

1

Tuesday, 30 May 2023

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY SMITH: Good morning. Welcome to the second week of  
4 our expert evidence. We move today, as I think was  
5 indicated last week, to hear Professor Levitt, who is  
6 going to cover inspections today and tomorrow,  
7 I understand, and is here and ready to give evidence.  
8 Mr MacAulay.

9 MR MACAULAY: Yes, my Lady. That is the position. Can  
10 I make it clear that today I'll be looking at the  
11 inspection report that covers the period 1992 to 2005.  
12 Tomorrow, I'll look at the final inspection.

13 LADY SMITH: Thank you very much.

14 MR MACAULAY: I would recall Professor Levitt.

15 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

16 Professor Ian Levitt (re-called)

17 LADY SMITH: Good morning, Professor Levitt. Welcome back.  
18 Could you take the oath, please, by raising your right  
19 hand.

20 Professor Ian Levitt (re-sworn)

21 LADY SMITH: Do sit down and make yourself comfortable.

22 Professor Levitt, you've been here before at our  
23 other building, you know how we work and what to expect,  
24 I hope. But be assured I never forget that it's hard  
25 work giving evidence and can be very anxious-making.

1 I normally take a break at about 11.30 in the  
2 morning and in the middle of the afternoon session as  
3 well. But, if you want a break at any other time,  
4 please do say. As ever, if we're not making sense in  
5 any questions we ask you that's our fault not yours, so  
6 don't hesitate to speak up; okay?

7 A. Thank you, my Lady.

8 LADY SMITH: If you're ready, I'll hand over to Mr MacAulay  
9 and we'll take it from there.

10 MR MACAULAY: My Lady, thank you.

11 Good morning, Professor Levitt. This is your fifth  
12 visit I think, having been here on 2 November and  
13 3 November 2017 and 4 April and 10 April 2019.

14 And you are here today to talk to your inspection  
15 report covering the period 1992 to 2005?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I think tomorrow we'll look at your final inspection  
18 report.

19 Can I take it that there is no change to your CV  
20 from when you were here before?

21 A. I think I've updated it. I handed it in to the office.

22 Q. So what have you included that we hadn't looked at  
23 before?

24 A. I think the previous was an abridged one. This is  
25 completely unabridged, from whenever I began in

1           academia.

2   Q.   And I think that's the one I have in front of me, that  
3       sets out articles and chapters and books and so on?

4   A.   That's right, yes.

5   LADY SMITH:  Mr MacAulay, I'm sorry to interrupt, could  
6       I just ask the stenographers what to do, because I'm not  
7       seeing the transcript coming up on my screen.  My last  
8       option is Day 349, which of course is last week.

9   (10.33 am)

10  LADY SMITH:  Thank you.

11           I'm so sorry about that delay, Professor Levitt, but  
12       I need to see the transcript appearing in front of me,  
13       and also be assured that it is transmitting to our  
14       system.  But it's obviously doing that now.

15           Mr MacAulay.

16  MR MACAULAY:  My Lady, before I start, the planned break was  
17       for 11.30 --

18  LADY SMITH:  We'll --

19  MR MACAULAY:  -- I wonder whether it should be put back to  
20       11.45.

21  LADY SMITH:  11.45 would work well, yes.

22  MR MACAULAY:  That would suit me.

23           Professor Levitt, you will see on the screen that  
24       the report I'm going to be looking at today -- and  
25       that's at SGV-000083601, and I think you have your own

1 hard copy in front of you?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You can either use the screen or the hard copy.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Just to backtrack a little bit, the last time you were  
6 here, you looked at the period from 1969 to 1992, and  
7 you're going to continue from there on, today.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. That was a period that post-dated the  
10 Social Work Act 1968.

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. I think you told us that the Social Work Services Group  
13 was formed in 1967 to assume functions previously  
14 exercised in both the Scottish Home and Health  
15 department and the Scottish Education Department?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. And also to prepare the groundwork for the 1968 Act?

18 A. The ground work for its implementation.

19 Q. Yes.

20 You also told us that the Central Advisory Service,  
21 CAS, was established in about 1968?

22 A. It was established in March 1968.

23 Q. Its functions included advising the Secretary of State  
24 and inspectorial functions, including reviews of deaths  
25 in care?



1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. Just to recap on this particular point, the 1968 Act  
3 devolved the registration of residential homes to Local  
4 Authorities?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. And hence the inspection regimes of such homes fell on  
7 Local Authorities?

8 A. That was an interpretation of the Act that Social Work  
9 Services Group accepted, which I think is in the second  
10 report.

11 Q. Yes.

12 Now, looking at this first report for today, the  
13 1992 to 2005 report, you set out your methodology and  
14 how you accessed the relevant materials. I think, in  
15 the main, it's similar to your previous approach?

16 A. That's correct. It was a combination of retained  
17 records at The National Archives of Scotland, plus some  
18 records retained by the Scottish Government which had  
19 not been, in effect, weeded ahead of transmission to The  
20 National Archives of Scotland.

21 Q. Can I then look at the first section in the report  
22 itself? That's on page 18. Can I just say the  
23 pagination for these purposes is the page number at the  
24 bottom right of the report.

25 Here you have a section headed:

1           "The administrative, legislative and regulatory  
2           background 1995."

3           As is, I think, your practice, you set out at the  
4           outset a summary of where you're going to go?

5   A.   That's correct, yes.

6   Q.   Can I take you to 1.1, "The legislative and  
7           administrative framework of inspection services"?

8           You tell us that in early March 1992 it was agreed  
9           that a Social Work Services Inspectorate would be  
10          established from 1 April.

11  A.   That's correct, yes.

12  Q.   Do you set out there what the function of this  
13          inspectorate was to be?

14  A.   Yes.  It's to evaluate reports on the quality of local  
15          social work services, assist the achievement of the  
16          national policy objectives, provide advice to the  
17          Secretary of State and provide guidance to local  
18          agencies on policy, implementation and practice.

19  Q.   If we move on to paragraph 1.1.2, on page 19; do you  
20          tell us in that paragraph that the SWSI function was to  
21          include carrying out local social work services  
22          inspections?

23  A.   It was to provide assistance to Local Authorities in  
24          delivering quality services across the board.

25          My, if you like, inferences that they were to

1           pressurise local services much more than they had in the  
2           previous period, but it wasn't necessarily to engage in  
3           inspecting the actual provision of services. They were  
4           to ensure that by conversation, by meetings, that the  
5           services would be improved rather than being inspected.

6   Q. Do I take from that they would engage with Local  
7       Authorities --

8   A. Yes.

9   Q. -- but not actually indulge in hands-on inspections of  
10       the services?

11   A. That's correct, yes.

12   Q. That is something that does come later?

13   A. Yes, yes.

14   Q. At 1.3, do you set out what the SWSI's legal powers of  
15       inspection were? And were they essentially the same as  
16       existed before?

17   A. They remained as they had been under CAS, following the  
18       1968 Act.

19   LADY SMITH: Again, there's a power, but not a duty?

20   A. Sorry?

21   LADY SMITH: There's a power, but not a duty.

22                Sorry, Professor Levitt, you are probably hearing  
23       that as if --

24   A. Yes, it's a power, but it doesn't specify precisely what  
25       duties they should perform.

1 LADY SMITH: Yes.

2 MR MACAULAY: If you go on to page 20 of the report; do you,  
3 just below halfway, have a reference to what the Local  
4 Authority had been doing and, in particular, do we read  
5 there that Local Authority service inspectorates were  
6 set up on a proper arm's length basis?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Can you just explain what that development meant?

9 A. The respective Local Authorities were in power to  
10 establish a unit within local government separate from  
11 the actual provision of social work services to  
12 inspect -- to assist the registration and inspect the  
13 quality of services provided in residential homes and  
14 other establishments.

15 Q. And the reference to "arm's length"; is that to indicate  
16 that they had a degree of independence in that job?

17 A. The intention was it would be independent of social  
18 work, local social work services who had established  
19 those services or who were commissioning those services.

20 Q. In this particular section, you also provide details of  
21 restructuring of functions within the Scottish Office.  
22 These are quite bewildering changes, but you set out, in  
23 particular at paragraph 1.1.9, what that restructuring  
24 meant.

25 A. Yes. It had nothing really to do with social work

1 services as such. It had to do -- my reading of it is  
2 a sort of cost-cutting exercise to reduce the number of  
3 departments in the then Scottish Office. And,  
4 basically, Scottish Education Department was united,  
5 I think, with the Industry Department and the Scottish  
6 Home and Health Department was similarly dissolved.

7 Q. At 1.1.11, you draw attention to an internal review into  
8 the arrangements for any investigations which the  
9 Secretary of State may feel it necessary to carry out  
10 into social work issues.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Can you just develop that for me? What did that  
13 involve?

14 A. What the ministers were being informed was the -- if you  
15 like, the statutory basis of the inspection service and  
16 the limitations of the information they could obtain  
17 when they conducted an inspection, if an inspection was  
18 so conducted. And it was clearly quite limited in terms  
19 of the information that they could actually obtain, at  
20 least directly.

21 Q. You set these limitations out on page 23?

22 A. Yes. They could examine the records, the registrar's  
23 files, but they were restricted in their exercise as to  
24 the extent of the records that they could actually  
25 review. It had to be directly related to the service

1           being provided.

2   Q.   At paragraph 1.1.13, on page 24; do you set out another  
3       change that involved SWSG?

4   A.   Yes.  That was after the establishment of the Scottish  
5       Executive, a further revision occurred.  In a sense, it  
6       was -- my assumption was it was unrelated to the issue,  
7       the direct issue of social work services, but the need  
8       really to divide Social Work Services Group into terms  
9       of the provision of childcare and provision of adult  
10      care and mental healthcare.

11  Q.   Do we see now the emergence of the definition of "young  
12       people" and "looked-after children"?  Which becomes  
13      relevant in particular when they are looking at deaths  
14      in care.

15  A.   Without going into too much detail, what happened was  
16      that the officials who were responsible for childcare  
17      simply moved and were retitled Children's Services --  
18      sorry, Young People and Looked-after Children's  
19      Services.  So it was -- if one looks at the various  
20      handbooks of staff functions, it was the same officials;  
21      right?  Except they were being renamed.  And they were  
22      being separated from the overall Social Work Services  
23      Group, which had been dissolved.

24           It would appear confusing, but in fact it isn't  
25      confusing once you actually look at the duties being

1 performed. They continued with the duties that they  
2 were doing in terms of looked-after children, except  
3 they were not bound up within the Social Work Services  
4 Group, which contained the remit for mental health  
5 services and adult services.

6 Q. You then go on in the following section, at 1.2, to look  
7 at the position with regard to deaths of looked-after  
8 children. I think what you say is, from 1962, the  
9 Secretary of State required to be notified of any death  
10 of a child in residential homes or foster care?

11 A. Yes, that's correct. Yes.

12 Q. Can you just explain how the process worked?

13 A. The process was that within a specified time period the  
14 Local Authority or voluntary organisation would write to  
15 St Andrew's House or telephone St Andrew's House as well  
16 and inform them that the death of a child in care had  
17 occurred, and that then that would follow up with the  
18 papers relating to the death of that particular child.

19 It would then be -- the papers would then be  
20 reviewed within the Scottish Office in 1962, within the  
21 childcare division of the Scottish Office, later the  
22 Social Work Services Group, and then the children --  
23 then the Looked-after Children Group, in 1999.

24 It would automatically be sent to one of the  
25 inspectors in 1992 and in 1999, one of the social work

1 inspectors, who would call on the services of the  
2 Department of Health medical officer, who then might  
3 call on the advice of HMI Inspector of Education. And  
4 there would be some correspondence between the officials  
5 and the Local Authority, or the voluntary body  
6 concerned, in terms of the death, and they might request  
7 further information on that death before closing the  
8 case, in terms of the interest of Scottish Ministers,  
9 previously the Secretary of State, or alternatively  
10 informing Scottish Ministers that there were serious  
11 concerns surrounding this particular death.

12 Q. And "looked after", as you set out on page 26, was  
13 intended to be a general term covering children  
14 accommodated by the authority?

15 A. That's correct, yes.

16 Q. So not just children in care, as we normally understand  
17 it, but also children perhaps residing at home under  
18 supervision?

19 A. Under supervision at home, yes.

20 I should also add that if you look at deaths in care  
21 in this period, what is perhaps quite important for the  
22 Inquiry is there would be an official letter from the  
23 Scottish Office to the Local Authority informing them  
24 that the case had been closed by the Secretary of State  
25 or Scottish Ministers. So it was quite a formal



1 process.

2 Q. At 1.2.10, on page 28, you make reference to an SWSG  
3 submission and you have quoted from that. For example:

4 "The expression 'looked after' will replace the  
5 existing term in care and will cover all children  
6 currently in care [as we discussed]."

7 Then you talk about the Local Authority forming  
8 a care plan.

9 A. That's one of the significant implications of the 1995  
10 Children (Scotland) Act, that Local Authorities weren't  
11 simply to bring a child into care, but to develop  
12 a health, personal and educational plan for that  
13 particular child and to have that plan monitored.

14 Q. Yes. And who would monitor the plan?

15 A. The social workers who were assigned to that particular  
16 case.

17 Q. But, at this point in time, would there be any external  
18 monitoring by, for example, SWSI?

19 A. No, no, it was a devolved function on the Local  
20 Authorities and, obviously, the local social work  
21 services authorities.

22 So, in effect, it would be the professional social  
23 worker job to develop that plan, have it approved within  
24 the Local Authority and follow it through.

25 Q. Now, you move on in the next section, at 1.3, to look at

1 residential grant aided and independent schools, and you  
2 draw attention to the Education Scotland Act and what  
3 the provisions in relation to inspections were; can you  
4 just recap on that for me?

5 A. I think the 1980 Act restated earlier provisions and  
6 made it clear that all schools would be inspected by HMI  
7 education, and HM inspector of schools were part of the  
8 SED, Scottish Education Department and successor bodies,  
9 and that the inspections reports would be submitted in  
10 due course to the department of administrative  
11 officials, if there were any issues arising as a result  
12 of that inspection.

13 Q. At this time, under the 1980 Act, what would the HMI  
14 focus be in inspection?

15 A. Primarily on the provision of education.

16 Q. I think that changes as we move on.

17 A. Yes, that's correct. Yes.

18 Q. You also point out, at 1.3.2, that under the 1980 Act,  
19 the Secretary of State was also required to appoint  
20 a registrar of independent schools.

21 A. That's correct. This reflected earlier provision and  
22 the rules and regulations that followed that particular  
23 Act, 1980 Act, were very much the same as what had  
24 occurred previous to that, and that the Secretary of  
25 State could refuse registration or deregister a school

1 if the school was considered objectionable.

2 Q. Is the reference "objectionable", a reference we find in  
3 the Act?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Is it defined as, for example, issues over welfare,  
6 accommodation and so on?

7 A. Primarily on the quality of teaching, on the buildings,  
8 but very little in the 1980 Act on the quality of  
9 accommodation, if it was a boarding school.

10 Q. You indicate, in 1.3.2, that the register, once  
11 completed and approved -- and I think it's the register  
12 that would be open for public inspection rather than the  
13 application?

14 A. The registrar would consider the application from  
15 a school if it was seeking registration. The registrar  
16 would also review the registration if a negative report  
17 was submitted by HMI inspectors.

18 Q. But, once registered, was the register open to the  
19 public?

20 A. Yes, the register was open to the public. Yes.

21 Q. On page 30, I think through to page 32, you provide some  
22 information to the background to the Children Scotland  
23 Bill that was then in the offing, which became the  
24 Children (Scotland) Act, of course. If we turn to  
25 1.3.9, you summarise what the Bill and in effect the

1 1995 Act envisaged --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- in relation to residential schools and inspection.

4 Can you just develop that for me and explain what the  
5 final position was?

6 A. I think the essential elements of it was the requirement  
7 for the residential accommodation to be registered with  
8 a Local Authority on boarding schools, and that they  
9 would -- and the school would be inspected by HM  
10 Inspector of Schools on both educational provision and  
11 the care and welfare of the pupils, and the issue there  
12 was in relation to safeguarding the pupils.

13 Q. That has broadened the jurisdiction of HMI.

14 A. It has broaden the nature of the inspection to be  
15 similar to what would occur in a residential home.

16 Q. And I think that was brought about by an amendment to  
17 the 1980 Education Act?

18 A. That's right, a significant amendment to the 1980 Act.

19 Q. On page 33, at 1.3.11, you have a discussion on the  
20 nature and scope, in particular, of the guidelines that  
21 were to be promulgated; can you take me through that?

22 A. There would be general inspection of the schools by HM  
23 Inspector of Schools, not just on education, but on  
24 welfare. All schools, independent schools and Local  
25 Authority boarding schools would be subject to similar

1 inspections. There would be a rota of inspections, and  
2 I think I state there or later that it was agreed that  
3 it should be at five-year intervals.

4 And that there would be an add-on inspection for  
5 schools catering for special educational needs, SEN.  
6 And that was because of the integrated nature of the  
7 provision being provided there, both extensive social  
8 work provision along with educational provision.

9 Q. And you indicate, towards the end of that particular  
10 paragraph, that the guidelines indicated that the SWSI  
11 inspectors would normally not be a part of the HMI  
12 inspection team.

13 A. That's correct. And I think later on, I think in  
14 1.3.13, 1.3.14, the Minister of State announces --  
15 I think it's the Minister of State -- in Parliament that  
16 both the Social Work Service Inspectorate and HM  
17 Inspector of Schools work closely. And if there was  
18 an issue, the HM Inspector of Schools would ask for  
19 advice from the Social Work Services Inspectorate. But  
20 that welfare, the welfare function of schools would fall  
21 on the HM Inspector of Schools.

22 Q. Essentially, there are inspections being carried out by  
23 the HMI inspector that are looking to both education and  
24 welfare?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And Local Authority inspections as well?

2 A. The school would be inspected by HM Inspector of Schools  
3 for welfare purposes, though I think I state later on  
4 that an issue emerged that that would -- that implied  
5 that the HM Inspector of Schools would have to go under  
6 some sort of training, some form of training, for them  
7 to be able to assess the welfare of schoolchildren in  
8 residential school.

9 LADY SMITH: And do I take it that you had the impression  
10 that, at least initially, what the SWSI inspectors had  
11 to offer was regarded as, if you like, subservient to  
12 what the HMIE inspector could offer? And it was  
13 dependent on the HMIE inspector saying, "I think they  
14 might be able to help", or "Give me guidance, because  
15 I want to draw them in"? But the lead always came from  
16 the education side; was that it?

17 A. Outside of SEN schools, that is Special Educational  
18 Schools, the issue -- if you like, the wider issue is  
19 that a residential school did not necessarily have  
20 issues concerning social work amongst its pupils and,  
21 therefore, why would you say there should be joint  
22 inspections of Social Work Services Inspectorate?

