

Friday, 8 December, 2023

1

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY SMITH: Good morning, and welcome to the last day this
4 week of evidence in the Scottish Prison Service section
5 of our Phase 8 case study.

6 Ms Forbes, I think the witness is ready to go; is
7 that right?

8 MS FORBES: Yes, my Lady, the witness is Dan Gunn, so
9 I would call him next.

10 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

11 Good morning, Dan. Could we begin by you raising
12 your right hand and repeat after me.

13 Dan Gunn (sworn)

14 LADY SMITH: Do sit down. Just take your time to make
15 yourself comfortable, before we move on to the next
16 stage. I may be presumptuous by using your first name;
17 is that all right?

18 A. Yes, absolutely.

19 LADY SMITH: Mr Gunn is fine as well, if you prefer.

20 A. Dan is fine.

21 LADY SMITH: Thank you, Dan. You will see the red folder
22 has your statement in it. Thank you very much for
23 engaging with us to provide that statement, very
24 detailed statement. It has been really helpful to have
25 that in advance. Of course, this morning you have come

1 along to answer our questions based on that statement,
2 and I am really grateful to you for doing that.

3 Before I handover to Ms Forbes, can I just say that
4 if there is anything I can do to help you give your
5 evidence as comfortably as you can, whether it is giving
6 you a break at some point or anything else, just let me
7 know. I do take a break at about 11.30 during the
8 morning session in any event, so you can bear that in
9 mind. But, other points, if it works for you, it works
10 for me; all right?

11 A. Thank you.

12 LADY SMITH: If you are ready, I will hand over to Ms Forbes
13 and she will take it from there.

14 A. Thank you very much.

15 LADY SMITH: Ms Forbes.

16 Questions from Ms Forbes

17 MS FORBES: Thank you, my Lady.

18 Good morning, Dan.

19 A. Good morning.

20 Q. Thank you for coming along this morning. I understand
21 you are a little bit under the weather, so if there is
22 an issue -- I think you have a cold just now; is that
23 right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Just let us know if there are any problems.

1 A. Okay, thank you.

2 Q. Dan, you have the red folder in front of you with your
3 statement in it. Now, for our purposes, we have given
4 that a reference number. I am just going to read that
5 out for the transcript, so we have a record of that. It
6 is WIT-1-000001330. So that's just for our records.

7 If you could go to the last page of your statement,
8 Dan -- I think it is 60 pages long, so it is the very
9 last page. I think you can see at the bottom of that
10 there is a paragraph 197.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And there you state:

13 "I have no objection to my witness statement being
14 published as part of the evidence to the Inquiry.
15 I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are
16 true."

17 And you have signed that, and it is dated
18 26 September 2023?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. That seems correct, okay. If we just go back to the
21 beginning, then. What I will do is start from the
22 beginning of your statement, really. You have given us
23 your date of birth, you were born in 1950; is that
24 correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. First of all, I will just go through your education,
2 just briefly, before we look at your work history,
3 that's relevant to your evidence.

4 So I think, first of all, you undertook a Master of
5 Arts, an MA in History and Politics at Aberdeen
6 University and that was in 1972?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was that when you graduated; 1972?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And thereafter you had a brief time, I think, in
11 Nigeria; is that right?

12 A. Yes, with Voluntary Service Overseas.

13 Q. Yes, you were teaching. Then you undertook a second
14 degree in African politics at the University of
15 Birmingham, and I think you completed that; is that
16 right?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. Yes. So I think that was completed; was it 1975?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. I think your view was that you were going to go maybe
21 into teaching, but you changed your mind about that,
22 I think. We will come into that with your work history.

23 I think, just finishing off your education
24 background, later on, I think in early 2000/2001, you
25 undertook a MSc in Criminal Justice at Glasgow Graduate

1 School of Law?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So that's a kind of summary of your education
4 background, if you like.

5 In relation to your work history, then, I think the
6 idea of teaching, that idea, you changed your view on
7 that, I think, it is fair to say, isn't it? You didn't
8 want to go ahead into the teaching realm.

9 A. No. I changed my mind, yes.

10 Q. And I think it was an advert that you had seen about
11 a management position in the Prison Service, in the
12 Scottish Prison Service. I think it was entitled,
13 "Management with a social purpose", and I think we can
14 see that at paragraph 5 of your statement?

