REDACTED] MEV used to teach [REDACTED]. I thought he was friendly and supportive. He had a long narrow office at the west end of the refectory. I remember going to his office one day. I would guess that I was about eight or nine. I can't remember why I went to his office. I remember sitting on his knee and he had his hand up my shorts. I remember having my penis felt and fiddled with. I did not know what on earth to do about it. As far as I remember that was as bad as it got.
41. The weird thing is that, and it is hard to explain, I was kind of comforted by it. That is odd to me. I think it was because it was an embrace and physical contact. I knew though, at the same time, that it was wrong. However, the wrongness was on my part. I felt that way because of the indoctrination. The priests were infallible. Father

MEV couldn't be doing something wrong so it must be me who was doing something wrong.

Abuse in chapels by Father MEV and Father MEY

42. The main mass was said every morning in the main chapel. However, all the priests were required to say mass at the same time. There were little chapels spread around the house where they gave their own mass. One of you would be detailed off to be their altar boy. There would be just the two of you alone.
43. There are vestigial memories of other incidents happening around the occasions where I was sent to be the altar boy in these other chapels. These memories may fit in the space of memories I choose not to remember. In truth, I do not know. My memory may have been blocked.
44. I have a memory of being in one of the chapels on the landing at the top of the central stairway next to the staff room. I remember wrongness in that place. I remember the detail of Father MEV office. I don't remember the particular detail of what happened in that place.
45. There was a sacristy near to the main entrance of the school where you would get changed out of your altar boy regalia. I have suspicions something wrong also happened there with Father MEV and Father MEY.
46. There was an old low converted stable block by the side entrance of the grounds. It had a cobbled courtyard. I remember going in there with Father MEY. I can't think of any reason why I would go there but I remember going into the converted stable block with Father MEY. I cannot remember what may have happened whilst there but I have a very strong feeling or residual memory of something happening there with Father MEY and I am sure I am blocking something.
47. I'm not aware of anyone being aware of my situation nor being aware of anyone else who went through the same things. I think I totally compartmentalised my own

abuse at the time. I don't think that is unusual in a boarding school situation. Your own space becomes vitally important to you.

48. I do not know what might have happened in Father **MEY** room. I don't really want to go there. I don't need to go there. I hope I wasn't raped. I know some of my peers at Fort Augustus said they suffered penetrative sex with this guy. I don't think I was abused liked that. I don't know. Weirdly, it's not too important to me because it is behind a wall. I don't really look back. I look forward.

*Sexual abuse by Father **MFA***

49. When it became fairly evident that I was not happy at the school it was Father **MFA** that I was encouraged to turn to. My mother and Father **MFA** had a good relationship. They hadn't met before I went to Carlekemp but they formed a quite close relationship. That was because Father **MFA** used to sail in the west of Scotland and because he ran the **██████████**. He was seen by mother as 'the really nice guy'. There was a particular friendship and trust bond which was already created. I thought Father **MFA** was ok because of his relationship with my mother and was assured by my parents that he was the man to turn to.
50. Initially I could just do this. Father **MFA** office was on the north side of the building. I remember talking to him about how I was not happy. We talked about how I was not happy. We also talked about my parents and sailing. It was all very comfortable. It felt as if he was taking me from this unhappy place to my happy reality which was sailing on the Sound of Mull and in the Hebrides. I remember feeling relieved that there was somebody that I could talk to.
51. One afternoon in my final year, in spring 1971, I remember Father **MFA** asking me to come into his office and I went in happily enough. He put his arms out to me as though to give me a hug, which had happened before. I put my own arms out and he caught my arms by the wrists, gently but firmly. He pulled my hands under the front of his monk's habit and down his groin. His penis was erect and he put my

hands onto it. I remember the impact which was me thinking “what the fuck’s that!?” I don’t remember what happened next. I think I ran away.

52. The shocking thing to me, looking back, is that the first erect penis you should feel is your own. I think that was the first time that I became aware that things were seriously wrong and not right. I felt, particularly, that things were wrong because they were happening with the one person I felt I could trust.
53. I suppose I remember this occasion in great detail because it was the final moment where my faith and trust was broken. That must have been why I finally acted and sought escape

Confession

54. Every Friday you had to go and confess your sins. You ended up confessing your sins to the perpetrator of what you perceived to be your own sin. It was extremely confusing. It’s masterfully put in the catechism as the catch-all phrase of “I have had impure thoughts.” However, when you said that you would be thinking internally “I’ve been thinking about what you did to me and trying to make sense of it. However, it must be me who is wrong. Therefore, I’m wrong for having tried to make sense of this. I’m going to have to tell you even though you know damn well you did it to me.” It was a pretty tortured way of thinking.
55. I don’t think I ever made sense of the confessionals. Even now I cannot make sense of it. I can only recognise the cognitive dissonance of it. There was a complete incompatibility of the two trains of thought. At the time you were confused but you were required by the rules and regulations to engage with the process. I was despairing. I couldn’t make sense of this form of reality.

Reporting of abuse whilst in Carlekemp Priory School, North Berwick

Speaking to parents

56. I did speak to my parents about school. My dad had been to boarding school so his response was always “well, you know, it’s always tough but...” Towards the end of my time at Carlekemp my dad did ultimately come to suspect that something was very wrong. I think that is why I wasn’t sent to Fort Augustus.
57. My mother was different. She subscribed faithfully and passionately to the system. She was, de facto, part of the system. Because of this I could not speak to her. It is one of my regrets that a barrier was formed between myself and her. I was always much closer to my dad.
58. Speaking with my parents was the only real opportunity I had to express disquiet during my time in Carlekemp. If I had chosen to tell my parents exactly what was happening I would have been faced with the problem of trying to express what was happening. You were the age you were where you were left thinking that what was going on was normal, in a sense, anyway.

Impact whilst at Carlekemp Priory School, North Berwick

Running away

59. By the end of my time in Carlekemp I was thinking about running away. However, you knew that running away wasn’t actually going to get you anywhere. I don’t remember anyone running away. You always knew that you would be caught and sent straight back again. There was no point in running back home because home was part of the system. Therefore, running away wasn’t a solution.

Despair

60. I remember being in a state of mental despair most of my last few years that I was at Carlekemp. At the same time I was complying. As time went on I increasingly entered into a state of confusion as to what the hell was going on. I started thinking “you know that this is just wrong. There is a wrongness happening here.”
61. One of the great sins against the Holy Spirit was despair. That is in the catechism. It comes under the title of ‘Sins against Hope’. Looking back now, how on earth can despair be a sin? It is a human emotion. The natural state was hope but you can sin against hope through despair. How destructive is that? I can understand things better as an adult but as a child you were seriously confused by all of that. You would know that you had done wrong through despair.

Going to bed and the catechism

62. The really terrifying part of the catechism is what you do at the end of the day. You say your prayers, you go off to bed then you prepare yourself to lie at the feet of the cross and death. It’s quite chilling to a seven year old. Every night you are saying that you are ready to die.

Insomnia and trips to the beach

63. By the time I was in the fifth form I was fairly insomniac. I’d wake up about four in the morning. My bed was right beside the window. There was a fire escape running down the side of the chapel from a little balcony area outside my window. I would climb out of the window, go down the fire escape, wander off through the woods, pass across the golf course and walk along the beach at North Berwick in the dark at dawn. That was freedom. That was my time. I did that a huge amount. I guess that walking along the beach in my slippers and dressing gown was my escape to reality from Carlekemp. It was my recovery space. I would do that for an hour to an hour and a half before returning to bed.