23 LADY SMITH: The short answer might be that the care and  
24 welfare of children is just as important as their  
25 education, if not more so. Children who are properly

1           cared for and their welfare attended to might just learn  
2           better.

3   A.   The issue, as presented here, was that the HM Inspector  
4           of Schools would undertake training, and I think in the  
5           report it does indicate that training was offered and  
6           that new staff were brought on board, who had been  
7           appropriately trained to conduct that sort of exercise.

8   MR MACAULAY: Did you find any actual evidence of training?

9   A.   I couldn't locate specific documents, except that the  
10           statements -- yes, these inspectors have undertaken  
11           special training.

12   Q.   Just to go back to the Local Authorities, the Local  
13           Authorities had the duty to carry out inspections of  
14           schools registering with the Local Authority?

15   A.   Registering, but not necessarily inspecting.

16           I think it's quite important to understand that if  
17           there's not a social work issue, right, why would you  
18           employ professionally trained social workers to conduct  
19           an inspection?

20   Q.   Yes.

21           And on page 35, beginning at 1.3.14, you discuss the  
22           format -- that the inspections would take place?

23   A.   Yes.

24   Q.   Can you just develop that for me?

25   A.   The first phase would be conducting an inspection

1 unannounced, two or three days with a small team of two  
2 or three inspectors, gather the information, have  
3 discussions, talk to pupils, and also seek out parents  
4 to talk to in relation to provision of education and  
5 also care and welfare of the pupils at the school.

6 Q. So quite a broad jurisdiction?

7 A. It is, yes, and a significant change from the previous  
8 period.

9 Q. Yes. When we looked at the past, what happened:  
10 children were not spoken to.

11 A. Children were not spoken to.

12 Q. Certainly not parents?

13 A. Certainly not parents, except in class. From my memory  
14 of a school inspector coming in, we were asked questions  
15 about the school inspector. That was the only occasion  
16 I seem to remember a school inspector engaging with  
17 a pupil.

18 Q. Thereafter there would be a second announced visit?

19 A. Yes. The second announced visit where any issues had  
20 been identified or specific concerns. The Minister  
21 would be informed, especially if complaints had been  
22 raised. They would look at the issue of pupil  
23 attendance, absence or exclusion, and that the Minister,  
24 Scottish Office Minister, who held the brief for  
25 education, was quite satisfied with that new approach.



1 Q. If we move on to page 36, at 1.3.17; do you tell us that  
2 following upon that second stage, the HM Inspector of  
3 Schools were provided with a framework evaluation to  
4 complete the report?

5 A. That's right. That would include looking at preventive  
6 arrangements, such as supervision and checks for child  
7 protection and safety, emergency arrangements for --  
8 avenues for complaints, knowledge that staff have of  
9 pupils, opportunities for pupils to influence the  
10 running of the residents' food and diet, and the whole  
11 philosophy in practice of nurturing welfare within the  
12 school.

13 Q. If we move on to page 37, at 1.3.21, does the HM  
14 Inspector of Schools Report, in April 1999, that the  
15 guidelines being followed had stood up well?

16 A. Yes, they were obviously quite pleased with the way that  
17 the pilots had been implemented, and they would now  
18 formulate the procedure to be adopted in conducting  
19 inspections as a result of the pilot study.

20 Q. You draw attention here, and I think previously --  
21 although I hadn't picked it up with you -- and that's  
22 the role of laymembers, the role they had to play. Can  
23 you just tell me about that?

24 A. Laymembers were appointed to assist the inspection of  
25 the residential school. I have to say, it's not very

1 clear from the evidence that I looked at as to what part  
2 they actually played within the actual inspection. This  
3 is the reports were retained, or the paper surrounding  
4 the reports that were retained, don't say very much  
5 about the use of laymembers in conducting an inspection.

6 Q. You tell us in the footnote, 102, that in 2002 it was  
7 reported that there were around 100 laymembers in the  
8 inspection team?

9 A. That's right, yes. That's about as far as I got.

10 Q. Quite a large number.

11 A. Quite a large number. But given that they would not be  
12 engaged in inspections all the time and inspections were  
13 across the whole of Scotland, it's probably not a large  
14 number. My understanding was that they might have two  
15 or three, at most, laymembers in any one inspection.

16 LADY SMITH: Can you remind me what the thinking was behind  
17 including laymembers?

18 A. It was partly, I think, to satisfy public opinion that  
19 any review of educational provision, including welfare,  
20 was being reviewed not just separately within the  
21 education sphere, but within the general public  
22 interest; that's all.

23 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

24 MR MACAULAY: I think you mentioned earlier there was  
25 a children's charter that spoke about this.

1 A. That's right, way back in 1991, 1992, the children's  
2 charter, seeking to involve the public and ensuring  
3 public support for the conduct of the inspections that  
4 were taking place.

5 Q. On page 38, at 1.3.22, you indicate that a separate set  
6 of guidelines for the final inspection of independent  
7 boarding schools --

8 A. Ahead of registration?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. Ahead of registration, yes.

11 Q. That was published in July 2000.

12 A. That's right, yes. Clearly, there was a distinction  
13 between those schools already registered and new schools  
14 who had not been registered, and the process you would  
15 follow when you were conducting an inspection and the  
16 registrar making a recommendation to Scottish Ministers  
17 that the school could be registered. That would include  
18 accommodation, staffing resources, the views of Social  
19 Services Registering Authority, where in fact pupils had  
20 been placed by local social services, provision of  
21 support for pupils, pastoral care, personal and social  
22 and health development, and the support offered to  
23 boarding pupils within the residence.

24 Q. And a point to -- an important addition that emanates  
25 from the Standards in Scotland Schools Act 2000 in

1 relation to the welfare of children.

2 A. That's right, yes. That meant that the registrar had to  
3 take into account the welfare of the pupils attending  
4 the school was adequately safeguarded and promoted.  
5 And, therefore, if they weren't, then the -- the school  
6 would not be registered, and a school could be  
7 deregistered if they were not adequately safeguarding  
8 and promoting the welfare of the pupils within the  
9 school.

10 Q. At paragraph 1.3.23, on that page and into the following  
11 page; do you pull together what you have been discussing  
12 in the previous paragraphs?

13 A. Clearly, it was more in depth than in the previous  
14 period, and that the HM Inspector of Schools was  
15 expected to undertake training and child protection.

16 Certainly, the HMI Inspection Reports I looked at  
17 before 1995 would indicate very limited amount of  
18 interest in pastoral care and certainly in terms of  
19 residential schools, seemed to be concerning the quality  
20 of food.

21 Q. You then have a section, 1.4, headed:

22 "Secure accommodation."

23 You set out provisions from the Social Work  
24 (Scotland) Act and subsequent related legislation and  
25 regulations that set out how a young person could be

1 placed in secure unit accommodation?

2 A. That's correct. In 1992, that wasn't any different from  
3 the previous period; had a history of absconding; that  
4 their physical, mental and moral welfare would be at  
5 risk, were likely to injure themselves or other persons,  
6 or had been placed by the Court Secretary of State  
7 Social Work Department on remand or committed as  
8 a result of a grave offence.

9 Q. You say that in 1986, apart from two schools, the  
10 financial responsibility of List D schools was  
11 transferred to Local Authorities, which resulted either  
12 in their use as part of a portfolio of residential homes  
13 or closure.

14 A. That's correct. I think I've covered that in the second  
15 report I did.

16 Q. Yes. But the two schools where the Secretary of State  
17 shared responsibility were Rossie and St Mary's Kenmure?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. They were two of the larger --

20 A. Two of the larger that had been retained.

21 Q. Yes. You may have touched upon this, but the SWSI  
22 assumed the responsibility previously exercised by CAS  
23 for the inspection of secure accommodation?

24 A. It was the same officials. If you actually look at the  
25 name of the officials before, it's the same inspector.

1 Q. Just a change in name?

2 A. Without giving his name; right? It's the same inspector  
3 who tours Rossie and St Mary's Kenmure, in 1991 and  
4 1992, and you can see that in the list of duties within  
5 the Social Work Service Inspectorate of the period.

6 Q. Now, if we go on to the following page, you give us some  
7 information about the number of beds available in  
8 Scotland. At that time -- towards the top of the  
9 page -- you say the number was less than 90?

10 A. That's correct. There was considerable discussion in  
11 that period as to the suitability of secure  
12 accommodation for children with -- and young people with  
13 specific needs, and whether the number in Scotland was  
14 far higher than in comparison, in proportionate terms,  
15 to that south of the border. And the issue surrounding  
16 whether or not the bed accommodation should be increased  
17 or not.

18 Q. I think we see, later, there was an increase?

19 A. There was certainly a series of incidents which led to  
20 the Minister effectively insisting that the  
21 accommodation should be increased.

22 Q. Was that a generally held view or not?

23 A. I think there was a lot of discussion, and I think there  
24 still is a lot of discussion, on the nature of secure  
25 accommodation and its appropriateness for young people.

1           And certainly there was a body of opinion at the time,  
2           in 1992/1993, that thought that the number 90 was  
3           adequate.

4    Q.   I see here that you indicate that if there was  
5           insufficient accommodation in Scotland a child could be  
6           committed to a secure unit in England?

7    A.   That's correct, yes.

8    Q.   Now, you go on to tell us about the drafting of secure  
9           accommodation regulations, and in particular restating  
10          the proposition that secure accommodation had to be  
11          approved by the Secretary of State.

12   A.   That's correct, yes.  On such terms as he thinks fit,  
13          which meant that -- after inspection.

14   Q.   Yes.  And the change in principle, I think that you talk  
15          about in the bottom end of that paragraph, you say:

16                 "Additionally the Draft Secure Accommodation in 1996  
17                 Regulations covering the welfare of children reflected  
18                 the principle underlying the 1995 Act, that a child's  
19                 welfare should be safeguarded and promoted.  Instead of  
20                 the principle of Local Authority ensuring the child's  
21                 care should be conducive to their best interests."

22                 There is a change of emphasis there.

23   A.   There is a change of emphasis and, of course, that  
24          correlated with -- if you like, with the nature of  
25          inspection of boarding schools generally.

1 Q. Did that mean then that the inspections after the  
2 passing of the regulations were centred on a broader  
3 concept?

4 A. On a broader concept, which included obviously --  
5 I think later on it said about the issue of a care plan  
6 and that a secure accommodation unit should have its own  
7 development plan, its care plan for the child and young  
8 person within the accommodation. And that was different  
9 from what had occurred previously, where there wouldn't  
10 necessarily be any specific plan for the child or young  
11 person in the accommodation.

12 Q. And would this care plan be, for example, looking ahead  
13 to --

14 A. It would be an assessment of their physical, mental,  
15 educational needs. It would obviously have to  
16 incorporate the views of the relevant medical,  
17 educational and social work authorities as to the best  
18 plan for that young person within the accommodation.

19 Q. So there's this broader concept of care than previously.

20 I think you say also that an inspection by SWSI  
21 could also be in conjunction with the HMI inspector?

22 A. Correct. That was the position prior to 1995 and prior  
23 to 1991.

24 I think the issues that emerged -- and I think you  
25 might want to talk about it later -- is the fact you had



1 integrated inspections in the way that you didn't  
2 necessarily have before 1995; that is the social work  
3 service inspector and the HMI inspector would both  
4 inspect the premises at the same time and, on occasions,  
5 sometimes the medical officer of the Department of  
6 Health would conduct an inspection at the same time. So  
7 you had an integrated inspection to reflect the fact  
8 that you had a care plan.

9 Q. Yes. At 1.6, then, you are providing us with  
10 an overview of what has gone before; can you just  
11 summarise that for us?

12 A. I think --

13 Q. It's 1.4.6.

14 A. Sorry, 1.4.6. Sorry, I'm flicking ahead of myself.

15 Q. It's on page 41.

16 A. Yes, I know. Yes, yes, yes.

17 The key element surrounded the issue of being more  
18 deliberative, as I say here, about the care plan, that  
19 it was especially with a child or young person. That  
20 the Social Work Inspectorate, HMI Inspector of Schools,  
21 retained their inspection function of secure  
22 accommodation, but with a deepened focus. And that, as  
23 I said, looking at the integrated nature of the care  
24 plan, in terms of both health and educational needs, as  
25 well as social needs.

1 Q. You have a short section, at 1.5, dealing with the  
2 provision for local inquiries. This is something that  
3 comes out of the 1995 Act; can you just tell us what  
4 this involved?

5 A. Yes. I think the issue that surrounded the 1995 Act was  
6 that the then Scottish Office had obviously been obliged  
7 to or agreed to conduct public inquiries into both the  
8 Orkney and the Fife issues.

9 These were quite expensive and took some time. The  
10 view at the time -- the view within the Act was that  
11 Local Authorities should initially conduct an inquiry,  
12 which would be a shorter time and so that any lessons  
13 that emerged could be learnt very quickly and be  
14 implemented within the Local Authority.

15 Q. At 1.5.3 -- I think you just touched upon this,  
16 page 42 -- such an approach, you put in brackets, which  
17 in the author's view was to avoid recommending to the  
18 Secretary of State a public inquiry was used by SWSI,  
19 and so on and so forth.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And it was a quicker and shorter --

22 A. A quicker and shorter --

23 Q. -- a probably less expensive way of --

24 A. Less expensive. It was -- expenses were met by the  
25 Local Authority and not by central government. And in

1           this case, within I think two years, the situation had  
2           been resolved to the satisfaction of the Social Work  
3           Inspectorate.

4   Q.   You provide us with examples in that paragraph and in  
5           paragraph 1.4 --

6   A.   Yes.

7   Q.   -- and I think in relation to the Marshal Inquiry?

8   A.   Yes.

9   Q.   The Edinburgh Inquiry.

10  A.   Yes.

11  Q.   At 1.1.5, do you draw attention to the fact that  
12           implementing the 135 recommendations of the Edinburgh  
13           Inquiry was essentially a matter for the City Council?

14  A.   That's correct, yes.

15  Q.   Does one get the impression that the SWSI, for example,  
16           did not want to get involved in this process?

17  A.   I think the SWSI understood the implications of the 1995  
18           Act.  In the first case, the matter was for Edinburgh  
19           City Council to resolve itself.  And if there was an  
20           issue that emerged, that they were unwilling to do it,  
21           then it might be necessary to advise the Scottish  
22           Ministers of the need for a public inquiry.

23           From my reading of the papers, Edinburgh did not  
24           necessarily realise that they could hold their own  
25           inquiry, until advised by the Social Work Service

1 Inspectorate that they could and they did.

2 Q. And it produced 135 recommendations?

3 A. 135 recommendations for the City Council, yes.

4 Q. You then have a section headed:

5 "Central inspection and national standards of care."

6 Can you just give me an overview as to what you are  
7 seeking to cover in this particular section?

8 A. In this particular section, there was clearly  
9 an election manifesto promise by the incoming Government  
10 that they would establish national standards of care and  
11 that -- and I think initially it was for elderly people  
12 and elderly people's homes, but then was broadened to  
13 cover children's homes as well and other residential  
14 accommodation for children.

15 And a series of meetings and working groups and  
16 working papers produced a number of papers, which set  
17 out the national standards of care that would be  
18 implemented with the establishment of the Care  
19 Commission in 2002.

20 Q. We are looking now at the lead-up to the  
21 establishment --

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. -- of the Care Commission under the 2001 Act?

24 A. That's correct, yes, yes. That's the sort of background  
25 to why you actually had national standards of care

1 coming into force.

2 Q. In paragraph 1.6.3, you draw attention to a Scottish  
3 Office White Paper, aiming for excellence modernising  
4 social work services in Scotland. It was this that  
5 really prompted the legislation to establish what we  
6 call the Care Commission.

7 A. That's right, yes, yes. It was a parallel, really, to  
8 the issue of care for the elderly.

9 Q. Yes. Then if we go on to page 46, at 1.6.9; do you  
10 summarise there the post-2001 Act position in as far as  
11 the Care Commission was concerned?

12 A. Yes, the Care Commission took over the responsibilities  
13 of the arm's length inspections of Local Authorities,  
14 the inspection of registration of children's homes and  
15 in the fostering of looked-after children. It also  
16 included the Social Work Service Inspectorate's  
17 responsibility for inspection of secure accommodation.  
18 Although, of course, the registration of secure  
19 accommodation remained with Scottish Ministers, and  
20 I think it's quite important to understand the  
21 distinction between inspection and registration.

22 Q. Just so I can fully understand it: if you want to be  
23 registered, you have to satisfy the Scottish Ministers  
24 that you comply with the relevant standards?

25 A. The Care Commission would have to inform Scottish

1 Ministers that they were satisfied that the secure  
2 accommodation unit met the relevant national care  
3 standards.

4 Q. Would the Care Commission, in coming to a view, would  
5 that be a paper exercise or would they --

6 A. It would be the result of an actual inspection.  
7 Obviously, reviewing the papers that the secure unit  
8 had, but also looking very closely at the result of the  
9 inspection.

10 Q. So accommodation would be a relevant factor?

11 A. Accommodation would be a relevant factor, as well as  
12 all -- what I previously said about safeguarding.

13 Q. You tell us that the SWSI continued to review deaths of  
14 looked-after children.

15 A. Yes, initially -- I should also say the Social Work  
16 Services Inspectorate retained inspection of secure  
17 accommodation simply because of the necessity to train  
18 staff within the new Care Commission to conduct that.  
19 But, in addition, of course the Social Work Services  
20 Inspectorate retained the brief to review deaths in care  
21 and recommend further action by Scottish Ministers or  
22 the closure of the case to Scottish Ministers.

23 Q. And the 2001 Act, the Regulation of Care Scotland Act  
24 2001, did not then impact upon the role being played by  
25 the HM Inspectorate of Education?

1 A. No, it did not, no. They were still responsible for the  
2 inspection, including the welfare of boarding schools.

3 Q. Do I take it from what you have said then that the Local  
4 Authority has really fallen out of the picture?

5 A. Local Authorities are no longer part of the picture of  
6 the registration and inspection of residential  
7 accommodation.

8 Q. So then if we move on to page 47, as is, I think, your  
9 practice, at paragraph 1.7, you provide an overview of  
10 this particular section we've been looking at; are you  
11 able very quickly to summarise that for us?

12 A. The Inspectorate powers remained very much the same in  
13 1992 as it had previously, that the Social Work  
14 Inspectorate certainly inspected secure accommodation  
15 and reviewed deaths in care, but did not, unless  
16 specifically required by the Secretary of State to  
17 conduct any further inspection of Local Authority  
18 services. That brief remained, if you like, throughout  
19 the period.

20 The significant change really occurred as a result  
21 of HM Inspector of Schools being empowered to conduct  
22 an inspection of residential schools in terms of the  
23 care and welfare of residential pupils.

24 Q. The one thing you do say is the SWSI was not a large  
25 organisation.

1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. And I think you did mention they essentially inherited  
3 the personnel from CAS?