15 A. Yes, yes. Very arbitrary. If I hadn't seen that
16 advert, who knows where I would have ended up.

17 Q. So that caught your eye --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- that phrase?

20 A. Well, I was actively looking around for jobs and
21 potential careers.

22 Q. I think that led you then to apply, perhaps, I think
23 from what you have said in your statement, a little bit
24 half heartedly to begin with, to the Scottish Prison
25 Service, to undertake a management role?

1 A. Yes, yes. I think probably at the time I was just
2 looking for an expenses paid trip back to Scotland from
3 Birmingham. But, as I have said in my statement, two
4 assistant governors came along to talk to us in the
5 evening and they really sold the job to me.

6 Q. And you were impressed by them and that changed your
7 view on whether this was something you actually wanted
8 to do, and you then tried to actively try to get the
9 position at that point.

10 A. Yes, and as it happened those two then assistant
11 governors played a big part in my subsequent career, our
12 paths crisscrossed repeatedly.

13 Q. Okay. I think that led you, then, to being offered the
14 position, and this was, was it, assistant governor under
15 training that you started out as?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And I think you tell us it was a two-year training
18 programme, and you outline that you spent placements as
19 a prison officer during the course of that. And in
20 social work and in mental health as well?

21 A. Yes, it was a superb course, well put together. Lots of
22 interesting secondments, meeting lots of people,
23 a variety of courses down in Wakefield. All senior
24 people coming along to talk to you, academics as well as
25 practitioners. So it was, I thought, a very good

1 course.

2 Q. And Wakefield; was that the training sort of department
3 for the three prison services at the time, Scotland,
4 England and Wales?

5 A. Well, this shows the hierarchical nature of the Prison
6 Service, but it was called the Staff College, and it
7 trained, primarily, the governors for the English Prison
8 Service. But, on occasion, governors from Scotland and
9 Northern Ireland attended. But it was primarily for
10 England and Wales, and the Scots and the Irish were
11 tolerated.

12 Q. So England and Wales primarily, and then Scotland and
13 Northern Ireland?

14 A. Yes. We had one -- well, initially we had two
15 governors 4, that was one grade above assistant
16 governor. They were based at Wakefield, and then that
17 was reduced to one and I, as it happened ten years
18 later, I was the last governor from Scotland to be based
19 at Wakefield.

20 Q. I think you say you also undertook an intensive
21 management course during that two-year training period
22 as well?

23 A. Yes, I think it was the University of Strathclyde
24 Business School, they came and delivered a two-week
25 course to us. I think there was a bit of resistance to

1 management. We thought we were working with people,
2 not -- we weren't really greatly interested in
3 management theory. But it was a good introduction to
4 management and the complexity of management, certainly
5 in the public sector.

6 Q. I think that the placement, if I have read your
7 statement correctly, your placement as a prison officer;
8 was that in Perth Prison?

9 A. Yes, yes. The arrangement was, if you were under 25,
10 you had to do a whole year as a prison officer. If you
11 were 25 and over, you did three months. So I did
12 three months, and I was the first Assistant Governor in
13 training at Perth Prison to go through this three months
14 in uniform. So shall we say the staff were a bit
15 dubious about having this person in their ranks who was
16 going to become an assistant governor, a hall governor.

17 But, for the most part, the staff were very good and
18 very fair with me.

19 Q. I think Perth Prison was where you then were the
20 Assistant Governor under training, and then you became
21 Assistant Governor there after that; is that right?

22 A. Yes, yes. Completed my two years. I was transferred to
23 Glenochil, but my transfer was cancelled. One of my
24 colleagues left the service, so I was allowed to stay in
25 Perth and I was given responsibility for A Hall and

1 C Hall.

2 A Hall were the local prisoners. C Hall was the
3 catch-all Hall. We had category As; we had strict
4 escapees; we had long termers starting their sentence;
5 long termers downgraded from open prison, semi-open
6 prison. We had the remands from all the local courts'
7 punishments. So it was a very diverse hall, and it was
8 the only hall in Perth at that time where prisoners did
9 not dine in association.

10 Facilities were very poor. Recreation facilities
11 were very limited. So it was a -- from a very personal
12 point of view, it was a great way of starting one's
13 career, because I came across virtually every type of
14 prisoner, bar females. Every category of prisoner.