64. Thinking about my trips to the beach now, the risks involved were massive. If I had been found out I would have received another strapping. However, I was fairly happy with that. That just happened. I am also now aware of the risk to myself being alone on the beach at that hour.

Acting, playing Judas and thoughts about suicide

65. I loved acting when I was in school. It was another form of reality. It allowed you to escape. Later on, during my time at Carlekemp, we started doing Passion plays. I became typecast as Judas, playing that role annually for two or three years. Normally we did the plays in the big hall from under the balcony. One time, when I was about eleven or twelve, we did it the other way round. There was a speech in the play where Judas realises his sins and his wrongs. He is holding the rope which he is about to hang himself with. It was fairly dramatic stuff.

66. I remember, really clearly, acting out that scene. I was going well beyond 'method acting'. I was living the part. I was going to go and kill myself because I had sinned and done wrong. I remember tears streaming down my face and my acting having a shocking effect on the audience. It was the first time I remember catching the audience and getting what the whole theatre thing was. I had several hundred people listening avidly to what I was saying. I was projecting the inner turmoil which was going on.

67. I think I related very much with what Judas was doing. However, I don't think I ever thought about committing suicide myself. Looking back, I do wonder what I was thinking about when I was walking up and down the beach. I know that I was looking for escape but realised that there was no spatial geographical place I could go. I had to be thinking about some other form of escape.

68. It is possible that I did think about suicide. I remember looking at the sea. There was nothing to stop me wading off into the sea. I was close enough to that level of despair and confusion but probably not mature enough to think of that as a solution.

I don't think suicide was in my sphere of reference at the time. I wouldn't have been able to work out the method of doing it.

Awaiting confirmation

69. Part of the catechism teaches that, unless you are part of the Roman Catholic church, you are doomed. Because you are awaiting confirmation this builds, for a little impressionable seven year old boy, this dreadful perception of hellfire and limbo. In a way I was more terrified of the limbo than the hellfire.

Leaving Carlekemp Priory School, North Berwick

70. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] My father had worked out that there was something rotten at Carlekemp and Fort Augustus. It was decided that, instead of Fort Augustus, I should go to Ampleforth in North Yorkshire. That was another Catholic school. I thought there was no way that I would end up there.

71. I knew that Ampleforth required you to pass the common entrance exams. I very deliberately and consciously decided to stop performing at school. I deliberately screwed up my exams so that I didn't go. I think, in retrospect, my dad understood what was going on. He saw my results nosedive and worked out what I was doing. I think my dad went along with it.

Brookfield School, Wigton (England)

Background and structure of Brookfield

72. I was at Brookfield between 1971 and 1977. Brookfield was a Quaker boarding school. It was a mixed school. Carlekemp felt like a school out of the 1950s.

Brookfield felt like a school out of the 1980s. It was progressive. It was open, honest, supportive, approachable and simple. Everything was self-regulating.

73. There was simplicity and clarity at Brookfield. The individual was valued. I suddenly had a first name. We referred to all the teachers as Mr and Mrs throughout our schooling but knew that, come sixth form, we would use their first names. There was a recognition that everybody was an individual. I could wear my own clothes after school ended. There was a television. Suddenly there was an outside world.
74. Discipline was entirely applied through the restriction of privileges. There weren't any boundaries for me to push against. I don't recall ever getting into trouble once. When you did something wrong the teachers would express themselves in terms of 'displeasure' and 'being let down'. It was all consequential ways of thinking. You were responsible for your actions and you had to accept the consequences of your actions. You learnt about cause and effect. If you had a privilege withdrawn they told you why it was withdrawn and the action was immediate.
75. The culture at Brookfield was all about moving forward together, helping each other and being nice to one another. It wasn't about there being a written law or whether you had transgressed that law or not. I don't remember there being any school rules. Certainly nothing was written down.
76. By fifth year I had responsibility for running the outdoor activities club. I had responsibility for taking out all the kids who wanted to go out on the hills to climb, sail or canoe. We had guidance and supervision from the teaching staff but we ran the club. We organised the buses, the leaders, who did what and all the rest of it. You had ownership of a communal activity.
77. When I got to upper sixth form I became a prefect. I later became the deputy head boy. Quite a lot of the monitoring of what the school was about went through the prefects in the upper sixth form. I know that both myself and the other prefects reacted very firmly when bullying occurred. The bully was someone to line up against and the victim was there to be supported and looked after. Because we had

come through a supportive community we wanted that culture to filter down throughout the school. My experience of Carlekemp was that bullying was condoned. In Brookfield bullying was absolutely vilified and stamped out.

78. Whilst I was at Brookfield my mother told me that I should continue to attend mass. That was one of her conditions. I agreed and got dispensation from my school to go down to the local Catholic church in Wigton. I started to take myself down there. During the second time I went I met this older guy who was very welcoming and friendly. He asked me whether I fancied a cup of coffee and I accepted. He then tried it on with me. He didn't actually get anywhere but I thought to myself "the sexual abuse is starting to happen again. This kind of proves it to me."
79. It was a moment of realisation which I look on now as almost a positive event. I realised that there was something fundamentally wrong with the Catholic church. I understood that I could control it and do something about it. Life could be very different.

Impact of abuse at Carlekemp whilst in Brookfield School

80. I was still in recovery when I started at Brookfield. I was springing out of the oppression I had previously suffered. I briefly saw an educational psychologist while at the school. I can't remember what the reason was for seeing her. I don't know whether there was anything particular or whether it was just my general unhappiness and despair. It might have had something to do with me doing so well then ultimately failing my exams at Carlekemp.
81. I did some relaxation exercises with the educational psychologist. I didn't think that was great as it really missed the point. In fact though, the real process of reconstruction came through my walking on the Lake District mountains. That's where I discovered myself and found out that I could put my past behind me.

82. There were quite a lot of kids sent to Brookfield on council grants. They quite often brought tensions. I arrived in the third year. I was relatively withdrawn when I arrived. There was a lad that arrived under a council grant called [REDACTED]. He had come from a rough background and so was looking to establish himself. He started bullying me. I can't recollect the exact circumstances of what happened but I picked up a chair and demolished it over his head. The seat broke in half as I demolished it over him. I remember holding the rubble of the chair and [REDACTED] being unconscious at my feet. I thought "what the hell have I done and where did that come from?"
83. I still am shocked that I did that because I'm a very peaceful non-violent type of character. It came from somewhere very, very deep. The head of English, Richard Fenwick, knew me very well through the drama society. He disciplined me by saying "Hugh, that was a bit over the top." That's the way he expressed his displeasure. I said to him "yes, I don't know where that came from." That was it. It was an example of meeting out the appropriate discipline by the appropriate person in the appropriate way.

Reporting and discussing abuse

84. Six months into my relationship with the girl I knew would be my wife, and after I started having a sexual relationship with her, I was still feeling tremendous guilt as to what was going on in our relationship. Deep down I felt "what goes on down there is bad stuff because priests do it." I had to get over that. I told my wife in 1978 that there were issues from my schooling. I put it all in a "box". I then talked about it again with her in 2013.
85. [REDACTED] was very sure that there was something very wrong. I know that because, when I told [REDACTED] a couple of years ago about what had gone on at Carlekemp, he instantly said "that makes a lot of sense. That's what it was. I've always known there was something." He had been a [REDACTED] so he knows about the whole abuse thing.