4 A. From what I can see, it was the same personnel from CAS,  
5 and the number of inspectors who, if you like, reviewed  
6 and oversaw childcare and looked-after children remained  
7 the same. I think one assistant chief social work  
8 inspector, plus three or four other inspectors, one of  
9 whom conducted the reviews of deaths in care and also  
10 seemed primarily responsible for inspecting secure  
11 accommodation in this period.

12 Q. Section 2 of the report, Professor, looks at deaths in  
13 care over this period, 1992 to 2005 and you begin that  
14 exercise on page 50 of the report.

15 You begin, at 2.1, by looking at the administrative  
16 procedures after deaths of looked-after children in  
17 care; can you perhaps summarise how that operated in  
18 practice?

19 A. In practice -- and this dated from 1962 -- the Local  
20 Authority, as I think I said previously, should  
21 telephone Social Work Services Group within one working  
22 day, with the details of the child, the legal  
23 circumstances of their being looked after, and the brief  
24 details of the cause and circumstances of their death,  
25 if known. Then that should be confirmed in writing,



1 with the death certificate as soon as available and,  
2 within a month, the Social Work Services Group will be  
3 sent a detailed report of supporting information of the  
4 relevant documentation.

5 Q. Quite strict time limits?

6 A. Quite strict time limits to get the information in, yes,  
7 yes.

8 Q. Would the subsequent report also make clear if material  
9 about the parents or anyone of parental responsibility  
10 had been informed of the death and what support may have  
11 been given to family?

12 A. Any parent of the child would be given support in terms  
13 of the death of the child, if they were fostered or in  
14 a residential home.

15 Q. You go on to tell us what the procedures would involve  
16 once the report had been made and reviewed, and you deal  
17 with that at page 2.1.3.

18 Can you just tell us about what points would be  
19 relevant here?

20 A. I can't be absolutely certain of the position before the  
21 1995 Act. But, certainly in 2002, the information that  
22 would be supplied or expected to be supplied by the  
23 Local Authority would concern the arrangements for the  
24 child's welfare, assessment of whether action had been  
25 taken or not by the Local Authority in contributing to

1 the child's death, identifying any lessons which need to  
2 be drawn to the attention of the responsible authority,  
3 or other authority or agencies, and if necessary as  
4 a result of that case, review the legislation, policy,  
5 guidelines or practice implications of the case or  
6 emerging trends, which might result in the regulations  
7 concerning looked-after children being altered.

8 Q. There is also some medical input from the Health  
9 Department's Medical Centre?

10 A. Yes. As really dating from 1962, the papers would be  
11 sent to the Department of Health Medical Officer, who  
12 would review the papers and come to a judgment on  
13 whether or not any further information would be  
14 required.

15 Q. You provide us, on page 52, at 2.1.5, the statistics,  
16 I think for the period 1989 to 1998, a 10-year time  
17 period.

18 A. Yes, yes. As you can see, approximately half the deaths  
19 were attributed to natural causes; nearly a quarter of  
20 the cases, substance misuse; road traffic accidents.  
21 Then a list of others, such as fall from building,  
22 drowning, hanging, accidental, hanging suicide, house  
23 fire, murder and accident.

24 Q. Are you able to say now how that number compares to  
25 previous 10 years, for example?

1 A. It's not absolutely clear. I'm fairly confident that  
2 was broadly the number of the previous decade and  
3 subsequent decade, from published sources. But that's  
4 not necessarily the actual distribution in terms of  
5 cause of death.

6 Q. The next section then you begin to look at deaths. At  
7 2.2, you have a number of case examples where we have  
8 deaths from natural causes, and you provide these  
9 examples.

10 Can you see the first three examples, for example  
11 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5, that you are looking at the deaths of  
12 children who were severely or profoundly disabled?

13 A. That's correct, yes. I wanted to ensure the Inquiry  
14 understood some of the circumstances of the deaths of  
15 children from natural causes and that one would not  
16 simply concentrate on this report on deaths from other  
17 causes. So you could see that it was clearly stated as  
18 the result of the review by Social Work and Service  
19 Inspectorate, Department of Health's Medical Officer,  
20 that everything possible had been done for the welfare  
21 of the child pre their death.

22 Q. In these cases.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. We are looking at children, the first one is by age 14.  
25 We then have an eight-year-old profoundly disabled

1 child, at 2.2, and then there is an 11-year-old girl,  
2 who, again, who had cerebral palsy.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So disabled children who probably did not have  
5 a significant lifespan in any event.

6 A. Their life expectancy was not very long.

7 Q. Then, at 2.6, you give examples, under example 4, of  
8 a number of infants who died, again, as a result of  
9 natural causes, but whose mothers were substance  
10 misusers.

11 A. That's right, yes. I wanted to bring out certainly one  
12 case at least, where there were concerns surrounding the  
13 support given to the child in the circumstances of the  
14 mother's substance misuse.

15 LADY SMITH: That was the case where there was a home  
16 delivery, and when the child died at a matter of months  
17 old, criticism of the agreement to do a home delivery in  
18 the first place, where the sort of support the child  
19 would have had in the maternity unit wouldn't have been  
20 available.

21 A. We need to bring out the depth of the review that was  
22 taking place with the Social Work Inspectorate and the  
23 Medical Officer.

24 Q. Clearly, the children that you are looking at there are  
25 vulnerable children.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You have a section dealing with deaths from road traffic  
3 accidents. I think you provide just one example of  
4 that, and this is in connection with a 15-year-old boy,  
5 who had been known to the social work department for  
6 a number of years.

7 A. Yes, that's correct. I'm sorry, I couldn't get any more  
8 in, but it depended on extent of the papers that were  
9 surviving.

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. And this certainly came across as indicating, again, the  
12 extent of review undertaken by Social Work Services  
13 Inspectorate and the Department of Health's Medical  
14 Officer. And in this particular case, the issue  
15 surrounded the involvement, sustained involvement of  
16 psychological services to support the boy, and the  
17 criticism that perhaps more should have been done.

18 Q. This was a boy who had had a number of different  
19 placements, I think?

20 A. Yes. Had a history of absconding from the placements,  
21 often involved breaking into and out, driving cars,  
22 et cetera.

23 Q. He had an attraction, I think, to stealing cars?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. That's what sadly killed him, in that he was in a stolen

1 car with three others from Kibble(?), I think, and was  
2 critically injured?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. Your conclusion in relation to these cases that you've  
5 been looking at, at 2.3.3, on page 56; what's your view?

6 A. The evidence suggests that from the review of the deaths  
7 in care that the Social Work Services Inspectorate and  
8 the Department of Health's Medical Officer was  
9 reasonably satisfied with the services that had been  
10 offered to the particular children involved, and that  
11 they could advise Scottish Ministers that the cases  
12 could be closed. And a formal letter would be issued.

13 Q. That was the procedure?

14 A. That was the procedure, yes. And I think I want to  
15 bring out very clearly that there was a formal procedure  
16 of reviewing and then closing the case.

17 Q. That's quite important, because I think we see later on  
18 that may not quite have been followed?

19 A. Precisely, yes, yes.

20 Q. We then have a section, Professor, dealing with deaths  
21 caused by an accident. This is at 2.4. I think you  
22 give one example and in this case, in 2001, you tell us  
23 that an 18-month-old boy, who was being looked after by  
24 an elderly carer, strayed unnoticed out of the garden  
25 and his body was found in a nearby stream, evidently

1           drowned.

2                   What transpired in this particular instance?

3   A.   What transpired, and it's quite a substantial file on  
4        this one --

5   Q.   Can I just say this was very much to your credit, some  
6        of these files are hundreds of pages long.

7   A.   Yes, I know.

8   Q.   They're not -- but this shows you, I suppose, the amount  
9        of work that goes --

10  A.   That's what I was trying to bring out, that the extent  
11       of review was substantial.  And in this particular case,  
12       the officials concerned, the Inspectorate and officials  
13       concerned looked in detail at what occurred and the  
14       lessons that this particular Local Authority should  
15       learn in terms of the appropriateness or not of the  
16       foster carers.

17  Q.   And there was a failure here --

18  A.   There was a failure of procedures within the Local  
19       Authority.

20  LADY SMITH:  You describe the carer as elderly, without  
21       giving us an indication of what age that was; did you  
22       have an indication?

23  A.   I think retired.

24  LADY SMITH:  Retired.

25  MR MACAULAY:  But I think the message that comes out of the

1 material, and I think possibly your own analysis, is  
2 that the carer was not able to keep up with a child that  
3 was beginning to move.

4 A. With a toddler, not -- moving around quite speedily, and  
5 the elderly carer could not keep up with the pace and  
6 lost sight of the child.

7 Q. Was the essential point here that the placement was  
8 designed to be a short placement?

9 A. It was designed to be a short placement, which might  
10 have been acceptable. But turned out to be a long  
11 placement, which clearly is unacceptable, and breached  
12 the Local Authority's guidelines.

13 Q. During the extended period, the child became more  
14 active, and that's what led to the child's death?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. At 2.4, you indicate this particular case brought out  
17 two issues in the Scottish Executive's approach to the  
18 review of deaths; can you tell us what these were?

19 A. I think the Inspectorate and the Young Person and Looked  
20 After Children's Division -- sorry, long name -- they  
21 saw it as their principal function, to assist Local  
22 Authorities to develop best practice.

23 They were not necessarily discharging any statutory  
24 duty in undertaking a review, but it highlighted the  
25 importance of these reviews in ensuring that best



1 practice was kept up-to-date within Local Authorities.  
2 And the information would obviously be supplied, not  
3 necessarily the details of the case, but, if you like,  
4 the broad nature of the death and the breach of the  
5 regulations within this particular council to other  
6 Local Authorities.

7 Q. Your next section is:

8 "Deaths connected to substance misuse and alcohol."

9 We're still on page 57. And the first example, at  
10 2.5.2, is one of a boy, 14-year-old boy, in 2001, who  
11 died from:

12 "The aspiration of gastric contents following the  
13 consumption of alcohol."

14 Can you just describe what happened here?

15 A. Well, the parents of the boy had purchased alcohol for  
16 themselves and the boy and his brother. They  
17 obviously -- the boy obviously drank too much, became  
18 unwell during the night, but was, after an ambulance was  
19 called, pronounced dead on admission to hospital.

20 The child was being looked after under terms of  
21 a home supervision for a substantial period of time, had  
22 been placed on the Child Protection Register in  
23 consequence of the conviction of the father for indecent  
24 assault. So this was a case where the family were  
25 certainly known to the Local Authority for some time.

1 Q. Looking to what the SWSI Inspector recommended, at  
2 2.5.3; did he recommend that the Local Health Board  
3 Trust should look at the effectiveness of local  
4 arrangements for providing young people and their  
5 parents with alcohol counselling?

6 A. That's right, yes. Clearly, there ought to have been  
7 a better risk assessment and advice given in such cases.  
8 I don't think they necessarily said that the boy should  
9 have been placed with the parents. But, nevertheless,  
10 there was certainly criticism of the support given.

11 Q. Did it also transpire that this boy suffered from  
12 epilepsy, at 2.5.5?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. And for the year preceding his death, he had not  
15 received his epilepsy medication?

16 A. Yes. I thought this was an important case to bring to  
17 the Inquiry's attention because you can see the depth of  
18 the Medical Officer's -- Department of Health's Medical  
19 Officer's review of the case and his concern in terms of  
20 the support given, given that the child -- the boy  
21 suffered from epilepsy.

22 Q. Was there a recommendation made that if children have  
23 ongoing medical problems -- during a home supervision  
24 requirement -- with a chronic disorder, there should be  
25 discussions between health and education services?

1 A. Yes. I think this brings out the fact that what you've  
2 got is a particular local issue, resulting in guidance  
3 being given both locally and nationally, in terms of  
4 alcohol and drug abuse.

5 MR MACAULAY: My Lady, that is coming up to a quarter to.

6 LADY SMITH: We'll take the morning break just now,  
7 Professor Levitt, and sit again around midday. Thank  
8 you.

9 (11.44 am)

10 (A short break)

11 (12.00 pm)

12 LADY SMITH: Welcome back, Professor Levitt. Are you ready  
13 for us to carry on?

14 A. Yes, thank you.

15 LADY SMITH: Thank you. Mr MacAulay.

16 MR MACAULAY: My Lady.

17 Now, if we turn to page 59 and look at the next  
18 example that you give under this head, at 2.5.6, this is  
19 another case in the same year, which is 2001. A teenage  
20 girl, who was subject to a supervision requirement with  
21 a condition to reside at a young people's centre, but  
22 was on home leave when her mother died after a fall from  
23 a boyfriend's flat.

24 Can you just highlight what the problems were here?

25 A. Yes, again, I wanted to bring out the depth of the

1        inspectorial review of the case papers, which is  
2        interesting in itself, that they certainly spent a lot  
3        of time on this particular case.

4            Although the Local Authority had provided a full  
5        case history and accounts leading to the events, it  
6        appeared to the Inspectorate that there were  
7        deficiencies in the care being provided; that there had  
8        been lack of long-term care planning and case  
9        management, and there was an issue surrounding the  
10       suitability of the placement resources.

11           And in addition, it was known to the Local Authority  
12        that there was a risk of the young girl residing with  
13        her mother and also her boyfriend, given their  
14        particular drink and drug history.

15    LADY SMITH: This was another case in 2001, I think, wasn't  
16        it? The same year as the previous one.

17    A. That's right, yes. And although the Medical Officer  
18        noted that medical help had been given for the girl's  
19        drug and alcohol misuse, that help had been refused.  
20        It would appear that she did eventually agree to see  
21        a counsellor on the issue.

22           There was certainly a lot of correspondence with the  
23        City Council, which was not necessarily to the  
24        satisfaction of the Inspectorate in terms of the process  
25        and procedures that the Local Authority had used to

1 support the girl.

2 Q. I think in the file -- although you don't flesh that out  
3 here -- there is a suggestion she may have jumped, in  
4 fact?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. After a row with her boyfriend.

7 A. Yes, that's right, but it's not clear whether that was  
8 the result of drug misuse or alcohol, or both.

9 Q. Can I just draw attention to one point, halfway down  
10 page 60? Because what you narrate there, Professor, is  
11 in one year alone, 1999/2000, there had been eight  
12 changes in placement, which pointed to a lack of  
13 suitable placement resources.

14 I think we have seen this quite regularly, that  
15 placements change and change.

16 A. Placements change and change, but the issue in this  
17 particular case, it would appear that the most  
18 appropriate placements were not being provided, which  
19 would have supported the girl in her misuse of alcohol  
20 and drugs.

21 Q. You then, at 2.6, have a section where you look at  
22 deaths of those who had been in residential homes.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You begin by telling us that the statistical breakdown  
25 of deaths in care, the 1988 to 1989 period, did not

1           indicate the number who died while being accommodated in  
2           residential care?

3   A.   Yes, correct.

4   Q.   So there are no statistics for that?

5   A.   No, but I hoped you might be interested in that.

6   Q.   That's well within our terms of reference.

7   A.   But, unfortunately, I couldn't provide you with details.

8   Q.   But the next case, 2.6, a boy who had drowned. I think  
9           he was -- yes, 2.6. Can you tell us about what happened  
10           here?

11   A.   Yes. This was a young boy who was in the care of  
12           a Local Authority. He drowned whilst swimming fully  
13           clothed during an organised outing, and the issues  
14           surrounded whether or not there should have been  
15           additional support for the outing, to ensure that there  
16           were sufficient life guards to support that particular  
17           outing.

18   Q.   This is a case in which there was an FAI; is that right?

19   A.   That's right, yes.

20   Q.   Before Sheriff Nigel Thomson. It was he, I think, who  
21           recommended, if you turn to page 62, that a panel of  
22           life saving social workers should be established. But  
23           I think the response to that was that would be difficult  
24           to ensure.

25   A.   It would be difficult to ensure, but they could give

1 a recommendation that clearly such outings would incur  
2 a risk if there weren't sufficient life guards in  
3 attendance.

4 Q. I was intrigued by the fact the suggestion is that this  
5 boy had drowned whilst swimming fully clothed. But,  
6 when you look at the file, what he was actually doing  
7 was swinging on a rope from the bank?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. With the intention of getting back to the bank, but in  
10 fact he fell into the water.

11 A. Right. I think the issue there was that he perhaps was  
12 not an accomplished swimmer, or perhaps couldn't swim at  
13 all. This is another issue that was brought out.

14 Q. The next example, this is a 15-year-old boy, who had  
15 been in a Strathclyde Regional Council home and was  
16 found hanged in a public lavatory in a nearby town.  
17 I think the home he had been in, according to the file,  
18 was Bells Hills children's home in Wishaw; can you tell  
19 me what happened here?

20 A. The Sheriff in the determination found there was no  
21 reason why the boy would take his own life, but it would  
22 be difficult for the Local Authority to assess what risk  
23 he might pose if he left an establishment that he was  
24 placed in.

25 There was clearly a background to his parents, the

1 objection of his mother, the attitude of his father, and  
2 that clearly the boy's state of mind wasn't particularly  
3 good during the period in which he was in care. And  
4 that there was clearly evidence of depressive illness in  
5 the boy.

6 The issue, I think in terms of inspection, was,  
7 again, the detail -- the review Medical Officer  
8 undertook, and the fact he contacted the Royal College  
9 of Psychiatrists and that they would meet with the  
10 directors of social work to discuss the issues of  
11 appropriate care for children with depressive illness as  
12 a result of their parents.

13 Q. At the end, you tell us at the same time the Chief  
14 Inspector of Social Work accepted that guidance should  
15 be provided on psychiatric services for all children in  
16 care or under supervision, and that it should also be  
17 available to the education service to residential and  
18 boarding schools?

19 A. That's right. Again, this case brings out the  
20 ramifications of this case in terms of taking guidelines  
21 and advice further.

22 Q. Your next example, on page 64, 2.6.5, again, this is  
23 a boy, 16-year-old boy, who was found hanged in 1998,  
24 and he appears to have been in a bed and breakfast  
25 placement.



1 A. That's right.

2 Q. What happened in this case?

3 A. The death was attributed to suicide. There was no Fatal  
4 Accident Inquiry. There were clearly behavioural issues  
5 at home, which included alcohol and cannabis. Perhaps  
6 the use of heroin, although this is not sustained.  
7 A record of school truancy, and that the boy had been  
8 placed under Local Authority supervision.

9 The boy was educationally unsettled and moved  
10 between schools. And although the Medical Officer felt  
11 that the medical care was appropriate in this particular  
12 case, the Social Work Inspectorate had doubts as to the  
13 support given by Local Authorities and Social Services  
14 in terms of supporting him in education and also  
15 ensuring he was -- if you like, his care plan included  
16 both personal support as well as educational support.