15 And in those days, we didn't have that many
16 categories of prisoners. As life has progressed over my
17 career, we subdivided prisoners into lots of other
18 different categories. But, at that time relatively
19 simple, long termers and short termers, convicted
20 remands, under 21, borstal demands, strict escapees,
21 category A prisoners. You may remember the dreadful
22 incident at the State Hospital when Messrs Mone and
23 McCulloch killed a nurse, a policeman, and I had Mr Mone
24 in my hall for a long time, and used to spend quite
25 a bit of time with him at weekends.

1 So it was a very varied role.

2 Q. I think the remand prisoners you have talked about there
3 also included young people as well; is that correct?

4 A. Yes, yes. I spent a lot of my time doing what was then
5 called borstal reports. Borstal was still in existence
6 then. So young people would be remanded in custody for
7 two weeks for court background reports and I would put
8 together a report for the Sheriff.

9 Q. Well, I think you come on to that in a little bit more
10 detail later in your statement. But, if we just go
11 through your work history first, and then we will come
12 back to that, if we can.

13 I think you tell us that Perth Prison -- your time
14 in Perth Prison, I think that starts from -- your
15 training period was 1975 and then you finished there in
16 1981?

17 A. I went to Dungavel in 1981.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. Yes, sorry.

20 Q. Your time at Perth Prison, sorry. It was probably the
21 way I put that to you there.

22 But you were in Perth Prison as assistant governor
23 under training and then assistant governor, and that was
24 until 1981. Then you moved to Dungavel from 1981 to
25 1985, and that was as a deputy governor. I think you

1 tell us a little bit about that. That was a small
2 establishment and there was the governor there, a female
3 governor and yourself, which you say was good because
4 you got lots of experience of senior management because
5 she was winding down to retirement at that time?

6 A. Yes, yes. If she was here, she would dispute that very
7 vehemently, but that was undoubtedly the situation.

8 She was very popular with the media and she used to
9 get lots of invitations to talk to organisations because
10 she was the first female governor, and she accepted
11 every invitation that came her way. And then nearer the
12 time, she then hesitated whether to actually turn up or
13 not. So, if she didn't, then I was deputised.

14 And I do remember going to one hotel which was
15 absolutely packed with women. I was the only male
16 there, and I tried to make a joke about that when
17 I started.

18 Yes, she picked which events she went to and which
19 she didn't. But she was a remarkable lady, and I did
20 learn a lot from her.

21 Q. I think you tell us then that you were promoted from
22 that position in 1985, and you left Dungavel and you
23 went, as you have said earlier, you went down to
24 Wakefield, the Staff College, in England?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What was your role there? Was that as a trainer?

2 A. As a trainer, training the recruits. At that time, we
3 still had the two year training course, so there were
4 two sessions at Wakefield of six weeks where all the
5 assistant governors under training from the three UK
6 services participated, and there was a team of four
7 tutors, of which I was one, and we would deliver a lot
8 of the training.

9 Of course, we also brought in lots of speakers to
10 speak to the assistant governors.

11 Q. I think --

12 A. But I had a lot of time to myself, because it was only
13 two 12 weeks, and even allowing for the overlap, because
14 at any one time you could have two or three courses
15 running, so you had to timetable everything very
16 carefully. But, even with that, I still had a lot of
17 time to myself, which I was allowed to decide what, if
18 anything, I wanted to do.

19 Q. Yes. I think you tell us, at paragraph 9 of your
20 statement, that you got involved in some of the English
21 courses and you were teaching some management courses in
22 race relations, which was an interest of yours, and
23 hostage management as well?

24 A. Yes, those were the two that the management of the
25 college were keen -- they always needed more people in

1 terms of hostage management training, and race relations
2 at that time was not a popular subject to teach. It was
3 not a popular subject to be involved in at any time. So
4 they were more than delighted that I offered to get
5 involved in that.

6 And some very difficult training situations in --
7 with these courses. The governors in England used to
8 send, I think, their most prejudiced staff on the
9 course, thinking this would transform them, and they
10 would suddenly become liberal and progressive. And
11 I think it did -- that did work in some cases. But,
12 equally, it didn't work in many cases. And the famous
13 phrase is, "I'm not a racist, but ...", and then you
14 would get a stream of invective in varying degrees next.