86. Hearing about the abuse at Fort Augustus in 2013 undid the padlock on the box. That's when I started thinking that I had been remiss in not talking about things. That's when I realised that not speaking about the abuse meant that I had not been able to influence change.
87. After the box was opened it became quite difficult to see where the open door was. Then the Inquiry came along. I took the opportunity of speaking to the Inquiry so that I could possibly discuss, together with them, what could be done about the future.

Life after school

88. My first degree was a BSc in Geography and Geology. I did that in 1980. I then did six years in the oil industry as a drilling engineer. I joined the army as an educator at the age of twenty eight. I then did a PGCE in further education in Cardiff in 1989. I then did a MEd degree in Educational Technology at Brunel University in 1992/3. That degree was basically about designing learning and educational systems.
89. I was an army educator who worked my way up from second lieutenant to colonel. My first position as an instructor was with junior army sixteen year olds at an apprentice college in Harrogate. I then became an instructor in an education centre in Germany. I then had a staff job in the MoD working on information training systems policy. I then became a senior education officer in another unit for the Royal Engineers. I then became the commanding officer of an education centre. We ran command, leadership and management courses but I also dealt with numeracy and literacy support. I then became a career manager in Glasgow.
90. I then became chief inspector of army individual training. That's when I became involved with the adult learning inspectorate and the Deepcut Inquiry. I was then the commander for education for the South East of England (I was essentially the head of a distributed further education college). I then became chief instructor for army education (I ran the whole education system and was in charge of standards). My

last job was assistant director of operations. I basically ran the worldwide army education system.

91. I left the army in 2011. Since then I've been a lecturer in the evaluation of learning and inspection at the school of education in Southampton and worked as an expert witness on training and operational injuries.

Impact of abuse

92. I think the way I have dealt with things is through trying to find solutions and reasons. I have tried to fix the problems through analysis. That's what I did for twenty five years in the army. I have used my professional and academic background to analyse what happened, where it came from and what was the root cause.
93. As a 'survivor' you move forward and grow in strength, perspective and understanding. However, in my experience, you cannot ever fully recover. I suppose the best analogy is what someone told me about bereavement. He said about bereavement that it is "the hole that never gets filled but you get used to living with the hole nonetheless."
94. I come across as confident but it's worrying and challenging for me to talk about my abuse. If someone asked me whether I am balanced with it I would say that "I know how to live with it." I compartmentalise things.
95. I am left with a resentment and an ambition to stop the kind of thing that happened to me happening in my profession. That's why, in my capacity as an inspector of army training, I would say "no, we've not got to be compliant. Compliance isn't the thing, being good is the thing. You have to find a better way of looking at the system."
96. The legacy of guilt, confusion and unworthiness from the abuse has continued well into my adult life. I am still trying to shed the guilt thing. I bought a campervan which I take off into the hills by myself. I still feel guilty when I have the pleasure of doing

that. The guilt still occurs because I am indulging in pleasure. I am indulging in something that is just for me.

97. My insomnia occasionally comes back when I am stressed. I will routinely get up at four in the morning and will only get off back to sleep after a couple of hours. I do lie awake at night and think about what has happened to me.
98. One hundred percent of the Catholic priests I was exposed to during my time at Carlekemp are, to some extent, guilty of physical and sexual abuse. That leaves me literally shuddering when I go into a Catholic church. I break out in a sweat. I just can't do it. The only time I have willingly been in a Catholic church, since the incident in the Catholic church in Wigton, is for my mother's funeral.
99. Weirdly I am still aware of religion. I haven't dismissed God or religion. My perspective on it all is very different now. I still believe that there is value in belief systems. There is value in seeking a greater good. There is wisdom in religion as long as you don't obfuscate it with dogma.

Views on bullying

100. One of the things I am utterly vehement against is bullying. It is an iniquitous crime against humanity. Any kind of domination is wrong. Leading through fear is utterly wrong. A leader only gets followers through engaging with them. You have to value everyone. I set out to not to be the dominating kind of leader. I set out on a different path.

Counselling and support from exterior organisations

101. I don't think I ever allowed myself to look for an organisation which could have assisted in terms of counselling or support. It was almost a deliberate act for me. I put it all away in a box. I didn't need to look back. It's part of where I came from but it's not where I'm going.

102. I kind of self-administered my own counselling. Brookfield allowed me to grow into a mature and confident individual. The love, mutual respect and support from my wife has also helped with that process. I never pushed any of the doors open in terms of organisations who could have assisted.
103. The moment I left the Catholic church in Wigton was the moment I realised that the only person who could change things and take grip of my life was me. I suppose I have always thought "I have been done wrong by but that is less important than doing right." I am sure that, had I gone and looked for an organisation to support me, I could have found help. However, that was not what I was looking for.

Records

104. I have not gone back to recover my school records. The only record keeping that I was aware of was the termly school reports. They didn't speak about my emotional welfare or anything like that.

Views on the Catholic Church

105. From my perspective there is an endemic problem with Roman Catholicism. Part of the challenge of overcoming abuse in the Catholic church is that you require to throw yourself up against a pretty big monolith. The Roman Catholic church has a set of rules and regulations which govern itself. Those rules and regulations create a perfect storm. They create the perfect environment for abuse to occur and grow. I am not saying that this occurs only in the Catholic church. You can grow that environment elsewhere. However, there were things that the Catholic church did, at the time I was in their care, which created that culture.
106. I was the army's lead on cultural capability. It was my job to look into how to understand the culture in the forces we were working with and the culture of the land that you are operating in. I was involved in things like looking into how people

interacted with the culture in Afghanistan. I don't wish to draw a parallel between the Catholic church and fundamentalist Islam. However, I do think parallels can be drawn between the Catholic church and fundamentalisms generally.

Systems analysis of the Catholic church

107. Any organisation which is strongly doctrinal and compliance based lays itself open to problems. There are three domains in learning systems (see Bloom's Taxonomy). The effective domain (belief, attitudes, emotions), the psychomotive domain (skills and learning) and the conceptual domain (what you understand). If the effective domain is dominant and inflexible then you have much greater potential for error. However, if you place more onus on the conceptual domain i.e. what colours your understanding of what is happening, then you have a flexible system with less potential for problems.
108. In the army we used to talk about 'the values and standards' which imbued themselves throughout the system. The values are selfless commitment, respect for others, loyalty, integrity, discipline and courage. It's a great mantra. However, where it can go rotten is if it is not a two way process. If those values are not exhibited by the leaders then the system goes wrong. A lack of an exhibition of those values can be seen in my experiences of the Catholic church.
109. The critical part of the system is discipline. Discipline, in itself, doesn't make you a leader. It makes you a controller. What makes you a leader is having followers. What makes you follow is if you ascribe to, understand and respect what is being said or you are just indoctrinated. Parallels, in this sense, can easily be found in the Catholic church.

The catechism

110. The catechism in the Catholic faith is akin to the rules and regulations. It sets out how the religion works. It provides the great monolithic truths. It shows how everything happens in the faith. It runs up to hundreds of paragraphs. If you have a

question as to whether something is right or wrong you just have to look it up in the catechism. I read a great article online in the Catholic press. It talks about the 'Penny Catechism', the standard 1960s catechism used in schools. The article ends up with the phrase "the catechism doesn't do nuance."