17 There was also criticism of being placed in a B&B,  
18 rather than a residential home or with foster carers.

19 Q. At 2.6.7, as we have seen before, that for the three  
20 years preceding his death the boy had resided in seven  
21 settings and attended education in four settings.

22 A. That's correct, yes. Again, I thought you might be  
23 interested in this case because of the depth of review  
24 that the Social Work Services Inspectorate had and his  
25 assistance in obtaining more papers concerning the Local

1 Authority's support for education and in Personal Social  
2 Services.

3 Q. And the places that he was being placed into, the  
4 placements seemed to break down. But if we look at  
5 page 63, it's the quote from the report. Halfway down  
6 the quote, do we learn that two days before his death  
7 his social worker told him that he must move again, but  
8 could not tell him where he might go, other than to  
9 another hostel?

10 A. Yes. That again indicates the concern that the  
11 inspector had as to the -- not necessarily the  
12 relevance, but the significance, really, of the lack of  
13 support being given, being completely unclear as to  
14 where that young person would reside and the impact it  
15 would have on their mental well-being.

16 LADY SMITH: That's the quotation in 2.6.8, on page 65, not  
17 63, I think; is that right?

18 MR MACAULAY: Yes.

19 We see, at 2.6.9, the Inspector's concerns, and we  
20 see, at 2.6.10, that the HM Inspector of Schools agreed  
21 that the case made very sad reading and recommended that  
22 additional reports should be obtained, and he sets out  
23 what these would include.

24 Does it appear that after -- what you tell us at  
25 2.6.11 -- the case was not followed up?

1 A. That's correct, yes. Again, this case, I think, brings  
2 out to the Inquiry the significance of the use of the HM  
3 Inspector of Schools reviewing the case. It wasn't just  
4 simply a question of the Social Work Service Inspector  
5 and the Medical Officer, it was also the Education  
6 Inspector looking at the appropriateness of the  
7 schooling. Yes, the papers were lost, simple as that.

8 Q. They were eventually located a year later, and I think  
9 there was an agreement that no further information would  
10 be sought?

11 A. That's right, yes. The papers were lost and, by that  
12 time, clearly it was felt that there was no point in  
13 pursuing the case with the Local Authority.

14 Q. Do we see in some of these cases that they take  
15 considerable time to come to an end with the closure of  
16 the case, particularly if there's an FAI?

17 A. I think in many of these cases, particularly where --  
18 which concerned substance misuse or residential care,  
19 the depth of the review was such that the Social Work  
20 Services Inspectorate would have to consult with -- in  
21 this particular case with the Medical Officer and HMI,  
22 who would then have to get reports from the relevant  
23 schools, education authorities, local Social Work  
24 Services and also the NHS, the local health departments,  
25 and that could take time. And I think, yes, it's

1 something that I think I wanted to bring out, the actual  
2 length of time it would take to review quite problematic  
3 and quite difficult cases.

4 Q. The next example that you provide us with, Professor, on  
5 page 66 -- it is 2.6.12 -- and this is quite  
6 an important case, this one.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. It focuses on the lack of availability of secure care;  
9 is that correct?

10 A. That's correct. This is quite important in terms of the  
11 impact it had on policy and provision in subsequent  
12 years.

13 Q. So far as the facts are concerned, do we learn that in  
14 1996 a 15-year-old Dundee boy was murdered in a stabbing  
15 accident?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. He was subject to a residential supervision requirement  
18 by Tayside Regional Council, with a condition  
19 authorising secure care. But the Minister was informed  
20 that at the time no secure accommodation was available  
21 to the Local Authority and he was residing in "his own  
22 squat"?

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. Can you just develop for us what happened here?

25 A. There were clearly some issues concerning Tayside

1 Regional Council and the availability to secure suitable  
2 alternative accommodation in the absence of them being  
3 unable to place the boy in secure accommodation as  
4 Rossie, St Mary's Kenmure and the other small secure  
5 units were full at the time.

6 The boy had obviously been murdered, and four boys  
7 had been charged with that.

8 The Medical Officer, given a review of the case,  
9 found it was quite incredible that there was no secure  
10 accommodation available.

11 Clearly, the case and the depth of the review of the  
12 case indicated that -- by medical officers -- the child  
13 had not undergone any review by a psychiatrist or  
14 clinical psychologist, and very limited information as  
15 to the involvement of the Health Services throughout his  
16 career in care.

17 Q. You provide us -- I'll look at them in a moment -- with  
18 some quotations, I think from ministers. But if we look  
19 at 2.6.14, we talk about -- it says that according to  
20 the file a 17-year-old was convicted of the murder.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And two others, a culpable homicide and another of  
23 assault, but that's just by way of background.

24 But we see there that in response the Health  
25 Department's Senior Medical Officer reported that they

1 found it "quite incredible" that secure accommodation  
2 was not available when required, so that was the  
3 response to the proposition --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- that he was, as it were, in his own squat because  
6 a place could not be found.

7 A. A place could not be found suitable for his care needs.

8 Q. Was it accepted that had a place been found, then he  
9 probably would not have suffered the fate he did?

10 A. That was the view of the Social Work Services Inspector,  
11 that the death might have been prevented. Clearly, this  
12 boy had a history of absconding and committing various  
13 offences, clearly the children's panels who authorised  
14 placement in a secure accommodation accepted that was  
15 an appropriate place where he should be.

16 Q. We were told, at 2.6.15, that the children's panel were  
17 advised that the Local Authority could obtain a secure  
18 place in England?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. But I don't think the children's panel found that  
21 particularly attractive?

22 A. It wasn't particularly attractive. But I think the  
23 Inquiry needs to remember that ultimately the placement  
24 would depend on the Chief Social Work Officer of the  
25 Local Authority, and if they wished to secure a place in

1 England, I think the legislation allowed them to do so.

2 Q. Now --

3 LADY SMITH: No doubt there would be cost implications?

4 A. I'm not sure there would be an awful lot of difference  
5 in costs between being placed in Rossie, up the road  
6 from Dundee, than south of the border.

7 LADY SMITH: We have come to 1996 here; can you remind me  
8 whether by this time children from England were also  
9 being placed in secure accommodation in Scotland?  
10 Because I know that started to happen at some point and  
11 I just can't off the top of my head remember.

12 A. I haven't seen any figures suggesting that. There are  
13 odd references to English children being placed in  
14 Scotland. But, in terms of this particular case,  
15 I've no evidence that the secure accommodation was full  
16 because of placements from south of the border.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 At this particular time -- and this develops later,  
19 and this is the quote on 2.6.15, on page 67 -- are we  
20 told there was a review of secure care that was ongoing?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And in due course that reported then?

23 A. There was an ongoing discussion within the Scottish  
24 Office and within the Social Work Services Group  
25 involving outside consultants that believed at the time

1           that 90 places were all that were required, and that's  
2           the context in which this quote is placed.

3   Q.   If you look at 2.6.16, the Inspector has, halfway down  
4           that paragraph, noted two issues of concern.

5           First, it appeared that during the previous year the  
6           boy experienced a change in his social worker, and it  
7           was not fully evident who was consulted within the  
8           social work department in bringing the case to the  
9           children's panel.

10          Second, it was the usual practice within secure  
11          units that a child psychiatrist or clinical psychologist  
12          would be consulted.

13          So had he been put into a secure unit, then he it  
14          would have to him that sort of medical input?

15   A.   That is correct, yes. I think what's important with  
16          this case is that there was clearly an issue surrounding  
17          the procedures within local Social Services, that the  
18          boy's social worker seemed to change quite frequently,  
19          and that it was not fully evident who actually brought  
20          the case in the children's panel, from the papers that  
21          they received.

22          In addition, that some time prior to admission to  
23          the secure unit, a child psychiatrist or clinical  
24          psychologist would have been consulted and would  
25          therefore have been able to advise the appropriateness



1 of secure accommodation.

2 Q. At 2.6.17, have you set out in quotes the response of  
3 the Minister's Private Secretary?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Can you just tell us what -- I think there he's  
6 essentially narrating what the Minister's response was.

7 A. That he had been assured there was sufficient secure  
8 accommodation in Scotland. Again, that reflected  
9 ongoing discussion within the Social Work Services Group  
10 with their consultants, that 90 places was adequate.

11 Q. The quote ends:

12 "He [the Minister] feels that this verges on the  
13 absurd."

14 A. On the absurd. That a placement was required and one  
15 could not be found, given the length of time that they  
16 were waiting for a secure placement. And that they were  
17 left in the flat on their own.

18 Q. Was there also a suggestion here that other children's  
19 homes in Scotland had refused to accept this boy?

20 A. The boy had a record within a number of children's homes  
21 in terms of his behaviour, and I assume it simply got  
22 round the children's homes not to accept this boy.  
23 Hence probably why secure accommodation was thought  
24 appropriate.

25 Q. If we look at 2.6.22, on page 69, this is the Minister

1           himself agreeing with the recommendations and his  
2           Private Secretary minuting that. He's very concerned to  
3           learn that this episode arose because there was no  
4           secure accommodation available:

5           "He believes that should never be allowed to happen  
6           and that sufficient accommodation which is secure must  
7           be made available throughout Scotland."

8           So this provides ammunition at least for those who  
9           are trying to broaden the secure estate.

10    A. Yes. I think that it's quite important to understand  
11           that this is a ministerial direction being given to  
12           increase the secure accommodation estate in Scotland,  
13           and that the Minister was rejecting, if you like,  
14           professional advice coming in that 90 was an adequate  
15           number, given the needs of Scotland.

16    Q. It's clear the Minister is taking a pretty strong line  
17           here.

18    A. Extremely strong line, in terms of when ministers do or  
19           do not get involved in particular cases. But this shows  
20           that a death in care did result in ministerial  
21           intervention and ministerial direction as to future  
22           policy.

23    Q. Would this direction feed in then to the decision that  
24           was ultimately made to extend the secure --

25    A. Yes, I think I've got that in the following section.

1 Q. Yes.

2 The next example you give, on page 70, at 2.6.23,  
3 also raises the problem about the secure estate. But  
4 this is an example when, in 1999, the young person --  
5 that Looked-After Children's division, were informed of  
6 a 16-year-old girl in Glasgow from heroin toxicity at  
7 a private house. And she had been living in Local  
8 Authority supported accommodation and was very troubled,  
9 involved in drugs and prostitution; that's the  
10 background.

11 A. That's the background to this case, which again resulted  
12 in ministerial intervention and direction, and this was  
13 at a time when in fact the subsequent -- subsequent to  
14 the previous death, the secure estate had been increased  
15 and this was, therefore, an issue surrounding whether or  
16 not the secure estate was sufficiently developed to  
17 cater for such children who suffered from substance  
18 misuse, particularly girls.

19 Q. It appears from what you tell us in that paragraph that  
20 in this case the children's hearing decided she should  
21 be placed in secure accommodation, but the Glasgow  
22 Secure Screening Group decided not to recommend  
23 implementation of that order; what do you make of that?

24 A. This is the internal process of when a children's  
25 hearing makes a decision in terms of recommendation, the

1 local Social Services Review Group, decided after  
2 reviewing the papers that they would not actually  
3 implement the decision. This was not the view taken by  
4 Glasgow's Chief Social Worker, as to the decision within  
5 the Local Authority social work department for that  
6 decision to be reconsidered. In the meantime, the girl  
7 remained in supported accommodation, before her death.

8 LADY SMITH: Professor Levitt, in the third-last line in  
9 that paragraph, you quote that the girl was "presenting  
10 to herself", I'm not sure I follow that. Is that  
11 presenting as a risk to herself?

12 A. Presenting a risk to herself in terms of her substance  
13 misuse.

14 LADY SMITH: Right. So it's not just "presenting to  
15 herself", because that doesn't tell me very much.

16 A. No, no, what that means in professional language is she  
17 presents a risk to herself in consuming heroin.

18 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

19 MR MACAULAY: We see, at 2.6.24, the -- and I think this is  
20 when the Glasgow took the line it did in relation to  
21 secure care, because the Assistant Chief Social Worker  
22 Inspectorate minuted this:

23 "As I observed before, no reasons were given on the  
24 screening form for the decision not to implement the  
25 secure accommodation authorisation, despite the views of

1 the children's hearing, the social worker, the  
2 safeguarder, the psychologist (who had known xxxx for  
3 some years) and the residential key worker that should  
4 xxx continue along her present path, she will end up  
5 dead."

6 A. This is an example where, if you like, the main social  
7 work Inspector, who was reviewing the papers, sent the  
8 papers, if you like, upstairs to their Assistant Chief.  
9 The Assistant Chief who oversaw the children's and young  
10 person's brief within the Social Work Inspectorate. And  
11 I think it's significant that the papers, if you like,  
12 went upstairs, and you had an Assistant Chief Social  
13 Work Inspector effectively confirming the view that the  
14 child, young girl, should have been placed in secure  
15 accommodation.

16 So it's the procedural element also attached to it,  
17 that the papers were being reviewed further up the line  
18 and a decision being taken that this young girl should  
19 have been placed.

20 LADY SMITH: And, importantly, the procedural element  
21 involved in not recording reasons for failing to follow  
22 what had been recommended.

23 A. Yes. And I think the criticism, therefore, is quite  
24 important if it's coming from an Assistant Chief Social  
25 Work Inspector, if you like, number two in the Social

1 Work Services Inspectorate hierarchy.

2 MR MACAULAY: If you look at 2.6.28, on page 72; was this  
3 a case where a Fatal Accident Inquiry was announced in  
4 June 2000?

5 A. Yes, it was clearly the case that the Shadow Minister,  
6 who was also a local MP, contacted the Scottish  
7 Executive Minister for Education and Children, that they  
8 were concerned and wished a Fatal Accident Inquiry. And  
9 then there were subsequent papers, dealing with the  
10 issue of how to respond to the letter from the Shadow  
11 Minister.

12 Q. Can we see the Sheriff, Sheriff Agnes Duncan, I think,  
13 though not convinced that secure accommodation would  
14 have helped the girl in the long return, confirmed the  
15 concern on the availability of secure accommodation, and  
16 in her determination stated:

17 "No doubt secure accommodation is not the answer in  
18 the long term for such young persons, but there should  
19 be some secure accommodation, even as an interim  
20 measure, available for those young persons who, quite  
21 literally, have gone out of control, by way of drugs,  
22 and associated problems."

23 A. That's correct. So the Fatal Accident Inquiry Sheriff  
24 is basically confirming the view of the Social Work  
25 Services Inspectorate.

1 Q. She goes on to say on the following page, at the top:

2 "It was depressing to hear that the root of the  
3 problem, as usual, can be traced back to resources,  
4 facilities and funding."

5 A. That's right, yes, yes. And I think the next section  
6 then goes on to discuss the further extension, expansion  
7 of the secure estate, particularly for young girls.

8 LADY SMITH: Now, that was a statement made by the Sheriff  
9 in 1999; is that right? Sheriff Duncan?

10 MR MACAULAY: December --

11 LADY SMITH: Sorry, yes, the FAI was issued then, and the  
12 death was in 1999.

13 That's a statement from a Sheriff who by then was  
14 very experienced. She had been a Sheriff for many years  
15 and was in as good a position, if not better than  
16 anybody, to make an observation like that.

17 MR MACAULAY: What happened then following upon the  
18 Sheriff's determination?

19 I think you said there was an increase in the number  
20 of places.

21 A. There was an internal review, and I think the next  
22 section of the report --

23 Q. Deals with that.

24 A. Or -- there was that. Or there was an internal review  
25 which indicated that the secure estate should be

1 increased and particularly for young girls, whose  
2 numbers were requiring some form of secure care, at  
3 least from the children's hearing, was increasing.

4 Q. Then moving on to the next example, example 6, at  
5 2.6.31, page 73, and this is in January 2001 the death  
6 of a 14-year-old boy at Kerelaw and this is in the open  
7 unit and the cause of death was thought to be drugs  
8 related. Can you give us a description as to what  
9 happened in this case, Professor?

10 A. In this particular case, the boy had, I understand, been  
11 in and out of residential care for some time and had  
12 been placed at Kerelaw's open unit for their own safety.

13 The boy in this case had, in 2.6.32, on page 74,  
14 substantial substance misuse in his career, aggressive  
15 violent offending behaviour, reluctance to engage with  
16 any healthcare services, chaotic lifestyle and there  
17 were some issues surrounding the involvement of the  
18 relevant Social Services within the care plan, if you  
19 like, following the 1995 Act.

20 There was no indication on the record he'd been  
21 medically examined. There is no case that he had been  
22 referred to a drug addiction counsellor and it wasn't  
23 very clear what sort of referral pattern in this case  
24 had actually occurred. In effect, I think there was  
25 criticism that the boy had just been sent to Kerelaw and



1 Kerelaw was meant to sort him out.

2 Q. And if I can pick up the point at the top of page 74,  
3 and this is an indication of ministerial involvement,  
4 the second line:

5 "The Minister had also raised then ongoing concern  
6 on the education provided at the school and was informed  
7 that whilst the HM Inspector of Schools had reported on  
8 secure unit, it had not conducted an inspection in the  
9 open unit, principally as a result of staff resources."

10 And it appears the Minister wasn't very happy with  
11 that response?

12 A. No. I think this case is yet another indication of when  
13 the papers end up in the Minister's office and in fact  
14 if you like, the directions that this case should be  
15 thoroughly reviewed occurred.

16 It was obvious that there was an issue surrounding  
17 the inspection of the schools. The secure unit may have  
18 been reviewed, but not the open unit. And the Minister  
19 was clearly unhappy that one part of Kerelaw should be  
20 inspected but not at the same time as the open unit.

21 The reason for that is simply because secure  
22 accommodation was being reviewed more frequently than  
23 an ordinary school, and the open unit was considered  
24 an ordinary school and therefore was not subject to the  
25 review that would occur in terms of secure

1 accommodation, even although the Inspectorate are on the  
2 same side, if that makes sense.

3 Q. The Minister clearly had assumed that if you're doing  
4 an inspection you do them both at the same time?

5 A. That's right. But there was a different sort of  
6 pro forma protocol for dealing with secure accommodation  
7 inspections which were more frequent than ordinary open  
8 residential schools, which, I think, I said earlier  
9 should occur every five years.

10 Q. 2.6.34, I think the SWSI Inspector noted a number of  
11 weaknesses in the arrangements for the boy's safety and  
12 welfare of the school?

13 A. There was no assessment of risk management that the boy  
14 might require in terms of his substance misuse and his  
15 behaviour. There is no record of any advice given by  
16 the staff of the open unit in terms of his substance  
17 misuse and there was clearly an issue of the handover  
18 between the day and night staff to check the boy  
19 situation frequently and there was finally no designated  
20 first aider on duty when the boy was actually  
21 discovered.

22 Q. Can we turn to page 76, 2.6.35, because we are told that  
23 two years elapse and Health Department's Medical Officer  
24 notices that he had not received information that he had  
25 requested, but he also noted there had been an FAI,

1           which had concluded in January 2002?