15 So it was a very -- as a trainer, it was incredibly
16 challenging, but, you know, very worthwhile. And
17 I believed in what I was doing, and the fellow tutors
18 were also exemplary in terms of their commitment.

19 Q. So, having decided against a career in teaching, this
20 was you in the Prison Service delivering some teaching?

21 A. And I also learned a lot about the English service. At
22 that time in Scotland we weren't that interested in
23 policy. The top leadership were of the view: we are
24 an operational service, we get through the day.

25 That was really it, in a nutshell. Whereas England,

1 when I went there, I found they had policies on all
2 sorts of subjects, which I lapped up. But then --
3 because after a year or two I suddenly -- well, maybe
4 not suddenly, but I gradually found that a lot of these
5 policies were never enacted, they had a policy, but it
6 was often parked in the governor's -- on the governor's
7 desk or in his bookshelves and never saw the light of
8 day.

9 Q. So something on paper, but it wasn't really put into
10 practice?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I think you tell us you were there, down at the Staff
13 College in Wakefield, until 1987, when I think you were
14 asked to come back to Scotland and help with the opening
15 of the new Prison at Shotts, which was scheduled to open
16 in 1987. And I think you tell us that was about four
17 months that you were involved in being part of the
18 management team there?

19 A. Yes, this turned out to be the most difficult time of my
20 career. I was working with very senior colleagues, all
21 who had, on the surface, exemplary careers, but they had
22 no -- how can I choose my words carefully? They did not
23 have the ability to start something fresh. They were
24 used to operating in a given working environment, and
25 a lot of that working environment was custom and

1 practice, and much of it localised.

2 So, when you have senior managers coming in from all
3 different prisons and then staff coming in from all
4 different prisons, you needed policy, you needed
5 a coherent approach, and I found it incredibly
6 frustrating that the senior managers either didn't see
7 it that way or didn't want to see it that way, and
8 resisted all my efforts to try and structure and
9 organise training. And what we would now call a vision
10 for Shotts, that was not on anybody's agenda.

11 Q. I think you say that everyone had their own way, you say
12 there was localised custom and practice, and they wanted
13 to do it that way. So there was the Edinburgh way, the
14 Barlinnie way, and the Glenochil way?

15 A. And every other way at the time. It was very -- there
16 was one other manager who saw the world as I did, and he
17 had been based at Shotts. Whereas I knew I was just
18 going to be there and then I would be out again. But we
19 had great difficulty convincing the management team.

20 And then I did have a direct route to the then
21 director of HR, and he was very sympathetic. He
22 understood the dilemmas that I was facing, and he and
23 the then head of operations then changed the management
24 team at Shotts and put -- took people out and put new
25 people in, and that did make a significant difference.

1 Q. I think you tell us that around that time there had been
2 quite a few incidents with long term prisoners,
3 particularly at Peterhead, and that was a difficult time
4 for the Scottish Prison Service?

5 A. Absolutely. The first incident that happened at
6 Edinburgh, then that triggered other incidents at
7 Barlinnie, Perth, and Peterhead.

8 And I was down in England, so I was out of it all.
9 But we'd never experienced anything like this before,
10 and we were losing halls. We weren't losing flats; we
11 were losing halls. And it was a --

12 LADY SMITH: What do you mean when you say that?

13 A. Losing control.

14 LADY SMITH: Losing control, yes.

15 A. We lost control of halls, and the most vivid picture
16 that people will remember is of an officer on the roof
17 in chains in Peterhead; that's just awful beyond belief.

18 LADY SMITH: And we are now in the late 1980s?

19 A. Yes, 1987.

20 LADY SMITH: Yes.

21 A. So, from 1985 to 1987, we had a series of incidents, and
22 all revolving around hostage taking and losing halls, or
23 having to take back control of halls. And that was
24 a new experience for everybody and a very painful
25 experience for everybody.

1 Q. I think you say that there was a lot of public interest
2 as a result of that, and you talk about Andrew Coyle
3 being interviewed for a TV programme, and talking about
4 the lack of training for governors.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Despite the fact that you had this two-year training
7 course. I think when you started, I think you tell us
8 earlier in your statement, it was maybe the third year
9 of that running. But, once you had that, if you had
10 come in at that stage when that had been put into place,
11 after that you didn't get a lot of training and there
12 was a need to change the training situation?