111. All the way through school you were working your way up to confirmation. Confirmation was seen as a big thing. You were being admitted to 'the faith'. You'd do that through the learning of the catechism. I remember spending hours and hours and hours learning the catechism. It was probably the penny catechism. You learnt the catechism by rote. You were then tested on it.
112. As a child you didn't have the life experience and analytical experience to question the structure. You were culturalised and indoctrinated into the church's way of thinking. This leaves you in a massively vulnerable position. You are, unwittingly, required to buy into the structure which leaves you vulnerable. The structure, in itself, isn't attacking you but it is laying you open to attack. The structure itself left you open for the opportunity of abuse. Your comprehension of what is happening is totally skewed by what you are taught are the infallible truths of the catechism.
113. A key feature of the catechism is the part about the infallible church. Because the Pope is the direct follower of St Peter the word of God is in this person. This means that the Pope is utterly infallible. The catechism says that is the same for the Pope and his bishops. By implication that goes for the priests as well (although more recent interpretation excludes priests from infallibility). The catechism builds this wonderful wall of infallibility and defence. The priests don't have to groom because they are protected by the structure they have built. The priests are utterly beyond criticism. Infallibility is an impenetrable defence. It's a masterful shield. It is a defensive shield that you would not even think of going past because the priests had built this enormous sense of trust and aura. The system had compliance designed into it. I don't think the catechism could have been deliberately constructed to provide the shield. The law of unintended circumstances was just that it masterfully does do that.

114. All fault is ultimately yours. You are taught in the catechism that you are capable of reasonable thought at the age of seven. Therefore, at the age of seven, you accept you are at fault because the priests are omnipotent and infallible.
115. In my opinion, the most dangerous construct in the Catholic church is infallibility. If the Catholic church said that these people aren't 'the word' but representatives of 'the word' you would have a crack in the shield of infallibility. If I were to look into the Catholic church's system and structure, infallibility would be where I would place the crowbar and start working.
116. It's a really difficult thing to get your brain around what the priests were thinking. They would have known what they were doing was wrong because they taught the catechism. They subscribed to the words from the same rote. They must have thought "this is wrong but it can't be wrong because I am a representative of God." I can only imagine what sort of cognitive process was going on in the perpetrators' brains.

Apologies by Catholic church

117. The church says that it is dreadfully sorry. However, saying you are sorry is completely different from addressing the systemic problem which is endemic within its own rules and regulations. The Catholic church needs to make a change to their doctrine. They need to make a change to their system whereby they can admit they are wrong. They need to remove infallibility. If they just remove that one word from the catechism then they would have made a start on creating a more flexible and just system whereby failure can be reported.

Complexity in the structure of the Catholic church

118. I was involved as the army's inspector of individual training in the study of initial recruit phase one training. I was involved in training safety, in particular putting in place systems for safe training. That role resulted in me being involved with the

Defence, House of Commons and Adult Learning Inspectorate (DHAI), Sir Quentin Blake QC's study into individual training and the Deepcut Inquiry.

119. I would also like to make reference to Sir Charles Haddon Cave QC's study into safety systems surrounding the Nimrod accident over Afghanistan. Sir Charles talked about a comfort blanket of "complexity, compliance and consensus." He also said "complexity is often the enemy of safety and security." There are parallels in using this analysis of safety systems and the Catholic church. Haddon Cave found that the RAF's engineering safety system was incredibly complex, that it was fully complied with and there was strong consensus from its adherents that it was effective. Despite this a critical failure happened causing the loss of the aircraft. The catechism, taken as a doctrinal 'safety system' is similar. Compliance with the catechism is central to the faith. It runs to many hundreds of paragraphs of detailed and complex instructions. The faith demands and advises consensus as a literal act of faith. Against this complexity, compliance and consensus one small voice of concern is unheard.

Reporting of abuse in the Catholic press

120. There are whole reams of stuff in the Catholic press trying to debunk various 'myths'. It tries to dispel the myth of child abuse being endemic by saying that there are only a relatively small number of cases. You can't dispel abuse as a myth. You have to debunk the myths. Any number higher than zero is a number and represents an abused individual.


This Inquiry

121. I think there has to be a culture which constantly asks the question "are we doing the right thing?" There needs to be a self-assessment which looks at the effect of what the organisation is doing and whether that system is supporting the well-being of the individual. There has to be a process which recognises these facets. That process needs to be imbued right across the organisation. There has to be a management plan in place which has become real to the staff and onwards towards the person in

care. It has to be a management plan which isn't just about saying what you do but is one which is actively enacted. To use an Army phrase; you have to "do the right thing on a difficult day."

122. Strangely, for me, it is not about individuals. It is about the system that those individuals represent. The iterations of sexual abuse are almost more important than the fact and circumstance of the incidents itself. If my one surviving abuser faces charges then fine. If he's brought across from Australia then so be it. It's only through making a public exposure of these people that you get acknowledgment from the organisations of their problems. However, Father MEV is largely an irrelevance to me. If he is sentenced it would give me no satisfaction.
123. What would give me enormous satisfaction would be organisational change in the Catholic church. If infallibility could be removed from the heart of the doctrine and the teaching of the church changed to remove the in-built 'comfort blanket' behind which abuse can happen then I would go to my grave knowing that I have achieved something.
124. I have no objection to my witness statement being published as part of the evidence to the Inquiry. I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed.....



Dated.....

31 July 2017

Appendix to Witness Statement of Hugh Russell



JUDICIARY OF
ENGLAND AND WALES

**“PIPER 25” OIL & GAS UK CONFERENCE
ABERDEEN - 19TH JUNE 2013**

SPEECH BY THE HON. SIR CHARLES HADDON-CAVE

**“LEADERSHIP & CULTURE, PRINCIPLES & PROFESSIONALISM,
SIMPLICITY & SAFETY – LESSONS FROM THE NIMROD REVIEW”**

ABSTRACT

RAF Nimrod XV230 suffered a catastrophic mid-air fire whilst on a routine mission over Helmand Province in Afghanistan on 2nd September 2006. This led to the total loss of the aircraft and the death of all 14 service personnel on board. It was the biggest single loss of life of British service personnel in one incident since the Falklands War. The cause was not enemy fire, but leaking fuel being ignited by an exposed hot cross-feed pipe. It was a pure technical failure. It was an accident waiting to happen. The deeper causes were organizational and managerial:

- A failure of *Leadership, Culture and Priorities*
- Seven Steps to the loss of Nimrod (over 30 years)
- Seven Themes of Nimrod
- Seven Pillars of Nimrod
- The four LIPS Principles (*Leadership, Independence, People and Simplicity*)
- The four classic cultures (*Flexible, Just, Learning and Reporting Cultures*)
- The vital fifth culture (*A Questioning Culture*)
- The four States of Man (*Risk Ignorant, Cavalier, Averse and Sensible*)
- Inconvenient Truths
- The importance of simplicity

*“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more violent.
It takes a touch of genius – and a lot of courage – to move in the opposite direction.”*
(E.F. Schumacher)

Introduction

1. It is a great privilege to be invited to speak to you at this remarkable “*PIPER 25*” conference. I congratulate Malcolm Webb and Oil & Gas UK for the inspired idea of marking the 25th anniversary of the loss of *Piper Alpha* by organizing this unique gathering of the oil and gas industry and speakers from all over the world. It is valuable to take stock and openly share experiences and ideas with colleagues across industry and to learn the lessons of the past. There was no more important or hard lesson for the oil and gas industry than the terrible loss of *Piper Alpha* on 6th July 1988