2    A.   Yes.

3    Q.   So there seems to be a gap in time.

4    A.   It's not clear why that gap occurred.  It may well be  
5           because an FAI had been called, that those papers were  
6           not being sent to the Medical Officer, but the Medical  
7           Officer basically agreed with the Social Work  
8           Inspectorate that the boy's psychological and addiction  
9           elements had not been comprehensively assessed at  
10          Kerelaw and there was no management plan in relation to  
11          his care plan for this particular boy.

12   Q.   If we look at 2.6.36, page 76, I think we are given some  
13          information about what the Sheriff concluded and in  
14          particular there were no defects in the Local  
15          Authority's system of working which contributed to the  
16          boy's death, nor in the actions taken by the Local  
17          Authority to improve its residential care services.  So  
18          that's one of the findings made by the Sheriff?

19   A.   That's one of the findings made by the Sheriff, but  
20          further down in that paragraph, the Local Authority  
21          should review the operation management of its alcohol  
22          and drug counselling services, particularly when young  
23          people were reluctant to engage and where there is  
24          liaison between community and residential-based services  
25          and there should be appropriate arrangements in place to

1 protect children and young people in the event of coming  
2 into contact with a retired minister, which the boy had  
3 befriended.

4 Q. If we look at the last section of this particular  
5 section, page 77, 2.7, you give us an overview of what  
6 you have been discussing over the last little while.  
7 Can you just perhaps summarise that for us?

8 A. Yes. The procedures basically followed that which had  
9 evolved since 1962 and reinforced by the 1995 Act, that  
10 there could be three outcomes to the review of each  
11 death.

12 The first would indicate that the inspectors and  
13 Health Department's Medical Officers concluded that the  
14 provision of care had been at a high standard and no  
15 lessons were required for practice or implications for  
16 wider policy.

17 Second, it would indicate that there were certain  
18 issues within the care provided and that the local  
19 agencies should review their practises or organisations  
20 with the aim of securing improvement, that is that the  
21 issues concerned the Local Authority.

22 The third was that the issues of wider national  
23 concern, which if not requiring ministerial action, then  
24 further consideration at official level before  
25 recommending a future practice or development of service

1 organisation.

2 I have given some examples of the way that ministers  
3 got involved and effectively issued directions.

4 Q. Would Ministers be interested in those cases that might  
5 get some press publicity?

6 A. I think that's probably the case or where a fellow MP or  
7 MSP brought it to their attention and they felt they are  
8 required to be briefed as to the circumstances  
9 surrounding the death. They may not. It's not clear  
10 from the papers exactly how many went to the relevant  
11 minister, except in the cases, which I've mentioned,  
12 which resulted in ministerial directions.

13 Q. You tell us that the cases indicate how the procedures  
14 operated. I think we have seen that?

15 A. Yes, yes, yes.

16 Q. And the final comment on 2.7.3, page 78, although the  
17 NHS services were commended for the actions that they  
18 had taken to provide a high standard of care, it can be  
19 seen that on occasion concerns did emerge?

20 A. There were concerns in the case of staff qualified in  
21 life saving for outdoor activities or greater healthcare  
22 in counselling support for children who were substance  
23 misusers or in the support of local service  
24 organisations and professional advice from the Social  
25 Work Services Group, Young Persons and Looked-after

1 Children Division, and so I think what I wanted to bring  
2 out here was that these cases are significant in terms  
3 of its impact on not just local policy or local  
4 practice, but of wider national practises, concerning  
5 the Health Services, the Education Services, and Social  
6 Work Services at a local level.

7 Q. Can we move on to section 3 of the report, where you  
8 deal with secure accommodation units, 1992 to 2005. You  
9 provide a short introduction, setting out what you're  
10 going to cover.

11 If I go to 3.1, the introduction, you remind us what  
12 is meant by "secure accommodation" and as we know it's  
13 there to restrict the liberty of young people?

14 A. Who have complex needs for a variety of reasons and who  
15 might be placed there by a children's hearing or by the  
16 Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers.

17 Q. And you give us some insight into the frequency of  
18 inspection of the issue and what do you tell us, at this  
19 time?

20 A. At this time, in 1992, they were on a rolling three-year  
21 cycle of Social Work Inspectorate, HM Inspector of  
22 Schools and it's important when we relate to the Kerelaw  
23 incident that you have a three-year being standard  
24 whereas with an ordinary residential school it was five  
25 years. So I'm bringing that point out again.

1           You can see here that there was fairly intense  
2           review in the beginning of this period of secure  
3           accommodation to ensure that the requisite standards had  
4           been met and the Secretary of State could continue to  
5           approve the unit for a certain period of time.

6   Q.   That's important, isn't it, from the perspective of the  
7           unit, that the inspection is sufficiently positive, that  
8           the unit can be approved to continue forth for three  
9           years?

10  A.   That's precisely the point.  Now, I think if you're  
11           looking at it historically, then this is certainly  
12           a change in policy, that you've got a much closer  
13           examination at frequent intervals of the appropriateness  
14           of secure accommodation.

15  Q.   At 3.2.1, just going back a bit, I think in the first  
16           paragraph you make reference to the secure accommodation  
17           Scotland regulations but over the period we are looking  
18           at these were updated?

19  A.   These were updated after 1995.

20  Q.   But at 3.2.1, the beginning of 1993 the sanctioned  
21           accommodation in Scottish secure units totalled 84  
22           places?

23  A.   That's correct, yes.

24  Q.   And you describe the nature of the units that there were  
25           two or three I think larger units, there is St Mary's

1 Kenmure, Rossie and Kerelaw?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. But there were also other units that accommodated  
4 a small number of children?

5 A. That's right, yes, for local needs, Howdenhall, by  
6 Lothian Regional Council had five places, High Trees,  
7 managed by Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council, held  
8 two, Rimbleton House, Fife Regional Council, held two,  
9 and Polmont Youth Care Centre, managed by Central  
10 Regional Council, also two. My assumption is that if  
11 they needed immediate placement they could find one.

12 Q. I take it these would be very much temporary placements,  
13 because there wouldn't be any scope for education?

14 A. No, no, a temporary placement to await one of the other  
15 units having a bed available at Rossie, Kenmure or  
16 Kerelaw.

17 Q. As we read on from the point made by the SWSG that's in  
18 quote, that Rossie and Kenmure are both large, secure  
19 schools, not merely units, designed to provide long-term  
20 care, so that's where the children are kept, but also  
21 educated there?

22 A. That's right, yes. That's why you have the education  
23 Inspectorate turning up on a three-year cycle with  
24 an integrated inspection with the Social Work Services  
25 Inspectorate.



1 Q. Now, at 3.2.4, on page 81, there is some involvement  
2 here between the Chief Social Work Inspector and the  
3 Chairman of the Board of Governors of Rossie. Perhaps  
4 just on that point, in relation to an establishment like  
5 Rossie, these establishments, the bigger, is larger  
6 units, they would be governed by a Board of Governors?

7 A. They were voluntary organisations, with a separate Board  
8 of Governors. They were not within the control of the  
9 Local Authority.

10 Q. This is a situation where the Chief Social Work  
11 Inspector has informed the Board of Governors that the  
12 school would be subject to inspection by the SWSI and  
13 that the approach to the inspection would be of  
14 a particular type. Can you develop that?

15 A. This was in a sense moving on from the previous form of  
16 inspection of secure accommodation and prior to that,  
17 List D schools, which didn't necessarily have  
18 a background of standards of care written down that  
19 would be expected of these particular units.

20 What was being developed here was that national  
21 standards were in the process of being developed and the  
22 Scottish Office's Another Kind of Home, published in  
23 1992, set out the formula by which these standards would  
24 be developed and Rossie was simply being told that  
25 a more systematic approach to the provision of services

1 in general and the clearly expressed standards for the  
2 conduct of approval, ie, inspection, would take place  
3 and this relates very much to, if you like, the  
4 forthcoming 1995 Act and the regulations which followed  
5 it, in terms of assessing the care plan that children  
6 who were placed there had and also the management of  
7 that care plan, an integrated care particular and  
8 basically Rossie is being informed: well, we are going  
9 to look at how you are trying to develop a care plan.  
10 You are not simply taking a child in and keeping them in  
11 the secure unit. You are actually looking at what sort  
12 of additional services you will provide for that  
13 particular young person, child or young person, whilst  
14 in your care.

15 Q. And does this relate back to the publication of Another  
16 Kind of Home?

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. And the recommendation from the Scottish Office:

19 "The Scottish Office should review the future needs  
20 for secure accommodation following a national inspection  
21 ... including an assessment of placements and use,  
22 distribution and condition of present provision and the  
23 quality of care provided."

24 A. That's right. They were simply seeking to assess  
25 whether the 90-odd places was adequate or not, given

1           that there was some pressure that perhaps Scotland had  
2           too many places.

3   Q.   But the appraisal goes on to focus on the needs and  
4           circumstances of the young people?

5   A.   Yes, the standards of care, staff recruitment training  
6           policies, external systems of care and support from the  
7           Health and Education Services, the complaints  
8           procedures, and the current system of management of  
9           these institutions.

10  Q.   And we then learn about an inspection carried out by HMI  
11           in, I think, December 1992?

12  A.   At Rossie?

13  Q.   At Rossie.

14  A.   Yes, yes, which clearly indicated that they were not  
15           particularly happy with the way the head indication was  
16           being provided at Rossie.

17  Q.   And there was a concern about the school's management?

18  A.   Concern about the school's management, which in a sense  
19           was a sort of entry point into whether or not sufficient  
20           care was being provided at a now appropriate level for  
21           the young people at Rossie, young boys at Rossie,  
22           I should say.

23  Q.   Thereafter, following that inspection was there an SWSI  
24           inspection?

25  A.   Yes, that covered 21 pages in detail and this is the

1 first time I've actually seen such a detailed report on  
2 any secure unit and previously a List D school.  
3 Extremely detailed. The arrangements for the admission  
4 of young people, the fabric of the building, security  
5 accommodation, quality of care providing, the aftercare,  
6 the views of the young people, which was perhaps new and  
7 their parents, the views of social workers, looking at  
8 case records, complaints procedure, the physical care of  
9 young people, including healthcare and smoking policy,  
10 smoking was still permitted of course, the use of  
11 segregation rooms, the measures of control and so on.

12 Q. You list --

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 Q. Certainly compared to reports of yesteryear --

15 A. It's extremely detailed.

16 Q. I think we saw -- this wasn't the SWSI -- an inspection  
17 report of Smyllum which was half a page?

18 A. This would not be untypical of that particular period.  
19 You can see that there is a sort of stepwise change in  
20 the approach to conducting an inspection.

21 Q. The SWSI report also at 3.2.11 echoed the concerns of  
22 the HMI on the unit's management insofar as it affected  
23 the integration of education and care?

24 A. That's right. It's basically pre-dating, if you like,  
25 the 1995 Act and subsequent regulations because it's

1 talking about care planning and programme, including  
2 assessment, individual care and the fact that the school  
3 simply seemed to be taking the young boys in a rather  
4 passive way and not really developing a care plan within  
5 the institution itself. Simply the care plan that the  
6 Local Authority had.

7 And what SWSI are saying that once a child is place  
8 inside secure accommodation they should have a secure  
9 accommodation care plan in addition to any other care  
10 plan that the Local Authority might have provided,  
11 because the circumstances in that secure unit are  
12 different.

13 Q. You mention the passive role in relation to childcare  
14 planning?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. That is compounded by the number of young people who are  
17 admitted on an emergency basis for short stays?

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. Because that would impact upon how well you could care  
20 plan for such individuals?

21 A. If you have a school such as Rossie, which has a mixture  
22 of young people in for a fair length of time and you  
23 then have young people coming in almost on the day, that  
24 the children's hearing have agreed they should be sent  
25 there and there is a place for them, then clearly there

1 is a management issue surrounding the care planning for  
2 one group and the other group.

3 Q. But notwithstanding these reservations, I think the SWSI  
4 report recommended that the unit be approved?

5 A. Yes, but the subtext is that the Headmaster was planning  
6 to retire and a replacement introduced, so that dealt  
7 with the management issue, which was fairly usual  
8 practice, I'm afraid, where you had a report such as  
9 that, which basically criticised its management.

10 Q. You finish off with Rossie on page 84, 3.2.14. In fact,  
11 you tell us that the HM Inspector of Schools had  
12 conducted the Rossie inspection as part of the  
13 registration of three other secure units, and that's  
14 Kerelaw, Howdenhall and High Trees and I think each of  
15 the reports for all of these recommended the  
16 registration of the secure units?

17 A. That's correct. I'm afraid the detailed papers  
18 surrounding the inspections, I was not able to trace and  
19 I think have not been retained, but my assumption is  
20 they follow the same pattern of inspection as occurred  
21 at Rossie.

22 LADY SMITH: Professor Levitt, going back to your comment  
23 about the Headmaster of Rossie, and you noted he was  
24 planning to retire and be replaced, you said it was  
25 fairly usual for that to be a way of dealing with

1 a management issue. Were you also seeing a diminution  
2 in effectiveness of heads as they were getting closer to  
3 retiring, even though there had not been a problem  
4 before?

5 A. There is some suggestion of that in the reports for the  
6 previous decade that I've seen that so and so is due for  
7 retirement and they're pulling back. I'm not clear in  
8 this case whether or not there was planning to retire  
9 was simply and excuse for saying: if you don't retire,  
10 you'll be removed.

11 LADY SMITH: Right.

12 So if he was at a stage where he could take  
13 retirement he would be encouraged?

14 A. Yes.

15 LADY SMITH: I just wondered whether there was also  
16 an element of an incidence of burnout of people in that  
17 role, but maybe it wasn't being tracked at that time?

18 A. There might well have been, but I think the subtext of  
19 SWSI, they wanted a different kind of manager in, who  
20 could respond to the new agenda surrounding care  
21 planning, personal development, interaction with the  
22 Health Services, the Education Services and Local  
23 Authority Social Services so looking for someone with  
24 a different set of schools.

25 LADY SMITH: And an appetite for a new way of working?

1 A. Yes.

2 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

3 MR MACAULAY: Do we note at the end of that paragraph that  
4 the remaining secure units at St Mary's Kenmure,  
5 Rimpleton House and Polmont Youth Care Centre were  
6 earmarked for inspection later that year.

7 A. That's corrects, yes.

8 MR MACAULAY: My Lady, it's 1 o'clock.

9 LADY SMITH: I'll take the lunch break now and sit again at  
10 2 o'clock: thank you.

11 (1.00 pm)

12 (The luncheon adjournment)

13 (2.00 pm)

14 MR MACAULAY: Before lunch, Professor, we were looking at  
15 secure accommodation units and we had looked at Rossie.  
16 If I could take you to page 84 of the report, at  
17 paragraph 3.2.15, you begin by telling us that the SWSG  
18 revised its checklist for the appraisal of secure units  
19 in 1995, ahead of an inspection at St Mary's Kenmure; is  
20 that correct?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. And this was under the three-year cycle of inspections?

23 A. Correct, yes.

24 Q. And if we read on, I think what you say is the  
25 requirements included statements that young people



1 should be treated as individuals in their own right and  
2 be prepared for adulthood. Parents should be aware of  
3 the rights and responsibilities, including the right to  
4 complain. You provide some further details as to what  
5 was to be included.

6 A. That's right, yes.

7 Q. If we then turn to page 85, at 3.2.16, you discuss the  
8 inspection of St Mary's and, on the face of it, a very  
9 detailed inspection.

10 A. This was the new formula to conduct inspections, which  
11 had been, if you like, previewed at Rossie before, but  
12 this was the new one coming in and reflected the 1995  
13 Act and subsequent regulations.

14 Q. Following the inspection, as you tell us at 3.2.17, the  
15 SWSI recommended the secure unit should be re-improved?

16 A. That's right, yes.

17 Q. I think, as we read on from its report, they clearly  
18 identified areas for improvement.

19 A. Yes, that didn't prevent them from recommending  
20 reregistration, but there was clearly an agenda for the  
21 management to take on.

22 Q. And that's developed, I think, on the following page,  
23 page 86, 3.2.18. There are particular points mentioned  
24 about an unfavourable comment in relation to the  
25 harassment of girls by boys?

1 A. That's right, yes. I haven't seen it before, so this  
2 might be a new sort of approach, making clear that the  
3 boys and girls -- that the care should be looked at in  
4 terms of preventing the harassment of girls in a mixed  
5 unit.

6 Q. This was at a time when the admission of girls to  
7 a place like St Mary's was on the increase?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I think one of the complaints by the girls was that  
10 their complaints to care staff were not always followed  
11 up.

12 A. And I think SWSI were trying to ensure that it would be  
13 followed up, by bringing this point out, really.

14 Q. And I think St Mary's agreed to work to implement the  
15 report's recommendations?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. That is a standard response, I see.

18 A. That is a standard response. But, of course, it would  
19 be picked up at the next inspection.

20 Q. Yes. We then move on to look at Kerelaw and, like the  
21 other units, it required to be registered and approved.

22 A. Yes. And there was an issue concerning who would  
23 register.

24 Q. Can you just tell me about that? It's to do with  
25 geography, is it?

1 A. That's right. Kerelaw was in North Ayrshire and was  
2 actually owned by Glasgow. And the issue was the North  
3 Ayrshire did not think they were responsible for its  
4 registration, which it was.

5 Q. Indeed, I think we know that, because of that, they did  
6 carry out inspection.

7 A. They carried out inspection, which included some  
8 criticism of Kerelaw.

9 Q. If we look at paragraph 3.2.21, page 87, criticisms, for  
10 example, around cleanliness, good order, poor care  
11 planning, style of accommodation and lack of privacy, as  
12 well as low staff morale. So there is a litany of  
13 problems?

14 A. Yes, that's right. Yes, which is interesting because  
15 I'd not seen that before.

16 LADY SMITH: Sorry, what hadn't you seen before, of that?

17 A. I hadn't seen a local registration authority's report  
18 before, so it was quite useful to have that coming in,  
19 saying: okay, this is what a local registration  
20 authority would do.

21 LADY SMITH: Thank you. Judging by the list there, there is  
22 quite a spread of interest --

23 A. There's a spread of interest.

24 LADY SMITH: -- on the part of the Inspectors.

25 A. Which indicates that at the previous inspection they had

1 not done so.

2 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

3 MR MACAULAY: But so far as the SWSI inspection is  
4 concerned, you tell us, at 3.2.22, that that took place  
5 in September 2000.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And follows the same format as the inspection at  
8 St Mary's Kenmure?

9 A. That's right, yes.

10 Q. Without dwelling on what was said, I think if we look at  
11 the last few lines on the page, progress in developing  
12 structured programmes of work with young people has been  
13 slow.

14 A. Yes. Again, that indicates that they are working from  
15 their pro forma protocol following the 1995 Act and  
16 looking very clearly at what in-house programmes Kerelaw  
17 had for the young people sent there.