13 A. Yes, it was -- you know, the world was changing. The
14 Prison Service was trying to run prisons on the basis of
15 the society of the 1950s: everybody knew their place,
16 everybody was deferential, the hierarchies were in
17 place.

18 And, of course, the 1960s came along and blew that
19 apart. But nobody told the Prison Service of these
20 changes.

21 So, suddenly, in the 70s -- and then in England they
22 had a lot of trouble in the early 1970s, and our
23 troubles came in the mid-1980s. And people realised: we
24 can't keep running the prisons the way that we have been
25 running them. Society has moved on and we just need

1 a new approach.

2 Q. I think that led to you being given the task of setting
3 up the Training, Planning and Development Unit for the
4 Scottish Prison service. You tell us that at
5 paragraph 12. That was in 1987?

6 A. Yes, that was very exciting. And although I was loathe,
7 in all honesty, to leave Wakefield, I really was
8 enjoying my time there, but I recognised the need for
9 some planning and we needed to change the training for
10 prison officers. We needed to change the way we
11 recruited our trainers, and we needed to improve the
12 training for newly recruited governors and beyond.

13 So there was a huge agenda and, for the one and only
14 time in my life, money was no problem, money was thrown
15 at me, and I couldn't spend the money quickly enough for
16 some people. But it took time to put a structure in
17 place, and the head of HR, who I had good relationship
18 with, he gave me a recently retired deputy schools
19 inspector who was to work part time with me.

20 And talk about first impressions, I thought: this
21 chap is going to be no help to me whatsoever, and how do
22 I sideline him?

23 However, I could not have been more wrong and he and
24 I became good friends. And I learned a huge amount from
25 him, and through him we managed to get training for our

1 trainers at Jordanhill College, which at a stroke
2 changed the whole expectations of trainers and gave them
3 a status that they'd never had in the service before.

4 Jordanhill College, at that time, was seen as one of
5 Scotland's Premier training colleges, and to have staff
6 going there doing intensive work as trainers was
7 fabulous. And that sent out a very powerful message to
8 the whole Prison Service: things have changed. Things
9 are changing.

10 And then we changed the prison officers' training.

11 Up to that point the recruits used to sit in a very
12 formal lecture theatre being talked at five weeks out of
13 six. We changed all that. We split them into two
14 groups. They were in a group of eight with one tutor
15 and they did their training either in the group of eight
16 or in a group of 16 with two tutors. So we completely
17 revolutionised the training for prison officers.

18 And one of my colleagues, he took on the job of
19 training -- devising new training for the governor
20 grade. So it was a very exciting and dynamic and,
21 I think, productive year. We did a lot. Of course, all
22 these changes had to bed down and the culture resisted
23 a lot of changes, and the adage that you forget all you
24 learned at the college, you know, what you need to know
25 is what I will teach you on the gallery. So we were

1 fighting that constantly.

2 And trying to bring in a more human rights approach
3 to training, which again was contested by some people.
4 Not by everybody, but was contested by some. Having
5 policies. The idea of following policy; that you
6 couldn't just do your own thing, however well
7 intentioned you may think you may be, but you have to
8 follow policy. Standing orders had to be reviewed and
9 updated.

10 So it was a very different world in which we were --
11 which we were trying to create at that time.

12 Q. And I think you tell us that, the unit, the training
13 unit, was Polmont College; is that right?

14 A. Yes, yes.

15 Q. You say that the focus then and the training, how you
16 revolutionised it was to have this face to face training
17 and to focus on responsivity, verbal and interpersonal
18 skills?

19 A. Absolutely. The key phrase was "interpersonal skills".
20 Everybody talked about interpersonal skills, and it was
21 about doing a lot of role playing; how do you deal with
22 an angry prisoner? How do you deal with an apathetic
23 prisoner? How do you deal with a difficult prisoner?
24 And trying to get staff -- who at that time in their
25 training were very keen, very enthusiastic -- trying to

1 get them to work through different scenarios. So it was
2 really, really interesting.

3 Q. I think you say, at paragraph 16, that there was already
4 some training in control and restraint that had probably
5 started in the early/late 1980s. You continued with
6 that, but used specialised trainers?