NIMROD XV230

2. I have been asked to talk to you this morning about *The Nimrod Review* following the loss of *RAF Nimrod MR2 XV230*¹ - and highlight some of the hard lessons that have been learned from this painful episode in British military aviation history.
3. On 2nd September 2006, *XV230* was on a routine mission over Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan in support of NATO and Afghani troops. Within 90 seconds of completing air-to-air refueling from a Tristar tanker, the crew were alerted by two almost simultaneous warnings: a fire warning in the bomb bay and a smoke/hydraulic mist warning in the elevator bay. Within a minute the aircraft depressurised. Within two minutes the spy camera operator reported “*we have flames coming from the rear of the engines on the starboard side*”. Emergency drills were carried out and a ‘MAYDAY’ transmitted. The pilots immediately diverted to Kandahar airfield. Faced with a life-threatening emergency, every member of the crew acted with calmness, bravery and professionalism, and in accordance with their training. Six minutes after the first fire warning, however, a Harrier saw *XV230* explode at about 3,000 feet and crash.
4. The crew had had no chance of controlling the fire. Their fate was already sealed before the first fire warning went off. The fire had broken out in a part of the lower fuselage of the aircraft which was unreachable and not covered by an automatic fire suppression system. It was the biggest single loss of life of British service personnel in once incident in theatre since the Falklands War in 1982.
5. The RAF Board of Inquiry found that the cause of the fire was not enemy action but fuel leaking during air-to-air refueling or from fuel couplings being ignited by a hot cross-feed pipe. That is to say, it was an engineering failure. This caused a major shock both in the military community and with British public because pure ‘tech’ accidents simply should not happen.
6. These sorts of major catastrophic accidents with a long gestation are, mercifully, rare; but they are a golden, once-in-a-generation, opportunity to learn deep and important lessons, if organisations are prepared to submit themselves to rigorous, objective examination and a real measure of soul-searching. It was a hard lesson for the RAF and military but a free lesson for everyone else.

¹ *Nimrod MR2* aircraft were specialized RAF reconnaissance aircraft which were manufactured in 1960s and in active service until recently.

Inquiry – 2007-2009

7. With a small military and civilian team, I conducted a two-year inquiry at the request of the Secretary of State for Defence from 2007-2009. We had valuable assistance from the US military, NASA, the HSE, the CAA, British Airways and others. I would also like to acknowledge the huge debt that my thinking owed to the seminal work of Lord Cullen who is here at the Conference today. It is perhaps fitting that Nimrods were circling over Piper Alpha on the fateful day of 6th July 1988, helping co-ordinate the rescue mission.

SEVEN STEPS TO LOSS OF NIMROD

8. We investigated 30 years of history of the aircraft, its design, maintenance and operation and discovered a series of flaws or matters– which when linked together over time had fatally combined to let to this major loss. It was an accident waiting to happen (for several decades). The history or genesis of the accident can be traced through the concatenation the following seven ‘steps’ which took place over 30 years:
- (1) **Poor design** and modifications from 1960s onwards gave risk to the risk of fuel coming into contact with 400 deg hot pipes in the bottom of the fuselage at any time.
 - (2) There was **history of fuel leaks** in 1970s and 1980s which did not ring alarm bells (and had become ‘the normalization of deviance’).
 - (3) There was an **increase in operational tempo** in late 1990s and early 2000s with the heavy use of Nimrod aircraft particularly in theatres such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
 - (4) There were increasing **problems of maintenance** of an increasingly aging aircraft, with its out-of-service date being regularly extended.
 - (5) There were meanwhile **distractions of major organizational change and cuts** in funding in the MOD in 2000-2005 following the Strategic Defence Review of 1998.
 - (6) There was the **outsourcing of the Nimrod Safety Case** in 2004-5 which produced a large amount of paper which said that the aircraft was safe – but it manifestly was not. The Safety Case missed obvious risks.
 - (7) And then on 2nd September 2006, following **air-to-air refueling**, the inevitable happened.
9. I also looked carefully into the underlying organizational causes and found a fundamental failure of *Leadership, Culture and Priorities*. My Report was laid before Parliament in October 2009. I made 84 recommendations (many of which went to clarifying responsibility and simplifying process) which were almost all accepted by the Government.

The Military Aviation Authority

10. I would like to pay tribute to the MOD and to the Military Aviation Authority which, under the outstanding leadership of Air Marshal Sir Timo Anderson KCB DSO,

immediately set about implementing the full lessons of *The Nimrod Review* and is well on the way to building a world-class organization in a remarkably short period of time.

SEVEN THEMES OF NIMROD

11. The following seven themes struck me forcibly as I began to investigate the Nimrod story:
- (1) **Complexity.** The Byzantine complexity of the organisation, the rules, the standards, the safety processes in the MOD was remarkable. Complexity and change had become the altar at which a lot of senior people worshipped – but had become the problem rather than solution.²
 - (2) **Dilution.** The immediate casualty of this complexity was a dilution of responsibility and accountability – it was difficult to divine who was responsible or accountable for what. Accountability is the ‘reciprocal’ of Responsibility.
 - (3) **Management by committee and consensus.** There were more committees, sub-committees, working parties *etc* dealing with safety-related matters than the UN.
 - (4) **Lack of challenge.** There was a culture which rewarded conformity rather than the asking of awkward questions.
 - (5) **Migration.** There was a migration of decision-making and budgetary power away from those with most direct working knowledge to those sitting in warm offices back home.
 - (6) **Triumph of generalists over specialists.** There was too little appreciation of engineering specialist skills, too great a reverence to for the young MBA.
 - (7) **Paper safety.** Safety was increasingly a paper, coloured diagram and PowerPoints exercise, rather than a people, process and cultural matter.

SEVEN LESSONS FROM NIMROD

12. I want to highlight seven particular lessons from *The Nimrod Review* for you:
13. **First, it is important to look at the underlying organisational causes of any major accident.** It is easy to blame the guy with the screwdriver or the joystick or the clipboard in his hand. But it is vital important to examine the fundamental ‘organisational causes’ of accidents. I found 12 uncanny, and worrying, parallels between the organisational causes of the loss of Nimrod XV230 and the loss of the NASA Space Shuttle ‘Columbia’:³

² A medieval philosophical saying was widely ignored: “*entities should not procreate themselves*”. (Lat. “*entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*”- attributed to the 14th-century English logician, theologian and Franciscan friar Father William of Ockham (d’Okham)).

³ Chapter 17, *The Nimrod Review*.

- (1) The 'can do' attitude and 'perfect place' culture.
- (2) Torrent of changes and organisational turmoil.
- (3) Imposition of 'business' principles.
- (4) Cuts in resources and manpower.
- (5) Dangers of outsourcing to contractors.
- (6) Dilution of risk management processes.
- (7) Dysfunctional databases.
- (8) 'PowerPoint engineering'.
- (9) Uncertainties as to Out-of-Service date.
- (10) 'Normalisation of deviance'.
- (11) 'Success-engendered optimism'.
- (12) 'The few, the tired'.