18 Q. At 3.2.23, on page 88, there is an issue identified  
19 there, first of all, in relation to the suitability of  
20 the staff and their qualifications; do you see that? At  
21 the first paragraph.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Then an issue about there being a high level of physical  
24 contact from the girls towards the male staff; do you  
25 see that?

1 A. Yes. I think it's important to recognise the issue of  
2 the quality and qualifications of staff at secure  
3 accommodation in particular, where one would assume that  
4 the level of staff competence would be required at  
5 a much higher level than in other residential  
6 accommodation.

7 And I think that point is bringing out that, yes,  
8 Glasgow needs to look very clearly at who it employs at  
9 Kerelaw, in particular in relation to the follow point  
10 about the risk of abuse towards girls in mixed  
11 accommodation.

12 Q. If we go on to the following page, page 89, at 3.2.25,  
13 the SWSI's conclusions, which were about to be  
14 published, begins by saying the secure unit is  
15 functioning well and young people feel safe.

16 A. Yes, I noticed that.

17 Q. Which doesn't fully chime with what has been said  
18 before.

19 A. It doesn't fully chime with what has been said before.  
20 And I felt that if you look at it from an independent  
21 view, then they recognise some issues and just hope that  
22 the management will follow through on the  
23 recommendations in the report.

24 Q. As we are told at 3.2.26, does the fact they would  
25 revisit Kerelaw in about 12 months suggest they had

1 reservations?

2 A. They had reservations, which they weren't willing to put  
3 in print, and the follow-up in 12 months, rather than  
4 three years, would indicate that.

5 Q. You then looked, at 3.2.27, at Howdenhall, and the  
6 inspection there in June 1998. I think you told us  
7 before, this was a small unit.

8 A. A small unit, generally used for short term.

9 Q. Notwithstanding the size, the inspection still lasted  
10 a full week?

11 A. Yes, that's what we would expect, because it would have  
12 to go through the same formula as applying to the other  
13 units, otherwise they might themselves end up with the  
14 criticism that they'd not followed their procedures.

15 Q. If we move on to the next page, towards the top, that's  
16 page 90, at 3.2.28, I think this fits in with one of the  
17 comments we have seen previously, that the inspectors  
18 noted the standoffish approach adopted by staff.

19 A. Yes, I would assume that's a similar comment to the  
20 issue at Kerelaw in relation to the qualifications of  
21 the staff and their ability to actually engage with  
22 those that had been sent there.

23 Q. At 3.2.30, you say that the inspectors were sufficiently  
24 concerned about the conduct of units, that they  
25 recommended a number of requirements for improvement

1           should be issued to the Local Authorities that place  
2           children.

3   A.   That's right.

4   Q.   Can I understand the reasoning there; what is being  
5           said? This is not to the unit, this is to the Local  
6           Authorities?

7   A.   I guess what -- they were trying to alert the Local  
8           Authorities that if they were sending children there, as  
9           a result of a children's hearing or direction of Chief  
10          Social Worker, that they should be aware of the need for  
11          interdisciplinary assessment. And that they themselves  
12          should put pressure on Edinburgh to ensure that  
13          particular unit was brought up to scratch.

14   Q.   The comments at the bottom of that page, I think this is  
15          a minute from the Assistant Chief social worker  
16          Inspector:

17                 "The basic purpose of these inspection visits, to  
18                 advise on whether the accommodation should be approved,  
19                 imposes some constraints on the extent to which we can  
20                 evaluate the effectiveness of the service in meeting  
21                 children's needs."

22                 So it's a recognition that having regard to why the  
23                 inspection is being carried out does pose some  
24                 constraint on, perhaps, a broader type of inspection.

25   A.   And that's -- I suspect, if you like, that is why they

1           are writing to the Local Authorities who placed children  
2           there, to put pressure on Edinburgh to improve the  
3           quality of care being provided. It was a sort of round  
4           about way of exercising authority on Edinburgh.

5   Q. There is another warning, I think, to Local Authorities  
6           at 3.2.31.

7   A. Yes.

8   Q. This is in fact to Edinburgh City, where the message was  
9           that whilst the children in the two units were  
10          adequately protected and safeguarded, significant  
11          deficiencies in care planning had been identified.

12                So there are two messages.

13   A. There are two messages and Edinburgh is, if you like,  
14          being pressed on two fronts; one is from -- directly the  
15          Scottish Executive and the other, the Scottish  
16          Executive's hope via the other Local Authorities who  
17          were sending children there, who had some responsibility  
18          for the children.

19   Q. There is a sort of pincer movement --

20   A. A two-pronged attack to ensure that care planning was  
21          actually developed.

22   Q. Again, there is to be an inspection within a year, so  
23          once again outwith the normal cycle?

24   A. That wasn't the normal -- that was outside the normal  
25          cycle of three years. There was sufficient concern to



1 ensure that a further visit would take place to see how  
2 far, in fact, the improvements were being implemented.

3 Q. Do we see in the next paragraph, in fact, that you talk  
4 about the follow-up inspection in January 2000 that  
5 concluded:

6 "Although there had been progress in meeting  
7 a number of requirements and recommendations, further  
8 improvement was necessary to ensure the secure units  
9 were fit for purpose."

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So some progress, but --

12 A. Not enough.

13 Q. When we read in this section that the HM Inspector of  
14 Schools conducted an inspection at the same time; does  
15 that mean that the two inspections were taking place --

16 A. It was an integrated inspection.

17 Q. That would create quite a large team of people --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- descending on the premises?

20 A. Yes. It would certainly involve three or four  
21 inspectors.

22 Q. And towards the bottom, do we see that the Young Person  
23 and Looked-after Children's Division wrote again to  
24 Edinburgh Council's Director of Social Work and informed  
25 them that as a result of the inspection, the division

1           remained very disappointed at the continuing lack of  
2           completed actions?

3   A.   That's right.

4   Q.   There seems to be an ongoing situation.  The Inspector  
5           seems to -- not quite bending over backwards, but he's  
6           giving a lot of leeway to -- here, we're looking at  
7           a secure unit.

8   A.   I think if you look at 2000, the system of secure  
9           accommodation is under pressure, as we have seen in  
10          earlier cases.  And there would be reluctance,  
11          I suspect, from SWSI to recommend that the unit should  
12          be deregistered.  And so long as the council were  
13          willing to seek improvement then they should continue,  
14          but with a further inspection.

15  Q.   Do we see that really it is the pattern not just here,  
16          but in other parts of this area where, rather than come  
17          down hard on a provider, the provider's given space to  
18          improve?

19  A.   If they felt there was a capacity to improve.  And my  
20          reading of the file suggests that they believed there  
21          was a capacity to improve, but they'd have to continue  
22          to apply pressure.

23  LADY SMITH:  And the unit you are referring to here was  
24          St Katherine's?

25  A.   Yes.

1 LADY SMITH: Which was close to Howdenhall.

2 A. That's right.

3 LADY SMITH: But you had moved from Howdenhall to

4 St Katherine's?

5 A. Yes.

6 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

7 MR MACAULAY: As is your practice, you give a broad overall

8 view of the section in 3.2.33. As we have discussed,

9 there is a more systematic approach to appraisal of

10 these units.

11 A. That's right, yes. Which followed from the Scottish

12 Office publication, *Another Kind of Home*, and the White

13 Paper, in 1993, on Scotland's Children Proposal for

14 Childcare Policy and Law. And, obviously, the checklist

15 that was developed in 1995, and the issues surrounded, I

16 think -- which was different from an earlier period --

17 managing throughcare within the particular units.

18 Q. Your next section is headed:

19 "Inspections and inquiries on issues of special

20 concern."

21 Over the period 1995 to 2001. You indicate where

22 you're going to go with this. The first is to do with

23 lack of availability, and we've looked to some extent on

24 that already.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. The second concerns issues that arose on the  
2 establishment of new provision, and I think that's  
3 dealing with The Elms in Dundee?

4 A. That's right, yes.

5 Q. And the third concerned inappropriate behaviour by  
6 a member of staff.

7 If I can look at these areas briefly. First of all,  
8 the availability of secure accommodation over the period  
9 1995/1996. This brings back to mind the case of the boy  
10 who had been murdered in Dundee --

11 A. That's right, yes.

12 Q. -- and the difficulties associated with his being placed  
13 prior to the crime happening.

14 A. That's right, yes, yes. You can see here the  
15 discussions that went on in relation to ongoing  
16 professional thinking about any kind of residential  
17 accommodation, including secure units and, if you like,  
18 the political pressure that was applied to increase the  
19 number of units/spaces available in Scotland.

20 Q. And I think we've looked already at what has been  
21 reported to have come from Ministers and their  
22 expressions of surprise, really, that such a situation  
23 should exist.

24 A. They had been given assurances that the number of  
25 placements in Scotland was adequate.

1 Q. We touched on this already, but there was a report on  
2 secure care, which I think was now published; is that  
3 right?

4 A. That's right, yes, yes.

5 Q. Was the upshot here an increase, but not a large  
6 increase of the places available?

7 A. Not a large increase. And I think it had been -- what  
8 had been proposed was reduced in scale, but was still an  
9 increase over what it had been before, and so instead of  
10 90, there should be somewhere between 90 and 100 beds  
11 available in Scotland.

12 Q. Then we look at 3.3.9, and that's the provision of  
13 a secure unit in the period 1998 to 2001. This was in  
14 response -- at 3.3.9 -- to the report on secure care.

15 A. That's right, yes, and the fact that the boy that had  
16 been murdered had been murdered in Dundee, where there  
17 was an issue of availability of secure accommodation,  
18 even on a temporary basis.

19 Q. What we see is that the unit that was being proposed was  
20 again a small unit, consisting of a five-bed closed  
21 support unit and a three-bed secure unit?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So, from the secure estate's perspective, it's three  
24 other places?

25 A. Three additional places, yes. Within a continuum of

1 care, close support did not imply the level of  
2 supervision that secure unit would have.

3 Q. If we turn to paragraph 3.3.11, towards the bottom of  
4 page 95; do we see here a reference to a formal joint  
5 inspection by SWSI and HMI was conducted in June 2000,  
6 once the work had been completed, and essentially  
7 concluded that the new build accommodation was fit for  
8 purpose?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Although I think we see later on that there are  
11 issues --

12 A. Issues emerge when children began to be placed.

13 Q. I think that was in June. Do we see, at paragraph 3.12,  
14 that there were a series of critical articles in the  
15 press about Dundee City's residential units? How does  
16 this fit into this particular narrative?

17 A. I think from what I gathered, the City were concerned of  
18 the criticisms being levelled against its ability to  
19 deal with the particular cases, particularly the  
20 existence of child prostitution in the city, and that  
21 the lack of secure care had meant there was no available  
22 places and they could not be accommodated in secure  
23 units for their own safety.

24 Q. You mentioned, and indeed you mentioned the extent of  
25 child prosecution in the city, and I think the same

1 press --

2 LADY SMITH: I think child prostitution.

3 MR MACAULAY: Prostitution. In the city, and I think the  
4 same press reports talk about violent youths roaming the  
5 streets?

6 A. Yes, yes, yes, at that time.

7 Q. In any event, the secure unit, you tell us, was opened  
8 in December 2000, but then problems emerged?

9 A. Problems emerged on the management of the unit, in terms  
10 of safety to the young people who had been placed there.  
11 And the issue related again to staff training. There  
12 was only one member of staff trained in the appropriate  
13 procedure.

14 Q. Was the response from Dundee City Council essentially to  
15 intimate that the unit would be closed and they would  
16 seek to implement an action plan to correct the security  
17 issues?

18 A. That's right. They closed it ahead of any  
19 deregistration of the unit.

20 Q. If we turn to 3.3.16, page 97, we can see that there was  
21 another joint inspection by SWSI and HMI Inspector in  
22 November 2000? And this, so far as one can read,  
23 produced a positive response.

24 A. Yes. Clearly, they intended to interview everyone  
25 involved, including from the Local Authority, Building

1 and Finance Officer, Education Department, Head of  
2 Behavioural Support Services, as well as those within  
3 the unit itself.

4 They clearly thought it was a positive move, four  
5 secure beds, plus five close support beds, the latter  
6 having remained operational throughout the period. It  
7 was only the secure unit that had been closed.

8 Q. We read on, at 3.3.18, subject to an action plan by  
9 Dundee City Council, the unit was considered fit for  
10 purpose, and that was confirmed by the Scottish  
11 Ministers?

12 A. That's right, yes.

13 Q. Now, the next heading is:

14 "Rossie School, the allegations of abuse and the  
15 standard of care."

16 This is 1997 to 2001. The submission that you quote  
17 from, at the top, contains positive messages.

18 A. It does, yes, yes. Evidently, they felt that Rossie had  
19 moved on with its new senior manager.

20 Q. This is in August 1997?

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. Although there are some reservations. For example,  
23 better access to psychiatric services should be secured,  
24 take that example.

25 A. That's right. I think it's important to recognise that



1 at ministerial consideration of this report -- and  
2 evidently the report was sent to Ministers -- that the  
3 school should be inspected twice a year, with one of  
4 these being unannounced. And that's a new departure.

5 Q. But not long after, three months later, the SWSG learnt  
6 through the press that there had been allegations of  
7 child abuse, drug and alcohol abuse, and illicit sexual  
8 activity at Rossie and that set off a train of events.

9 A. A train of events to investigate the veracity of the  
10 allegations.

11 Q. I think there was an inspection -- if you look at  
12 3.3.23, page 99 -- over two days, in January 1998.

13 A. Yes. SWSI, and that was followed up by the Health  
14 Department's Medical Officer.

15 Q. Can you tell me what the outcome was then of the --

16 A. There was clearly an issue surrounding the internal  
17 management of the secure unit and that the segregation  
18 room had been used extensively over the period January  
19 to August 1997, compared with the previous six months.

20 And although there were positively developments,  
21 there needed to be a clearer strategy for a reduction of  
22 the use of single separation. That's within the secure  
23 unit itself, the young people being segregated from each  
24 other.

25 Q. And if we look at 3.3.25, do we see there the quote from

1 the report:

2 "Rossie staff and governors do not believe they have  
3 a serious drug problem ..."

4 A. That's right.

5 Q. Was there any evidence of a serious drug problem?

6 A. They evidently did not believe there was, and that SWSI  
7 supported Rossie on the basis of the evidence that --  
8 and the police reports that they had, that there wasn't  
9 a significant drug problem at Rossie.

10 Q. If we go to paragraph 3.3.28, this is another  
11 unannounced inspection by SWSI in November 1998, and can  
12 we read there that they found no grounds for concerns  
13 about the safety of the young people at Rossie:

14 "The young people spoke positively to inspectors  
15 about the care they received. Since the last inspection  
16 there had been progress in improving the quality of  
17 education and work with Local Authorities."

18 So that's a positive description.

19 A. Yes. I think it's important to bring out the fact that  
20 this was an unannounced inspection, ie, the inspectors  
21 simply turning up. And this follows the Ministerial  
22 direction earlier, that there should be two visits, at  
23 least one unannounced.

24 Q. Just going back to, I think, one of the allegations that  
25 was being made at 3.3.30, on page 102; can we see that

1 SWSG was informed by the Crown Office that there were  
2 proceedings against an ex-member of staff for assault?

3 A. That's right.

4 Q. Was this essentially in connection with what one might  
5 describe as overzealous restraint?

6 A. It would appear to be the case. I was not able to  
7 establish any further proceedings in the court case.

8 Q. We don't know whether there was a conviction or not?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Then we have another inspection with SWSI and the Health  
11 Department's Medical Officer, and the HM Inspector, in  
12 September 1999. So they're keeping a close eye on this  
13 establishment?

14 A. Yes. It's a big establishment and there's obviously  
15 some history attached to Rossie and the Minister is  
16 clearly aware of it, and that's why the Minister  
17 insisted that there should be regular inspections, with  
18 some unannounced.

19 Q. I think positive messages come out of this inspection.  
20 If you look at 3.3.34, the SWSI inspectors commented  
21 that the young people at Rossie feel safe and settled;  
22 is that correct?

23 A. That's correct. Although there was a caveat attached to  
24 the end of it, in terms of the segregation suite.

25 Q. The segregation suite seemed to have been a problem at

1       Rossie, that it was -- as we're told, it wasn't very  
2       attractive.

3    A. No, no. Cold, dirty, smelly and worse than a police  
4       cell, were the comments.

5    Q. Also, we're told, I think, that young people who had to  
6       face that often had to be carried, sometimes struggling,  
7       down several flights of stairs and through a number of  
8       doors.

9    A. Yes.

10   Q. Thus endangering their safety.

11   A. Endangering their -- it wasn't the purpose of Rossie in  
12       the first place.

13               And that they should replace the segregation unit.

14   Q. I think the messages they were getting from the  
15       children, but being locked in their own rooms might be  
16       a better option for that.

17   A. Yes.

18   Q. Professor, you have a general review of what we've been  
19       discussing, at 3.3.36. Perhaps you can just summarise,  
20       give us an overview, as to what you say?

21   A. The three issues, the availability, suitability,  
22       small-scale provision, allegations of abuse, illustrate,  
23       really, that the SWSI's inspectorial functions went  
24       beyond its three-year cycle. It was clearly some  
25       continuing concern that young people were being placed

1 in secure accommodation and its suitability for them, in  
2 terms of the care planning and personal development.

3 It had to accept that the decisions on placements  
4 were made by the Children's Panel, Directors of Social  
5 Work and even by the Secretary of State and Scottish  
6 Ministers.

7 And I think what is evident from these reports is  
8 there is a very cautious approach by the inspectors.  
9 They knew they had to have secure accommodation, but at  
10 the same time there were continuing concerns on the  
11 quality of provision that was being supplied and offered  
12 to the children in these particular units.

13 It meant that they stressed the issue of staff  
14 training, and particularly trying to ensure focused  
15 integration of social, educational and healthcare within  
16 the personal development plans for each young person who  
17 had been committed there.

18 In addition, there were clearly ministerial  
19 directions, and that required, in order to implement  
20 them, considerable fresh and professional tact, and  
21 repeated appraisal of provision to ensure that the  
22 Minister's directions were being followed.

23 Q. Then there is a relatively short section, 3.4, on  
24 page 104, headed:

25 "Review of secure accommodation."

1           1998 to 2003. What you are seeking to capture in  
2           these two or three pages that you devote to this?

3   A. What I think the report is trying to bring out is the  
4           fact that it was clearly evident that secure  
5           accommodation was required. There were clearly issues  
6           concerning the young people concerned. Over 80 per cent  
7           had offended in the community, a third had deliberately  
8           harmed themselves, two-thirds had problems in relation  
9           to drug and/or alcohol abuse, and half the girls and  
10          a fifth of the boys were thought to have been sexually  
11          abused so there were clearly complex issues there,  
12          requiring more specialist provision.