7 A. Yes, yes. I didn't have anything to do with that; that
8 was a different team.

9 But, again, it was important that you had to have
10 a proper way of managing difficult prisoners. If you
11 were trying to move a prisoner who didn't want to move
12 from place A to place B, then you had to have a system
13 in place to do that, lawfully, and minimising the risk
14 of any injury, either to the prisoner or to the staff.

15 Q. I think you said there was a focus on difficult
16 prisoners in the 1980s and an advisory committee was set
17 up, with a particular focus on violent prisoners who
18 were in segregation?

19 A. Yes, we were left with -- after this, after the dust
20 settled from all the incidents, we were left with about
21 50 difficult prisoners. And "difficult" meant lots of
22 different meanings, but -- and the object was to get
23 that 50 down, to get them into mainstream gradually.
24 And that was the overall strategy.

25 There was a hard core of a group of prisoners who

1 just did not want to engage at all, and we set up this
2 advice committee which had external representation, and
3 they would interview prisoners. If they had been in
4 segregation -- I think it was three months. If they had
5 been in segregation three months, then they would be
6 interviewed by two members of the advisory committee to
7 see if there was some way that we could break into this
8 cycle that they were in.

9 So, gradually, we reduced the numbers, and then
10 Peterhead took on a different population entirely, with
11 the sex offenders in the 1990s, and we absorbed all the
12 difficult prisoners, either in the mainstream or we
13 created more specialist units.

14 Barlinnie Special Unit, when I was governor for
15 three years, that was the leader. But we had a Shotts
16 unit, we had a Peterhead unit, we had a Perth unit and,
17 at one time, we envisaged having more units. But
18 I think the view changed.

19 The view was we were managing the prisoners better
20 in mainstream. Mainstream had improved. We weren't --
21 as our critics were saying, we were no longer making bad
22 prisoners worse. We were managing them, we were
23 listening to them more, we were engaging them more. So
24 we weren't creating the difficult prisoners of the
25 1980s.

1 The units all had their problems; how you manage
2 boundaries in units; how you manage entry/exit; how do
3 you measure progress? So I think more and more people
4 realised units are not a panacea, and the units bring
5 problems of their own.

6 As well as being very expensive to run. And from
7 the mid 1990s, expense became a big issue. The staff
8 structure review was commissioned in 1995, when we were
9 facing the possibility of market testing. So we
10 suddenly had to be a lot more objective about what were
11 the benefits of the units; how many units did we really
12 need? So that ended up with all the units closing,
13 except the Shotts unit.

14 Q. Just going back to the time that you were in the --
15 developing this training unit, I think you tell us at
16 paragraph 17 that at that time prison officers were
17 recruited by adverts and there was no minimum education
18 requirement, because that came in much later. And the
19 assessment by human resources was by career civil
20 servants at that time?

21 A. Yes. Looking back on that time, if there was one thing
22 I would have done differently, I would have got
23 personally involved in the selection process.

24 I thought, rightly or wrongly, I had enough on my
25 plate at the time. But very important -- I believe in

1 training. I believe in the importance of training, the
2 value of training, but who are you training? And we
3 were using managers from the old school -- if I can
4 simplify matters like that. We were using managers from
5 the old school who were going to recruit people in their
6 own image.

7 At that time, we didn't have all of the knowledge
8 that we have now, and have had for a number of years,
9 about the dangers of recruitment and how you do tend to
10 recruit in your own image because you think you are the
11 best and you want people like you in the job.

12 LADY SMITH: Dan, when you are referring to managers,
13 I think you say middle managers in paragraph 17; are
14 these people who are working in Scottish Prison Service
15 headquarters or are they generally working in the civil
16 service out with SPS?

17 A. There was a variety, because at times we needed a lot of
18 recruitment. So anybody could be thrown in to do
19 recruitment.

20 LADY SMITH: So was the key to get people at a certain
21 grade --

22 A. Yes.

23 LADY SMITH: -- and they might not have been working in
24 prisons at time?

25 A. Well, most of -- as I recall, most of the recruitment

1 was done by a panel of three, and you would have a civil
2 servant, usually a HR person -- and in those days HR
3 people were not specialists --

4 LADY SMITH: No.

5 A. -- they were career civil servants who just moved in and
6 out of HR -- and you would have two operational
7 managers. So you might have trainers from the prisons
8 coming in or just people who governors would release.