14. **Second, beware assumptions.** Certainly, beware making assumptions without being satisfied or checking that the assumptions you are making are valid, sensible and/or still justified. It was assumed that the Nimrod type was safe because it had flown safely for 30 years. Big mistake. It was assumed the Nimrod safety regime was safe because there was a complex safety system. Big mistake. It was assumed that if you outsourced the Safety Case to the original Nimrod manufacturers you could relax. Big mistake. The SAS have a saying which I would like you to remember (if you remember nothing else from my sermon this morning) – which I will express in slightly less colourful language than they do: *“Assumptions are the mother of all [cock-ups]”*.
15. **Third, avoid change for change's sake.** Change can become addictive – but can distract and disrupt people for doing the day job and be dangerous (as well as wasteful). There was constant change in the MOD following the SDR in 1998. I recommended that: *“The Orwellian-named Director General Change MOD be re-named Director General Stability MOD”*.⁴
16. **Fourth, avoid what I call the three 'comfort blankets' of complexity, compliance and consensus.** They can lull one into a (warm) sense of false security and conceal dangers:
- (1) *There is a false comfort in 'complexity'.* As Martin Anderson of the HSE memorably said to me: *“NASA was so complex it could not describe itself to others.”* I believe that complexity is more often than not the enemy of safety. Simplicity is your friend.
 - (2) *There is a false comfort in 'compliance'.* Compliance with prolix regulations may give one a warm feeling – but (like 'New Math') can lead to a focus on the process rather than the problem.⁵

⁴ Chapter 28, *The Nimrod Review*.

⁵ And as the enlightened Dutch traffic guru Hans Monderman said and I quote in Chapter 27 of *The Nimrod Review*: *“The greater the number of prescriptions, the more people's sense of personal responsibility dwindles.”* He worked out that if you removed the cornucopia of confusing traffic signs littering some streets, accident rates actually went *down* because both cars and pedestrians took more care and thought about what they were doing, *i.e.* rather than just driving at 30 mph because the sign said so.

- (3) *There is a false comfort in 'consensus'. It is easy for everyone to hold hands and have warm feelings at a meeting about safety but I am a great believer in Mr Awkward at the back of the room throwing the curve-ball.*

17. **Fifth, if you have to outsource, it is important not to outsource your thinking and to remain an 'intelligent customer'.** Companies and government departments have increasingly become hooked on the heroin of outsourcing, which can be a quick fix and get employees off balance sheet. But outsourcing has many perils. It can lead to unclarity as to where risk lies. It can be corrosive to in-house skills, culture and corporate memory. It can be an irreversible mistake to cede control over processes, thinking and decision-making. NASA's shuttle programme had become a "*slimmed down, contractor run operation*" to its ultimate cost. The keys to sensible outsourcing are (a) intelligent and rigorous contracts and (b) remain an 'intelligent customer'.⁶
18. **Sixth, (as Lord Cullen said) Safety Case should be an aid to thinking, not an end in themselves.** I felt strongly that the Safety Case regime⁷ had lost its way in certain environments. It had led to a culture of 'paper safety' at the expense of *real* safety and did not represent value for money. Its shortcomings included: bureaucratic length; obscure language; a failure to see the wood for the trees; archaeological documentary exercises; routine outsourcing to Industry; lack of vital operator input; disproportionality; ignoring of age issues; compliance-only exercises; audits of process only; and prior assumptions of safety and 'shelf-ware'.⁸ I recommended in the Military Domain that Safety Cases should be renamed "*Risk Cases*" and conform in the future to the six Principles: ***Succinct; Home-grown; Accessible; Proportionate; Easy to understand; and Document-lite.***⁹ Like the Pompidou Centre in Paris, Safety Cases should have their workings visible on the outside.
19. **Seventh, age matters. The age of equipment is important.** Increasingly aging kit – and extensions of out-of-service dates – is an increasing problem.¹⁰ Age matters, but it is not necessarily an insoluble problem. Older kit generally need greater rigour, resources, and vigilance. But with the right care, 'legacy' aircraft can continue to fly safely for many years. It is a question of resources, priorities, and unrelenting attention to detail. Good collection and analysis of data, trends and patterns is vital.¹¹

⁶ See recommendations in Chapters 24 and 25 of *The Nimrod Review*.

⁷ A 'Safety Case is often defined as "*a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensive and valid case that a system [or platform] is safe for a given application in a given environment*". (c.f. DEFSTAN 00-56, para. 9.1; and US military OSS&E system (Operational Safety, Suitability and Effectiveness)).

⁸ Many of these criticisms of Safety Cases were not new: see the *Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry* and the writings of Professor McDermid's Department at the University of York.

⁹ The '**SHAPED**' Principles – Chapter 22 of *The Nimrod Review*.

¹⁰ Problems of 'legacy' aircraft include: (1) Design to standards which would not be acceptable today; (2) Difficulties of access and maintenance; (3) Diminishing pool of skilled engineers; (4) Decline of 'corporate knowledge' and memory; (5) Dwindling spares; (6) Difficulties of incorporating modifications and new systems; (7) Different aging rates of systems and components; (8) Degradation of components.

¹¹ The advances in pre-emptive Human Factors (HF) reporting using Human Factors Maintenance Error Management Systems ((M)EMS) are impressive. The great advantage of HF M(EMS) is that it encourages a pro-active reporting and trend analysis culture which focuses attention on the 'below the waterline' near-

Lessons are not new

20. As the head of the HSE, Judith Hackitt, said yesterday “*There are no new accidents*”. It is important to remember that many of these lessons to be learned are not new.¹² The organisational causes of the loss of Nimrod XV230 echo other cases, not just the loss of the Space Shuttles *Challenger and Columbia*, but other catastrophic accidents such as the *Zebrugge Disaster* (1987), *King’s Cross Fire* (1987), *The Marchioness* (1989) – and more recent ones such as *BP Texas City* (2005) and the recent *BP Gulf imbroglio*.
21. I am a great believer in identifying the right principles and culture and sticking to them.

THE ‘LIPS’ PRINCIPLES

22. Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “*Rules are not necessarily sacred, principles are*”¹³. In *The Nimrod Review*, I highlighted four principles which I regarded as of paradigm importance: **Leadership, Independence, People (not just Process and Paper) and Simplicity**.¹⁴
- (1) **Leadership: Principle of Leadership: There must be strong leadership from the very top, demanding and demonstrating by example active and constant commitment to safety and risk management as an overriding priorities.** As Lord Cullen said in Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry Report (2001) “*[T]he first priority for a successful safety culture is leadership*”.¹⁵
- “*When a 3-Star is interested in safety, everyone is interested in safety.*” (Junior RAF officer, 2009)
- “*There was no doubt that the culture at the time had switched. In the days of Sir Colin Terry you had to be on top of airworthiness. By 2004, you had to be on top of your budget, if you wanted to get ahead.*” (Former Senior RAF Officer, 2008)
- “*Generally speaking, organisations behave and teams behave in the way that their management, immediate boss, does, this dictates culture. So if you have a boss in a bank who likes to take risks, his staff will take risks. ...And you end up with a culture of risk.*” (Witness L [QinetiQ], Safety Engineer, 2009)
- (2) **Independence: Principle of Independence: There must be thorough independence throughout the regulatory regime, in particular in the setting of safety and risk policy, regulation, auditing and**

misses, which, if openly and honestly reported in sufficient numbers, provide valuable information and visibility of potential issues *before* an incident or accident occurs. This changes fundamentally the approach of hazard management from reactive to pro-active. (see Chapter 18 of *The Nimrod Review*).

¹² Chapter 17, *The Nimrod Review*.

¹³ Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945)

¹⁴ Chapter 20, *The Nimrod Review*.