13                 In addition, there were issues concerning  
14           psychiatric or psychological care that was required.  
15           There were clearly distinct problems and distinct issues  
16           that required highly specialised support, and I think  
17           that's what these reports bring out constantly, saying  
18           that you've got to make sure the agencies are working  
19           together, even within the secure units. And secure  
20           units have the highest possible level of professional  
21           skills available within them.

22   Q. I think SWSI in this connection had commissioned  
23          a survey of young people in the secure accommodation  
24          themselves --

25   A. Yes.

1 Q. -- to see what their position was; did that produce  
2 a report?

3 A. There were evidently ongoing concerns about the use of  
4 secure accommodation in Scotland, and that as a result  
5 the Minister for Education and Children established  
6 an advisory group to advise on the future development of  
7 the estate. In particular, the issues surrounding  
8 Kerelaw, whether it should be replaced or not, the  
9 financial support and further investments, in terms of  
10 secure accommodation and the specialist programmes that  
11 were required within those particular units.

12 And, in particular, I think it was noted that there  
13 was more evidence of young girls, particularly,  
14 requiring care and assistance. And I think that's the  
15 difference from an earlier period, and that the  
16 provision did not -- as it existed, did not necessarily  
17 represent the needs of that particular group.

18 Q. I think there was a group set up, the secure  
19 accommodation advisory group, SAAG --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- to look into this issue?

22 A. Yes. And their view is: okay, yes, we lock up a much  
23 higher proportion than England and Wales. Girls need  
24 a third of the places. The current demand, irrespective  
25 of disproportionate between -- south of the border is

1 certainly more than we are actually providing. 83 to  
2 139 suggests something in the region of 100 plus places  
3 ought to be provided.

4 There are clearly some differences between the Local  
5 Authorities in terms of needing secure accommodation.  
6 But, in relation, there is nothing that central  
7 Government could do about that, because placing children  
8 in secure accommodation was really outwith the current  
9 set of regulations or current legislation.

10 It noted that, yes, future developments should  
11 surround specialist units from girls.

12 Q. Do we learn, at 3.4.6, that in October 2002 the Minister  
13 announced that the Scottish Executive was seeking to  
14 increase secure accommodation by 24 beds?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. That is a larger increase that we'd seen previously.

17 A. Yes, and that reflects the fact that they've begun to  
18 accept that specialist provision for young girls was  
19 actually necessary.

20 Q. If we look at the next section in the report, at 3.5,  
21 you have a section here headed "Joint inspections", 2002  
22 to 2005; can I just understand fully, just in case  
23 I'm misunderstanding what is meant by "joint  
24 inspection"?

25 A. "Joint inspection" refers to the institution of the Care



1 Commission, and within the regulations, the Care  
2 Commission, it was intended that they have the  
3 responsibility for the inspection of secure units of  
4 accommodation.

5 The issue that I think this particular section tries  
6 to bring out is the fact that they didn't have enough  
7 skilled staff to conduct the inspection, so they  
8 continued to rely on the Social Work Inspectorate  
9 actually beyond 2005.

10 And the issues that concerned that, in particular,  
11 in relation to some of the joint inspections that  
12 emerged in that particular period.

13 Q. Just looking -- I think we have looked at this earlier,  
14 but just to remind ourselves -- in relation to the  
15 jurisdiction then of the Care Commission, from  
16 an inspectorial perspective; what was that jurisdiction?

17 A. They had -- they took over the responsibilities of the  
18 Social Work Inspectorate to inspect and make  
19 recommendations for improvement or to recommend to  
20 Scottish Ministers deregistration.

21 But if I could add, of course, that deregistration  
22 would, first of all, go through to social work  
23 inspectors and then to administrative officials within  
24 the Scottish Executive. It's not a question that the  
25 Care Commission was simply sending a letter, detailing

1 the circumstances, direct to a Scottish Minister. It  
2 would go through an appropriate process inside the  
3 Scottish Government at the time.

4 Q. The first joint inspection you mention at 3.5.2, we're  
5 back to The Elms in Dundee, in June 2002.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, just let's note, as you point out, that the SWSI,  
8 the HM Inspector of Schools, was assisted by the Health  
9 Department and the Care Commission for this joint  
10 inspection.

11 A. Right. But you must remember the Care Commission were  
12 established in April 2002 and, therefore, within the  
13 regulations, had the responsibility for conducting that.  
14 But it was decided that they didn't have enough  
15 specialist staff and, therefore, "We'll carry on as we  
16 are, and they'll come along and tag along and perhaps  
17 appreciate and learn and how to inspect secure  
18 accommodation", as opposed to ordinary residential care  
19 accommodation; does that make sense?

20 Q. It does. Thank you.

21 So far as this joint inspection was concerned, we  
22 read towards the bottom of that page, 108, that  
23 a particular strength were the assessments of risk young  
24 people posed to themselves and others. So that's  
25 a positive note?

1 A. It's a positive note, with a caveat.

2 Q. Yes:

3 "Although there was ample evidence of one-to-one  
4 work between key workers and young people, this tended  
5 to focus on daily living rather than the reason for  
6 admission and we have already identified the requirement  
7 for the unit to develop multi-disciplinary assessment of  
8 young people's needs and more formal programmes of  
9 work."

10 So you are right, you give with one hand and take  
11 a little with the other.

12 A. Yes, it's being positive, but stressing again, if you  
13 are, like, following the 1995 Act, the need for  
14 multi-disciplinary interagency approach in developing  
15 and implementing an individual care plan.

16 Q. So far as Rossie is concerned, at 3.5.6, you tell us  
17 that the first joint inspection -- page 109 -- under the  
18 new post-2001 arrangements was in September 2002.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Again, we read that the school has made progress in  
21 promoting aspects of positive behaviour among young  
22 people. So we have -- we begin with that positive  
23 message?

24 A. It's the same themes emerging, the need for structured  
25 programmes, structured care programmes within the unit

1           itself.

2   Q.   If we look at the top of page 110, the shortages of  
3       teaching staff have hindered the implementation of  
4       a broad and balanced curriculum?

5   A.   Yes, yes.

6   Q.   But since the last report, the last approval inspection,  
7       in 1989, specialist services had also been introduced,  
8       including a mental health initiative. Then do we have  
9       this practice of action points being set out for --

10  A.   Which is relatively new, that the inspections would lead  
11       to some commendations as to progress, but then action  
12       points that would be required to be followed up, and  
13       would be appraised at the next inspection.

14  Q.   This report, I think, was issued in August 2003. But  
15       the following October -- which would be August 2004 --  
16       the SWSI and the now entitled HMI of Education, assisted  
17       by the Health Department's Medical Officer undertook a  
18       follow up inspection, to evaluate progress on the  
19       recommendations made; what was the outcome here?

20  A.   It was, again, indicating that there had been progress,  
21       although there were clearly incidents of parasuicidal  
22       behaviour of some people. No serious outcomes. Senior  
23       management should review their cases, the robustness of  
24       risk assessment and risk management, and the  
25       appropriateness of immediate actions taken.

1           So that was positive.

2           Less positive was the implementation of focused  
3           programmes of work. It wasn't necessarily related to  
4           each individual child and, again, the issues surrounded  
5           staff training to implement child assessment.

6   Q. The next joint inspection you draw attention to -- at  
7       3.5.11 -- is of St Mary's Kenmure.

8   A. Yes.

9   Q. That was in October 2003. Can we see the inspection  
10       team now is the SWSI Inspector, three HMIs of Education,  
11       Health Department Senior Medical Officer and a member of  
12       the Care Commission.

13   A. That's right.

14   Q. Again, quite a group.

15   A. It's quite an integrated inspection. And with three  
16       HMIs of Education, it indicates the seriousness to which  
17       education provision was being evaluated.

18   Q. And this, the intention behind this inspection, was to  
19       see whether the Scottish Ministers could approve the --

20   A. Yes, continue to approve.

21   LADY SMITH: That is six people in the team, I think? Is  
22       that right?

23   A. Yes, yes.

24           It was the same social work Inspector since 1995,  
25       throughout this period.

1 LADY SMITH: Right. In every one of these inspections?

2 A. The same particular Inspector.

3 LADY SMITH: How interesting.

4 A. He'd obviously been assigned to that particular -- that  
5 particular Inspector also generally did deaths in care.

6 MR MACAULAY: Yes.

7 This inspection found that progress had been made in  
8 relation to the previous inspection in 1999, most  
9 notably in establishing a programmes team and providing  
10 specific input to meet the assessed needs of young  
11 people.

12 Again, we see here that it's a positive result and  
13 that the approval by Scottish Ministers should be given?

14 A. Yes, yes. Clearly, they felt that St Mary's Kenmure had  
15 improved the quality of its provision since the previous  
16 reports.

17 Q. The next joint inspection is of Howdenhall and  
18 St Katharine's, and this was in June 2004.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. A large inspection team, again.

21 If we turn on to page 112 in the report, they noted  
22 improvement in the methods of assessment of young  
23 people, and the integration of health issues within  
24 their care plans.

25 This next sentence:

1           "However, on the advice of the Scottish Executive  
2           Officials the SWSI's involvement had required the  
3           special approval of the Scottish Ministers."

4           What is that telling us?

5   A. Well, that simply reiterates the position from April  
6   2002, that the inspection was meant to be led by the  
7   Care Commission and that, as I say in the following  
8   quote, the legal basis for Ministers to register was  
9   a quality of service. There was no longer any legal  
10  basis to ensure the quality of service. Basically, it  
11  was the quality of buildings, rather than quality of  
12  service. That had been delegated, if you like, to the  
13  Care Commission and, therefore, there was, if you like,  
14  a constitutional issue surrounding the registration.

15           But, if you like, the upshot was everyone forgot  
16  about it. And would carry on, on the basis as  
17  previously.

18  Q. I think the last joint inspection that you consider  
19  under this head is of Kerelaw.

20  A. Yes.

21  Q. I think we have seen before that there had been concerns  
22  about Kerelaw, partly in relation to the physical  
23  conditions of the buildings and also to the extent of  
24  staff training and the programme of care provided,  
25  especially to girls.

1           Now, Kerelaw was clearly suffering problems.

2   A.   It was evidently suffering issues which -- and it would  
3       appear that Glasgow City Council no longer wished to  
4       maintain the school as -- for secure accommodation, and  
5       wished it to be redeveloped for other purposes,  
6       childcare purposes, looked-after children care purposes.

7   Q.   I think, essentially, it was clear that some investment  
8       into Kerelaw was essential.

9   A.   Yes, yes, yes.

10   Q.   Because of the situation there, we are told, just above  
11       halfway:

12           "That since local government reorganisation, Kerelaw  
13       has suffered from low staff morale and poor management."

14           In that context, Glasgow City Council wished to see  
15       it redeveloped in an up-to-date building to reflect the  
16       authority's commitment to high-quality care.

17   A.   That's right.

18   Q.   That was the council's position then.

19   A.   Yes.

20   Q.   Do you tell us, at 3.5.16, that in November 2003 there  
21       was an integrated inspection of Kerelaw by HM  
22       Inspectorate of Education and the Care Commission, and  
23       the resulting report commented unfairly on the  
24       school's --

25   LADY SMITH:   Unfavourably.



1 MR MACAULAY: I'm sorry, unfavourably on the school's  
2 management.

3 A. Yes. I think it's important to realise that it's the  
4 first integrated inspection that I've been able to find  
5 between HM Inspectorate of Education and the Care  
6 Commission, without the Social Work Service  
7 Inspectorate.

8 Q. Is it called "integrated" because it's no longer joint?

9 A. Yes, yes. "Integrated" because the Care Commission are  
10 an arm's length Government body, so it can't be called  
11 "integrated".

12 Q. It can't be called "joint" because they are the lead; is  
13 that the way it works?

14 A. Sorry, they -- it's an integrated inspection, rather  
15 than a joint inspection, because it's -- they're no  
16 longer -- the Care Commission is not officers of  
17 Scottish Ministers.

18 Q. I think the upshot of what was a negative report was  
19 that Kerelaw was required -- and I assume this is  
20 Glasgow City -- to prepare an action plan addressing the  
21 main findings.

22 I think as we discussed before lunch, this seemed to  
23 be the procedure; if there were negative findings, then  
24 the provider was allowed time to put together an action  
25 plan to meet these findings?

1 A. Yes, and Glasgow was given an action plan, but in the  
2 process of considering the action plan there were  
3 allegations against members of staff, a police  
4 investigation, and a further HM Inspectorate of  
5 Education and Care Commission inspection, which resulted  
6 in an improvement notice being issued by the Care  
7 Commission, which I think is the first one that  
8 I've come across in relation to secure accommodation.

9 The end result was that Glasgow City Council decided  
10 to close Kerelaw's open school and enter into discussion  
11 with the Scottish Executive about transferring secure  
12 unit young people to other providers.

13 Q. I think that's what happened, is it?

14 A. Yes, yes.

15 Q. Then you have an overriding review of the chapter we  
16 have been looking at; can you briefly summarise that for  
17 us, Professor?

18 A. Yes. It seeks to indicate that at the beginning of the  
19 period of review there were 84 places divided among  
20 a number of units; three large units and a number of  
21 small units.

22 Small units were essentially for short-term  
23 placements, and restating that they were subject to  
24 inspection by SWSI, before approval of the Secretary of  
25 State.

1           Rossie and St Mary's and Kenmure were also subject  
2           to improval by the Secretary of State as residential  
3           establishments for the purposes of secure accommodation,  
4           and the inspections by HM Inspector of schools.

5           There was clearly a shift in thinking in terms of  
6           what kind of care should be provided in secure  
7           accommodation, publications of Another Kind of Home, and  
8           then the White Paper, Scotland's Children's Proposal for  
9           Childcare Policy In Law, ahead of the 1995 Act. That  
10          Act and the subsequent regulations brought out the need  
11          for moving on from, if you like, the best interests of  
12          particular young people who had been placed there to  
13          integrated plans for their care and development whilst  
14          they were there.

15          Effectively, the inspection reports subsequent to  
16          1995, right, all were beginning to stress the need for  
17          integrated care planning, involving three services,  
18          social work, education and health, given the needs, the  
19          complex needs of the young people that had been  
20          committed there.

21          Clearly, the inspections were not necessarily all  
22          extremely positive. There were some which required  
23          action, and action points were laid out and were subject  
24          to review increasingly -- increasing number of  
25          inspections that followed after the short term. So,

1 within the three-year cycle of inspections, there were  
2 other inspections taking place. So it can't be said  
3 that in this particular period, at the end of the  
4 period, that there wasn't very close inspection taking  
5 place of secure units of accommodation.

6 LADY SMITH: Professor Levitt, did all these reports, that  
7 you're referring to here, speak with one voice or could  
8 you tell from the way the report was written which part  
9 was Social Work Services Inspectors and which part was  
10 HMIE?

11 A. Sometimes there were separate reports.

12 LADY SMITH: I wondered about that.

13 A. Sometimes there were separate reports. But, generally,  
14 the report, I think, went through SWSI. The Medical  
15 Officer, sometimes had a separate report, which was  
16 incorporated in.

17 My guess is that the eventual report was looking to  
18 endorse Social Work Services Inspectorate's review by  
19 saying two linked professional bodies, in education and  
20 health, also support the view of Social Work Services  
21 Inspectorate in the recommendations being made. So it's  
22 not simply a social worker making a recommendation.  
23 It's an HM Inspector, Education Inspector, and a Medical  
24 Officer, Senior Medical Officer.

25 I think the person conducting on the medical side

1 was a Senior Medical Officer within Scottish Government  
2 at that time.

3 It had an additional force.

4 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

5 MR MACAULAY: Yes, I should say sometimes there would be  
6 separate reports, because on occasion you will see in  
7 a report reference to other reports that have clearly  
8 been produced separately.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do I take then, from this discussion, that the only  
11 secure unit so far to fall by the way side is Kerelaw?

12 A. That's right.

13 LADY SMITH: Mr MacAulay, it is 3 o'clock. I would usually  
14 take a break. Would that fit with your plan?

15 MR MACAULAY: Yes.

16 LADY SMITH: We'll take a short break and get back to the  
17 rest of your evidence for today, Professor.

18 (3.00 pm)

19 (A short break)

20 (3.10 pm)

21 LADY SMITH: Professor Levitt, are you ready to go?

22 A. Yes, thank you.

23 LADY SMITH: I mean "go" in answering more questions.

24 I will let you away at 3.45.

25 Mr MacAulay.

1 MR MACAULAY: Professor Levitt, if we move on to section 4  
2 of your report, you have a general heading of  
3 "Residential schools". The first section you look at,  
4 4.1, is devoted to independent grant aided residential  
5 schools for children with special educational needs.

6 I think what you repeat here, really, is that the  
7 residential schools with special needs resided with HM  
8 Inspector of Schools; is that right?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. As far numbers are concerned, within that group, there  
11 were just under 40 such schools in, I think, 1996?

12 A. That's correct. That's the figures I could actually  
13 establish.

14 Q. You go on to say that the 1980 Act, Education Scotland  
15 Act 1980, defined an independent school as:

16 "A school at which full-time education is provided  
17 for five or more pupils of school age, not being  
18 a public school or grant aided school."

19 That is the definition from the Act.

20 A. Yes, that's right. Yes.

21 Q. Now, you go on to look at, I think, eight schools that  
22 fall into this category, beginning with Raddery and  
23 that's at page 11.9, at 4.1.4.

24 You say that Raddery came to the attention of the  
25 Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State because

1           there had been allegations of sexual abuse there, and

2           you set out what the information available then was.

3   A.   Yes, that's correct.

4   Q.   The school, you tell us, had been established for:

5           "Emotionally and disturbed children, aged 9 to 17

6           and, like other independent schools, required to be

7           registered with the registrar for independent schools."

8   A.   Yes, correct.

9   Q.   What was the response then to the allegations that were  
10       being made?

11  A.   The response initially was to await what action might be  
12       taken by the Procurator Fiscal and the member of staff  
13       was charged later by the police and released on bail.

14       The Minister was then informed by the SED that two  
15       former pupils had complained about this particular  
16       member of staff, and the HM Inspector of Schools was  
17       making arrangements to conduct a full investigation of  
18       the running of the school on behalf of the Secretary of  
19       State, under section 99 of the 1980 Act, as a matter of  
20       urgency.

21  Q.   Do you tell us, at 4.1.8, that previously, in  
22       November 1992, and after a visit by the HM Inspector of  
23       Schools, a set of recommendations had been made to  
24       improve safety and the standard of care?

25  A.   That's right, yes. That was an ordinary inspection,

1           which followed from a series of incidents. These  
2           included the requirement that staff -- further staff  
3           training and permissible forms of physical control and  
4           constraint, formal complaints procedure for pupils and  
5           an element of outside independent involvement, staff  
6           development and appraisal should be introduced.

7   Q. A number of recommendations were made, but I think we're  
8       told that these had not been fully implemented?