9 So you would phone a governor and say: could you
10 release a manager for a panel of interviews next week?

11 And of course the governors would release the people
12 that they valued the least.

13 LADY SMITH: These panels would be interviewing people for
14 a wide range of prison jobs, would they?

15 A. No, just prison officer jobs.

16 LADY SMITH: Just prison officers?

17 A. Yes.

18 LADY SMITH: So they are interviewing people to work on
19 a daily basis, face to face with prisoners?

20 A. Yes.

21 LADY SMITH: But, at that time, nobody on the panel would be
22 themselves working face to face with prisoners or
23 necessarily have experience of that?

24 A. Oh, no, no. I think most -- I think two of the three
25 would have come from prisons.

1 LADY SMITH: Okay, right.

2 A. And would have had a lot of operational experience.

3 LADY SMITH: But not contemporaneous?

4 A. No, well, they tended to be the older managers.

5 LADY SMITH: Right.

6 A. And as I was saying, they very much typified the old
7 school of thinking.

8 LADY SMITH: So they are thinking of what it was like in
9 their day?

10 A. Yes.

11 LADY SMITH: Just going back to what you say about the
12 assessment of the applications; that's the sifting of
13 the applications, is it?

14 A. Yes.

15 LADY SMITH: Thank you. Sorry, Ms Forbes.

16 MS FORBES: My Lady, thank you.

17 I think you say when this was happening these panels
18 were looking for people who looked and sounded the part,
19 and there was an emphasis on brawn and physique. We
20 have heard evidence about a lot of prison officers'
21 backgrounds perhaps being in the military; is that the
22 kind of thing you are talking about there?

23 A. Yes. I can't quote any statistics, and I don't know if
24 you have uncovered any? But certainly a number of staff
25 had been, I think, in the services. But I didn't

1 actually come across that many. I think this is more of
2 a myth than reality.

3 But, again, I say that with great caution, because
4 I have not seen any statistics about that.

5 LADY SMITH: Dan, we should probably tell you that we have
6 heard from two men this week, sitting in the chair you
7 are sitting in now, who worked in prisons, both of whom
8 had a military background, one with the Paras, one from
9 the Marines, and one only retired in 2014. The other
10 retired in 2004, I think.

11 A. Yes, so I am sure there were a lot of -- certainly some
12 of the governors had been in the military, but not that
13 many.

14 When I joined, the governor of Peterhead had been in
15 the Army and some of the middle managers that we
16 recruited had been in the military. But I think the key
17 feature of governor grade was diversity, although we
18 didn't use that word. But the incredibly varied
19 backgrounds -- and this was true in England as well as
20 in Scotland -- of governors. No two governors were
21 alike.

22 In terms of prison officers, I think from the 1980s,
23 when we expanded our recruitment, we were actually
24 recruiting more tradesmen. You know, we were giving
25 them a reasonably good salary and a good pension and

1 a predictable job, a safe job, a job for life. So they
2 didn't have the vagaries of, you know, being
3 an electrician or a plumber, or whatever. And I think,
4 certainly from my experience, a lot of the staff were
5 people who had been doing trades of one description or
6 another.

7 Q. I think you also say that male and female staff were
8 still separate at that time, and the staffing wasn't
9 combined until 1991?

10 A. Yes, that was -- I did a visit to the Dutch Prison
11 Service in 1990, through one of the international
12 fellowships, and I spent two weeks studying the Dutch
13 Prison Service. And one of the features that I noticed
14 was that the staff, male and female, were
15 interchangeable. I knew we were looking at that, but
16 there was a lot of trepidation about making the change.
17 And at that time we were an incredibly male dominated
18 service, very few females.

19 The governor grade had been brought together way
20 back in -- well, before I joined, and that was how Agnes
21 was promoted to Governor 3, she got there on her own
22 merits on a promotion board. But she and her boss, Lady
23 Martha Bruce, who died just a few months ago, they were
24 female governors in female prisons. But that
25 distinction was abolished, I think probably the early

1 1970s. But it took us 20 years do that with women.

2 And there was a lot of concern about that,
3 particularly in the early days, when we had a very small
4 number of female staff in male prisons. They were under
5 a lot of pressure.