¹⁵ Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry Part 2 Report (2001), Chapter 1, paragraph 1.11.

enforcement. As the Legal Advisor to CAA, Rupert Britton, said to me and I quote in my Report, *“It is important that that regulation is truly independent of operation.”*

- (3) *People (not just Process and Paper): Principle of People: There must be much greater focus on People in the delivery of high standards of Safety and Airworthiness (and not just on Process and Paper).* Whatever elaborate Processes and Paper requirements are in place, it is People who ultimately have to ensure they take care, pay attention, think things through and carry out the right tasks and procedures at the right time and exercise caution where necessary. As Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, Commodore Andrew McFarlane, said to me and I quote in my Report: *“Safety is delivered by people, not paper”*.
- (4) **Simplicity: Principle of Simplicity: Regulatory structures, processes and rules must be as simple and straightforward as possible so that everyone can understand them.** A safe system is generally a simple and stable system. As Director of Engineering, British Airways, Garry Copeland said to me and I quote in my Report: *“We believe hugely in simplicity and stability”*.

23. I am a great fan of E.F. Schumacher who wrote ‘Small is Beautiful’ and said memorably: *“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more violent. It takes a touch of genius – and a lot of courage – to move in the opposite direction.”*

SAFETY CULTURE

24. I also believe that fostering and maintaining a strong and effective Safety Culture¹⁶ is vital to reducing accidents. It is often said but easily forgotten. There is much to be learned from the work of NASA and the US Joint Planning and Development Office who have adopted Professor James Reason’s four-part approach to creating an “Engaged” Safety Culture which includes four elements:¹⁷

- **A Reporting Culture:** an organisational climate where people readily report problems, errors and near misses.
- **A Just Culture:** strikes a sensible balance between a ‘blame culture’ and a ‘blame-free culture’, *i.e.* between holding people properly accountable for their acts or omissions and ensuring the right lessons are learned for the future.
- **A Flexible Culture:** a culture that can adapt to changing circumstances and demands while maintaining its focus on safety.

¹⁶ *“Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance”* (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group).

¹⁷ Professor Reason’s composite approach has been adopted by NASA and the US Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) in its NextGen project to account for a three-fold increase in air traffic by 2025.

- **A Learning Culture:** the willingness and competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information and the will to implement major safety reforms.

Fifth Culture

25. To the four NASA cultures, a **Reporting Culture, a Just Culture, a Flexible Culture, a Learning Culture**, I have added a fifth – and I believe vital – element:

- **A Questioning Culture:** It is vital to ask “*What if?*” and “*Why?*” questions.
26. The keystone of a strong Safety Culture is, in my view, however, is this vital fifth element, namely a ‘*Questioning Culture*’. At all stages of the safety pilgrimage it is vital to ask questions such as “*What if?*”, “*Why?*”, “*Can you explain?*”, “*Can you show me?*”, “*Can you prove it?*”. As a presaged earlier, Questions are the antidote to assumptions, which so often incubate mistakes. It is important always to think.

Four states of man

27. There are to my mind four states of Man: *Risk Ignorant, Risk Cavalier, Risk Averse* and (the state what I advocate in Nimrod one should aim for) *Risk Sensible*.¹⁸ My big message is to encourage everybody not to be *Risk Ignorant, Risk Cavalier, or Risk Averse*, but to be *Risk Sensible*.
28. It is tempting to parcel risk and the ‘safety thing’ up into neat packages, PowerPoints or graphs and statistics and, after a committee meeting with all the ‘stakeholders present’, tie them up and hand them back to the relevant corporate risk department with a pat on the head and a thank you. Risk is Safety, however, is everyone’s personal responsibility. And it starts at the very top – and should cascade right through the organisation.
29. Being *Risk Sensible* means embracing risk, unbundling it, analysing it and taking a measured and balanced view.
30. What I want to do is encourage everybody, from the top to bottom of every organisation, whether military, civilian, public or private, governmental or NGO, to embrace risk and responsibility on a personal and collective basis. Unbundle risks, look at the pros and cons and make sensible decisions. Everybody has a role to play, but the role of you as leaders is critical to this endeavour.
31. In times of increasingly scarce resources and financial pressures, how do you get that balance right? One of the ways is to focus your time, energy and resources on areas that you think really matter in terms of *outcomes*. Don’t be misty-eyed about safety. Be hard-nosed. Look at the stats and see what you most common, serious and habitual risks are and target those. Share and discuss knowledge, experiences, concerns and *outcomes* with colleagues, industry and regulators.

¹⁸ “*Risk Sensible*” is referred to in e.g. *The Monro Review on Child Protection 2011*.

Inconvenient truths

32. There are four 'inconvenient truths' which form the backdrop to any discussion of risk in today's oil world and make this conference especially important:
- (a) First, like it or not, we live in an instant media and internet age - with 24/7 TV News coverage, the Web, blogs, and tweeting, *etc.*- and increasing public scepticism – regarding government and 'big business' and the need to hold 'grey suits' to account..
 - (b) Second, we live in a consumer and litigious age of burgeoning 'rights' of all kinds – and multi-party litigation.
 - (c) Third, there is an insatiable demand for oil and gas – and greater technical challenges and risks to be faced in satisfying that demand.
 - (d) Fourth, there is a great deal of 'legacy' equipment out there, rigs which are past their original out-of-service dates – and how to deal with that equipment is something of a time-bomb.

Self-preservation' Management and Regulation

33. There is an increasing tendency towards what I call the 'Self-preservation' Management and Regulation. By this I mean three things in particular:
- (1) First, an increase in *Defensive engineering* (*i.e.* being over-cautious, being reluctant to take decisions, unnecessary outsourcing, over specifying and including a *plethora* of unnecessary checks);
 - (2) Second, further *Dilution of Responsibility* (*i.e.* shedding, spreading and delegating responsibility far and wide so that the picture as to ultimate responsibility is unclear and diffuse); and
 - (3) Third, more (of what I call) *Promiscuous Procedure* (*i.e.* organisations and individuals wrapping themselves in a protective blanket of more and more procedure and becoming slaves to process, box-ticking and paperwork).
34. These tendencies have a baleful effect on safety and must be halted and reversed.

SUMMARY


35. In summary, I advocate in *The Nimrod Review* three things in particular:
- (a) a return to a focus on, and belief in, core values and technical skills;**
 - (b) a tightening of lines of responsibility and the clear identification of Duty Holders; and**
 - (c) a rolling back of the comfort blanket of procedure and, above all, simplifying process.**

POWERPOINTS

36. I recommend in my Report: *“The ubiquitous use of PowerPoint should be discouraged. It can lead the audience to watch rather than think”*.¹⁹ But here are a few which you may find useful:-

ICE-BERG

37. Imagine an ice-berg -- and plain sailing around it:



¹⁹ *The Nimrod Review*, Recommendation 28.2.

HEINRICH'S TRIANGLE

38. But it is what lies beneath the surface that really matters:




Figure 18.5: Examples of Heinrich's Triangle

39. Heinrich was clever and inspired. He analysed a series of 1920s industrial accidents and drew "*Heinrich's Triangle*" showing the relationship between low-level deviations and accidents. Ratios of 600:1 are often reported. The example above illustrates data reported from air traffic management about the number of low level Operational Errors (OE) and Operational Deviations (OD). Whatever the precise ratio in any given field, the key point is to capture and understand these low level errors and deviations before they conspire to cause an incident or accident. It is important that errors and 'near misses' are reported to accident investigators.²⁰ Mine the data from the bottom. Avoid having to learn from your own headline accident.