9   A. That's correct, yes, yes. That included a formal  
10       complaints procedure not being established.

11   Q. If we go on to 4.9, I think you tell us that the full HM  
12       Inspector of Schools inspection was completed in 1993,  
13       and I think this was quite a positive report?

14   A. It was relatively positive, in that they'd made  
15       substantial progress to meeting the recommendations  
16       previously set. And a further visit indicated that  
17       further progress had been made, so there was a series of  
18       inspections as a result of incidents and concerns at the  
19       school.

20   Q. Do you tell us, at 4.1.10, that in September 1994 the  
21       ex-house parent was found guilty of indecent practises  
22       towards five girls under the age of 16?

23   A. That is correct. So, clearly, the concerns had resulted  
24       in a charge and, also, that there had been HMI  
25       inspections.



1 Q. Did allegations of inappropriate behaviour then emerge  
2 again in 1995?

3 A. It did, yes.

4 Q. And what was the response to this?

5 A. The HM Inspector of Schools informed the registrar of  
6 independent schools and there were other -- there was  
7 additional evidence of other incidents which had given  
8 concerns.

9 Q. But do you tell us, at 4.1.12, on page 123, that  
10 Raddery's reaction was the production of an internal  
11 report?

12 A. Internal report, which was not seen as adequate by the  
13 Schools Inspectorate and that there remained issues of  
14 concerns for child protection.

15 Q. And the HM Inspector of Schools is quite critical of  
16 this as an approach to the allegations that have been  
17 made?

18 A. That's right. In fact, although it says HM Inspector of  
19 Schools, in fact that was in fact the Senior Inspector  
20 of Schools at the time. So it was taken to a very high  
21 level, informing the chair of the governors that they  
22 ought to institute child protection procedures as  
23 previously outlined. And that a further inspection  
24 would take place.

25 Q. I think you discuss that inspection at 4.1.15?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And it appears to have been a fairly thorough  
3 inspection.

4 A. It was a very detailed inspection, which I think you  
5 can -- you note it involved the Assistant Chief Social  
6 Work Inspector, and that was someone, if you like, at  
7 number two rank within the Social Work Inspectorate.

8 Q. Do we learn in the report that the allegations were  
9 against the ex-principal and spread over a period of  
10 16 years?

11 A. That's right, but it wasn't thought -- the Fiscal didn't  
12 believe criminal proceedings would be instituted because  
13 of the historic nature and the vagueness of the  
14 evidence; all right? Although there was sufficient  
15 evidence to indicate that the principal had used  
16 inappropriate physical sanctions on a number of  
17 occasions.

18 Q. Then, on page 125, 4.1.17 to 4.1.18, do we see that  
19 further incidents emerged?

20 A. Further inappropriate behaviour occurred and HM  
21 Inspector of Schools sufficiently concerned that the --  
22 to attention of the police, and the Secretary of State  
23 would have to be advised about the possibility of  
24 issuing a note of complaint.

25 Q. And the issues here were, I think, to do with a deputy

1 principal?

2 A. That's right, yes.

3 Q. And it's physical abuse?

4 A. That's right, yes.

5 Q. Kicking and ...

6 A. This and two other incidents confirmed. The

7 effectiveness of the procedures that had been introduced

8 as a result of previous inspections and HM Inspector of

9 Schools writing to the Board of Governors.

10 Q. I think the person involved was given the option of

11 dismissal or resignation, and he chose to resign?

12 A. That's right, yes.

13 Q. The next school you look at is Oakbank School in

14 Aberdeen, the period 1993 to 1995.

15 I think you say Oakbank had been a List D school?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But it was now providing education for up to 66 pupils

18 of secondary age who had pronounced social, emotional

19 and behavioural difficulties; is that right?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. And, like Raddery, it was an independent residential

22 school?

23 A. It was an independent residential school, which required

24 registration with the Registrar of Independent Schools.

25 Q. I think the problem that arose here was a local

1           councillor complaining about several staff at the  
2           school, and one staff member in particular had previous  
3           convictions?

4   A.   Yes, 13 previous criminal convictions, including  
5           indecent exposure. The member of staff had admitted the  
6           crime, but the criminal records office in Glasgow  
7           revealed no trace, so the particular person continued to  
8           be employed.

9   Q.   As we read on, one way ahead was for there to be an HMI  
10          inspection, that was seen as a sensible way ahead with  
11          SWSI assistance.

12  A.   That's correct, yes, yes. But there were issues  
13          connected with a joint inspection, because of the  
14          difference in legislation.

15  Q.   So what happened?

16  A.   The HMI Schools Inspectorate would conduct the  
17          inspection with the assistance of the Social Work  
18          Inspectorate.

19  Q.   Do we see, at 4.1.25, on page 128, that that inspection  
20          was completed in January 1995, and the outcome in the  
21          report was that the overall performance of the school  
22          was unsatisfactory, with serious failings in the  
23          standard of care provided and a worrying breakdown of  
24          discipline?

25  A.   Yes.

1 Q. What was the upshot here?

2 A. The upshot was that there was a clear grounds for notice  
3 of complaint being issued against the school, but the  
4 advice from HMI to the Secretary of State that no action  
5 should taken, but the school should be given  
6 an opportunity to implement an action plan it had set  
7 out for the school.

8 Q. I think this is the pattern we've discussed already,  
9 that this seemed to be the way that these problems were  
10 being addressed?

11 A. It gave the management time to reconsider its system of  
12 management, and there would be a further inspection at  
13 some time to affirm that the action plan had been  
14 implemented.

15 Q. Next school you look at is the Camphill Rudolf Steiner  
16 School in Aberdeen, in the period 1994 to 1996. This  
17 school was also, I think, an independent school like  
18 Raddery and Oakbank; is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. It was required to register with the registrar?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And there was an HM Inspector of Schools inspection with  
23 the assistance of the SWSI in late 1994; is that  
24 correct?

25 A. Mm hmm.

1 Q. I think there were two incidents which may have been the  
2 background to this inspection, and these involved the  
3 removal of a child by Highland Regional Council after  
4 two members of staff were suspended and charged with  
5 an incident involving tying up of the child, and also  
6 allegations of rough handling?

7 A. Yes, and the inspection was focused on any deficiencies  
8 in the practice of care at the school and inappropriate  
9 provision for the pupils at the school.

10 Q. There is a separate allegation that a mother removed her  
11 daughter, alleging she had been raped in the school  
12 grounds.

13 A. That's right, yes. But this wasn't followed up in terms  
14 of HM Inspector of Schools.

15 Q. The outcome of the investigation of the -- I think,  
16 first of all, at 4.1.28, there was some consideration --  
17 the HM Inspector of Schools was asked to investigate and  
18 the investigation lasted 14 days?

19 A. Yes, that's quite a long period of time, two weeks, with  
20 the assistance of a Social Work Inspectorate, again  
21 because the difference in legislation.

22 Q. And what was the outcome?

23 A. The outcome was that the recommendations were made and  
24 there would be a follow-up inspection.

25 The Scottish Ministers were advised there were no

1 grounds for a notice of complaint given the very  
2 specialist provision that Camphill provided, and that  
3 a follow-up visit by the Chief Social Work Inspector  
4 accompanied by another SWSI Inspector, indicated that  
5 they were impressed by the school's integrated approach  
6 to care, education and therapy.

7 I think it's important to bring out that it was the  
8 Chief Social Work Inspector who visited, not just  
9 an assistant or an ordinary Social Work Inspector.

10 Q. That was a visit in September 1995?

11 A. That's right, yes, and another follow-up inspection by  
12 the Inspector of Schools were indicated that  
13 a designated child protection officer and other  
14 procedures had been instituted.

15 LADY SMITH: Can you just flesh out for me your feeling that  
16 it was important to stress that it was the Chief Social  
17 Work Inspector himself, I suspect, who visited?

18 A. Yes, yes. The previous cases, it was an Assistant Chief  
19 Social Work Inspector, ie, the Inspector who held the  
20 brief for all childcare at that time and had for other  
21 inspectors under their management.

22 In this case, the Chief Social Work Inspector  
23 decided to visit.

24 LADY SMITH: And that's not very common?

25 A. I haven't come across it. In all the other inspections,

1           it is either the Social Work Inspector and some times,  
2           if there is a serious issue, the Assistant Chief Social  
3           Work Inspector.

4   LADY SMITH:  Why, in this case, do we find the Chief Social  
5           Work Inspector leading it?

6   A.  I think by 1995 there were serious concerns in  
7           residential schools and this is the third case, if you  
8           like, that had come up.  Camphill, a Rudolf Steiner  
9           School was clearly thought as a very specialist  
10          provision and, therefore, the attention of the Chief  
11          Social Work Inspector to reassure the Inspectorate and  
12          Ministers I think was regarded as important.

13   LADY SMITH:  So we are getting a tension here between, on  
14          the one hand, being desperate not to lose the specialist  
15          provision that the Rudolf Steiner School could afford --  
16          because nobody else was offering that -- but, on the  
17          other hand, recognising there was a real problem with  
18          the allegations, with the failures that were occurring  
19          in the school, and that needed to be addressed, or the  
20          answer had to be: enough, no more?

21   A.  The answer had to be addressed, otherwise the  
22          recommendation for deregistration under a notice for  
23          complaint would have been issued.

24   LADY SMITH:  Thank you.

25   MR MACAULAY:  Just on that line, I think part of the remit



1 for the inspection was to -- whether or not they would  
2 have to consider serving a notice of complaint.

3 A. That's right, yes.

4 Q. But it's made clear in the report that there were no  
5 grounds for such --

6 A. There were no grounds. They were satisfied that the  
7 school had instituted enough remedial measures to avoid  
8 that.

9 Q. You then go on to have a short section on Stanmore House  
10 in Lanark, in 1996, 1998, that is 4.1.32, on page 131.  
11 That's another example of the SWSI assisting the HM  
12 Inspector of Schools with an inspection and this was in  
13 September 1997?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. This school, you tell us, was managed by Capability  
16 Scotland and, again, it was catering for children with  
17 complex learning and physical difficulties. It was  
18 seeking registration with the Local Authority under  
19 section 34 of the 1995 Act; that's what you tell us?

20 A. That's right, yes. The inspection was led by the HM  
21 Inspector of Schools with some assistance from the  
22 Social Work Inspectorate.

23 Q. At 4.1.33, you indicate that the inspection lasted  
24 a full week?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So, again, a thorough --

2 A. A thorough inspection, with the Social Work Service  
3 Inspector visiting the school for two days.

4 Q. As you tell us in the last section, in this part,  
5 4.1.34, although they were described as minor comments,  
6 the HMI Inspector's report was generally supportive?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Could I add that these four cases were really the  
9 only cases I could uncover from the retained files  
10 dealing with that specialist independent school.

11 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

12 A. Which I don't apologise for, but that's all I could  
13 find. There might have been other cases.

14 MR MACAULAY: The next school you look at is Donaldson  
15 College, that used to be in Edinburgh and I think it's  
16 moved.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But this is another residential school where, in 1998,  
19 the HM Inspector of Schools was assisted by the SWSI,  
20 and the college, you tell us, was an independent  
21 grant-aided school and provided nursery, primary and  
22 secondary education for pupils throughout the UK.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Essentially, although the pupils may have had other  
25 problems, essentially it catered for pupils who were

1 severely or profoundly deaf?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. Now, in 4.1.36, on page 133, there was an allegation of  
4 rape concerning two of Donaldson's pupils, which  
5 allegedly occurred outside of the grounds of the school;  
6 did that result in the Board of Governors conducting  
7 an internal inquiry?

8 A. Yes, which the SOED thought or believed had acted with  
9 complete proprietary, full co-operation with the police,  
10 and the female pupil was offered counselling.

11 The Minister was informed -- it was obviously in the  
12 press at the time -- that in the light of other recent  
13 occurrences, presumably at Camphill, Raddery and  
14 Oakbank, this minute was put forward, but it was not of  
15 the same order, did not involve school attendance and  
16 was really a matter for the police, rather than the  
17 Education Department.

18 Q. In relation to Donaldsons; were there also allegations  
19 made against the Headmaster?

20 A. Yes, later, the Highland Regional Council informed the  
21 Education Department two boys -- on two boys they had  
22 placed in the school, the Headmaster had stated -- in a  
23 drunken state, had wandered into the bedroom apparently  
24 singing and talking nonsense. There seemed to be some  
25 difficulty within the school about pursuing the

1 complaint.

2 In addition, the headteacher had entered the girls'  
3 bedroom and Regional Council believed the girls were  
4 under 16 years of age, their education authority ought  
5 to be informed, and the usual child protection  
6 procedures set in train.

7 Q. There was no suggestion of sexual abuse at that time?

8 A. No, no, there weren't.

9 Q. But there was an allegation by a female student  
10 suggesting that, at Lochgilphead Outdoor Centre, she had  
11 been raped by the Headmaster?

12 A. That's right, yes.

13 Donaldsons suggested the Scottish Office carry out  
14 an investigation and they apparently believed that they  
15 would, like Camphill, come out of it quite well.

16 The Education Department official advised that it  
17 wasn't really a matter for the Minister and not for  
18 inquiry.

19 Q. Was there an inspection of Donaldson in April and May  
20 1998 and you talk about that at 41, on 46.

21 A. Yes. It was evident that there was some concern within  
22 Edinburgh and Lothian's Child Protection Committee on  
23 Donaldson. It's not clear what other evidence they had  
24 obtained. They were concerned that the school had not  
25 registered or sought registration with them, as it

1 should have, under the 1995 Act, and had not engaged  
2 with the City's child protection programme.

3 Q. Then the inspection, in 1998, do you tell us that the HM  
4 Inspector of Schools were accompanied on this occasion  
5 by an SWSI Inspector?

6 A. Yes, again that format, the difference is in the  
7 legislation, and it was assisted by the Social Work  
8 Inspectorate, and it transpired as a result of that --  
9 further allegations against the Headmaster, who after  
10 the HM Inspector of Schools had talked to the governor,  
11 the Chair of the Governors was suspended.

12 Q. If we look at 4.1.49, page 139, do you say that the  
13 inspection report published in June 1998 made a series  
14 of recommendations on strengthening the school's child  
15 protection procedures?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And that would be through the development of a personal  
18 safety programme for the pupils, and a more child and  
19 parent friendly complaints procedure?

20 A. Yes, they should institute, basically, Edinburgh and  
21 Lothian's Child Protection Programme, which included  
22 those elements.

23 Q. Once again, did this result in an action plan for the  
24 school to follow through?

25 A. Yes, yes, which would be monitored.

1 Q. The final paragraph here is at 4.1.50, where you tell us  
2 that in August 1998 one of the HM Inspector of Schools  
3 met the acting headteacher and a member of the Board of  
4 Governors; would that be usual, unusual for that sort of  
5 direct contact? Not in an inspection context, but  
6 another context.

7 A. I can't say for absolute certainty whether that happened  
8 at Raddery, Oakbank and Camphill. There is an inference  
9 that it did. All I can say is that here it is  
10 accurately stated that the Inspector of Schools met the  
11 acting headteacher and a member of the Board of  
12 Governors.

13 I wouldn't be surprised at that, that the Schools  
14 Inspectorate want to make sure that the headteacher and  
15 Member of the Board of Governors were aware of their  
16 concern and being informed of the progress that had been  
17 made, so it wasn't just an issue of the, if you like,  
18 headteacher following out and saying: yes, I've done  
19 that. The Board of Governors were also confirming that  
20 those actions had been taken.

21 Q. You have noted the progress that what actions had been  
22 taken, namely, in relation to security, the introduction  
23 of a video-controlled entry system, five additional  
24 residential staff and, for teachers, a further programme  
25 of child protection?

1 A. That's right, yes, yes.

2 Q. So these were areas identified by the inspection, which  
3 formed part of the action plan?

4 A. It clearly was. And I think it's obvious that the  
5 issues had come as a shock to the Board of Governors.

6 Q. That was the next point I was going to raise with you.  
7 Not only the issues, but also the prevarication by the  
8 Headmaster on seeking registration under the 1995 Act?

9 A. Yes. They had not understood their legal position as  
10 a Board of Governors; that they were required as  
11 managers of the institution to seek registration and  
12 that they were liable as much as the Headmaster,  
13 Headteacher.

14 Q. You then have a short section on Wellington School,  
15 Penicuik, 4.1.51, page 140, and again you have the HM  
16 Inspector of Schools being assessed by the SWSI in 1999,  
17 in connection with a planned inspection of Wellington  
18 School?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And this is a school that's managed by Edinburgh City  
21 Council and catered for the needs of 12 to 16-year-old  
22 boys with social, emotional and behavioural  
23 difficulties. So, again, it's a special school?

24 A. It's a special school, and I've included this because  
25 you can see that the SWSI indicated that it would not be

1       able to join the inspection team because of other  
2       commitments, but would be willing to have an office  
3       meeting as a result of the inspection to run through any  
4       issues that arose, which it did, the top of the  
5       following page.

6               The level and deployment of staff, assessment of  
7       pupils needs, and Wellington's contribution to Edinburgh  
8       City Council's Children's Services plan.

9   Q. Next school you look at is Woodlands School in Newton  
10       Stewart, in 1999. And this is in March 1999, the HM  
11       Inspector of Schools completed a follow-up inspection of  
12       the independently managed residential Woodlands School,  
13       so there had been a previous inspection?

14   A. Yes, there had been a previous inspection. I've  
15       included this one because, if you like, because of the  
16       caveat role of the Social Work Service Inspectorate,  
17       that it wasn't -- they could not really join in the  
18       inspection in terms of registration. That was  
19       a matter -- they had no locus in that -- that was a  
20       matter for Dumfries and Galloway's arm's length  
21       Inspectorate. However, if there was an issue about the  
22       operation of that arm's length inspection, it would  
23       consider investigating the matter.

24               That's why I've included that. It's not just an HM  
25       Inspector of Schools; it's the role of SWSI.



1 Q. Finally, in this section, you have a review of  
2 independent special and grant-aided residential schools,  
3 and you mention, in the first paragraph, the schools  
4 that are covered and what the outcomes were.

5 Likewise, at 4.1.56, you indicate that these  
6 inspections of Stanmore, Wellington and Woodlands, they  
7 form part of the routine inspection programme and were  
8 not the results of --

9 A. No, yes, yes.

10 Q. And finally in this section, ahead of the 1995 Act, the  
11 primary authority central to conduct the inspection of  
12 these schools lay with the HM Inspector of Schools?

13 A. That's right, yes.

14 MR MACAULAY: My Lady --

15 LADY SMITH: Is that a good place to break?

16 MR MACAULAY: I'm virtually finished with this section.

17 LADY SMITH: I can see that. Very well.

18 We are going to stop there for today,  
19 Professor Levitt. I look forward to welcoming you back  
20 tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. Thank you.

21 (3.46 pm)

22 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am  
23 on Wednesday, 31 May 2023)

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