Accident theory

40. It pays to have an understanding of Accident Theory, particularly in the context of managing safety in relation to high-risk technologies. I recommend study of the work of the leading academics in the field such as James Reason, Charles Perrow, Scott Sagan, Diane Vaughan, and Karl Weick.²¹ There are two main Accident Theories: *Normal Accident Theory* and *High Reliability Theory*. Their proponents

²⁰ As Professor John McDermid of York University has pointed out, there are many 'low-level' errors which are precursors of, and hence warnings of, impending accidents. He emphasises, "*Good safety management identifies these low-level issues and feeds them back to reduce risk*" (JA McDermid, PHD, FEng, University of York, *Through Life Safety Management: Some Concepts and Issues*, 2007).

²¹ Chapter 18, *The Nimrod Review*.

share the same goal, *i.e.* effective safety management at both an individual and an organisational level.

- (1) *Normal Accident Theory*: 'Normal Accident Theory' holds that, when technologies become very complex and 'tightly coupled', accidents become inevitable and therefore, in a sense, 'normal'. This theory takes a pessimistic, but not defeatist, view of the ability of organisations and individuals to manage high risk technologies.
 - (2) *High Reliability Theory*: 'High Reliability Theory' argues that organisations responsible for operating high risk technologies can successfully compensate for inevitable human shortcomings which would normally lead to catastrophic failures. Proper design, management and training are seen as important requisites for being a highly reliable organisation. Both sets of theorists share the same goal, *i.e.* effective safety management at both an individual and an organisational level, but differ about the degree to which it is ultimately possible to avoid errors, incidents, accidents, and catastrophes. Both strive to achieve the 'dynamic non-event' that represents 'reliability' in high-risk technologies. It is 'dynamic' because processes remain within acceptable limits due to moment-to-moment adjustments and compensations by the human operators. It is a 'non-event' because safe outcomes claim little or no attention. The paradox is rooted in the fact that accidents are salient, while 'normalcy' is not.
41. In my view, there is value in both philosophies, but neither has a monopoly on veracity. The pessimism of Normal Accident theory must give way to rigorous and pro-active safety management during one's tenure of responsibility. The optimism of High Reliability must yield to human fallibility and the truth that "*...the one hazard for which there is no technological remedy: the insidious concatenation of latent human failures that are an inevitable part of any large organisation.*" (James Reason, *Human Error*, 1990, page 250).

THE 'SWISS CHEESE' AND 'BOWTIE' MODELS

42. I am sure that most of you will have seen or heard of the Swiss Cheese Model. Professor James Reason's inspired way of illustrating how accidents occur:




Figure 18.1: Classic 'Swiss Cheese' Model from Beyond Aviation Human Factors (Ashgate Publishing)

43. Applied to the Nimrod story, the 'Swiss Cheese' model looks like this (and gives you a clear idea of the long gestation period that this sort of catastrophic accident can have):




Figure 18.2: 'Swiss Cheese' Model as applied to XV230

44. You may also be have seen the *'Bow Tie'* model which elegantly distinguishes between the two distinct categories of defences, preventative and ameliorating measures.




Figure 18.3: Classic 'Bow Tie' Model

H-C's COMPOSITE MODEL

45. In order to aid understanding of accident theory, I have combined Professor James Reason's classic 'Swiss Cheese' and the 'Bow Tie' models to form a composite 3-D model which may prove a useful tool in illustrating how the various layers of defences and the 'hierarchy' of preventative and ameliorating measures may be logically placed. It can also be a valuable management and teaching tool to help explain to those tasked with particular responsibilities, where they sit in the chain and why their particular role is important in the overall preventative scheme.




Figure 18.4: 'Composite Model'


AGE MATTERS

Figure 23.1 The 'bathtub' Curve

46. It is important to remind oneself regularly of the trusty 'bath curve'. Age is no bar to continued success – but the older kit gets, generally the greater vigilance, maintenance and resources is required to keep it up to scratch. It is a question of resources, priorities, and unrelenting attention to detail.
47. In the late 1990s, the Nimrod fleet was already beginning to be described as “old” and reaching the end of the 'bathtub' curve. The generic problems in relation to some aged and 'legacy' aircraft include:
- (1) Design to standards which would not be acceptable today;
 - (2) Difficulties of access and maintenance;
 - (3) Diminishing pool of skilled engineers;
 - (4) Decline of 'corporate knowledge';
 - (5) Dwindling spares;
 - (6) Difficulties of incorporating modifications and new systems;
 - (7) Different aging rates of systems and components; and
 - (8) Degradation of components.

COMPLEXITY and SIMPLICITY

48. In 1990s the organizational structure of the MOD looked like this:





Figure 13.4: Chain of delegation for airworthiness in 1990s

49. By 2005 the organizational structure of the MOD looked like this:



FIFTH CULTURE

50. My final slide illustrates the four NASA cultures, a **Reporting Culture**, a **Just Culture**, a **Flexible Culture**, a **Learning Culture**, to which I have added a fifth – and I believe vital – element: **A Questioning Culture**. As I have said, it is vital to ask questions such as “What if?”, “Why?”, “Can you explain?”, “Can you show me?”, “Can you prove it?”. Questions are the antidote to assumptions, which so often incubate mistakes. It is important always to think.




Figure 27.1: Engaged Organisation and Safety Culture

51. Thank you. I wish you every success with this great conference.

CH-C
Aberdeen,
19th June 2013

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Carlekemp Priory School - Autumn 1966 to Summer 1971

Fr	MFD	SNR
Fr	MFA	
Fr	MEY	
Fr	MEV	

Penny Catechism
Catechism of St Pius X

Infallible church etc ...
Sins against hope: Despair as a sin
Confession ... of your perceived sin to the perpetrator
Confirmation

proecclesia.com
catholictradition.org
catholicbook.com

Grooming. Indoctrination. Culturalisation.

EF Schumacher – “Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more violent. It takes a touch of genius and lot of courage to move in the opposite direction.” (Schumacher – influential political economist)

Haddon-Cave QC report into an RAF Nimrod crash

The ‘comfort blanket’ of Complexity, Compliance and Consensus. These lull one into a (warm) sense of false security and conceal dangers:

- (1) *There is a false comfort in complexity?* Complexity is more often than not the enemy of safety and quality. Simplicity is your friend.
- (2) Compliance with regulations may give one a warm feeling – but can lead to a focus on the process rather than the problem.
- (3) *Consensus. Management by committee.* It is easy for everyone to have warm feelings at meetings but what about the awkward ‘curve ball’




Figure 27.1: Engaged Organisation and Safety Culture

Organisational culture, self assessment

The 4 boxes are Prof James Reason's Concept of an Engaged Organisation and is taken from Haddon-Cave's report – hence Safety Culture – but the same applies to a Quality Culture

Self assessment can be process heavy or it can be part of the quality culture.

Reporting Culture: Readily reports problems and errors

Just Culture: The right balance between 'blame culture' and 'blame-free' culture: we need to ensure that people are accountable but also ensure that the right lessons are learned. (Error Management.)

Flexible Culture: adaptive to changing circumstances and demands

Learning Culture: one that is willing and able to draw the right conclusions from information and has the will to implement reforms.

Questioning Culture is added by Haddon-Cave – to challenge Complexity, Compliance and Consensus.