6 Q. So was the concern a safety one?

7 A. I think there were a lot of concerns. Safety, yes,
8 I think that's what the -- most people would articulate.
9 The prisoners would behave more badly towards female
10 staff. There was never any evidence of that. And most
11 people thought it would be the opposite, which
12 transpired to be the case.

13 The height restriction, the image, the very macho
14 image, notwithstanding the new training that we'd
15 brought in years -- just four years earlier. Still,
16 I think I would have to acknowledge it was still a very
17 macho service, so bringing women into that was going to
18 be problematic.

19 Q. And I think you tell us that this programme that you
20 devised whilst you were setting up this unit meant that
21 new recruits -- was this new prison officers? -- could
22 come back to the college on two occasions later on in
23 the year?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. For a refresher?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And -- sorry.

3 A. Yes, that was to try to reinforce the good practice that
4 we were teaching and to -- also, to send out a message
5 about the importance of training; that training was
6 ongoing. It is not something that you just do at the
7 beginning of a job and then forget about it.

8 So we were developing lots of new courses and, from
9 that time onwards, we started having a lot more
10 specialist roles within the service.

11 Up to that point, the number of specialists was very
12 few. But we started creating a lot of different roles,
13 and you needed to have some process of assessing staff
14 for these roles and trying to assess, on the one hand,
15 ability, proven ability. Equally, you are trying to
16 assess potential, which is always difficult, trying to
17 identify people who have the ability to do other jobs
18 than the ones that they have been doing.

19 So that was very interesting and very challenging.

20 Q. I think you say -- and you have touched on this
21 already -- that your one regret was that you didn't get
22 involved in the recruitment of staff. You said, you
23 know, you had a lot on your plate, and that would be
24 another thing to add in. But that was something that,
25 when you think back, when you reflect --

1 A. Yes, and even if I had just got it on to the agenda and
2 got people talking about it, and the dangers of
3 recruiting people in your own image. That perception
4 was just sort of emerging at that time and we just
5 didn't have a debate about who to recruit.

6 We had a debate about qualifications, and I was
7 always one of those who was trying to improve the basic
8 qualifications we need to be prison officers. And that
9 tied in with another part of the change agenda; getting
10 staff who could write and who would write reports on
11 prisoners, who would write reports on incidents, and to
12 see that report writing was a key part of the prison
13 officer's job. That was a step far too far for a lot of
14 people. They just didn't want to know that, didn't
15 recognise that.

16 And of course a lot of the cases that went to court,
17 both the operational cases and the human rights cases --
18 many of which we lost because of poor record keeping.
19 I think it was still a problem when I retired, and
20 I suspect it is still a problem today, getting accurate
21 records and making sure -- managers making sure staff
22 keep accurate records at all times.

23 Q. I think you talk about record keeping, perhaps
24 particularly when you were later at Polmont, later in
25 your statement, and we might touch on that later on.

1 A. That was -- excuse me -- a huge issue for a lot of
2 people. The idea that prison officers should be able to
3 write reports was -- I was going to say anathema, that's
4 not quite right. It was just outwith the mindset of
5 a lot of managers. They just didn't think that was --
6 they couldn't see where the world was going, you know,
7 in terms of human rights, in terms of court cases, in
8 terms of the need for evidence, the hostage cases, the
9 incidents. We were learning as we went along in terms
10 of how to manage a hostage incident, and some commanders
11 kept good records, some didn't. But we learned we had
12 to keep good records.

13 LADY SMITH: Dan, I suppose that's not just for the purpose
14 of evidence in case you have to be able to show in the
15 future what happened and protect your own position,
16 putting it frankly. But, if you keep good records, they
17 can be learnt from in the future; others can go back to
18 them and learn what worked and what didn't work in
19 particularly difficult situations; isn't that right?

20 A. Yes, absolutely. But the culture was so negative
21 towards record keeping. It was a hard, hard slog to get
22 this over to people. And of course it didn't affect
23 every prison officer or every governor, but I think it
24 was obvious to me and many others that this was the
25 direction of travel, and if we don't invest in this, we

1 are going to reap a very negative dividend down the
2 line, which is what happened, sadly, on numerous
3 occasions; our records were non-existent; our records
4 were not consistent, and the courts took a dim view of
5 that, and understandably so.

6 We were reluctant to really push this.

7 And I remember the then operations director and
8 myself having a chat, and he wasn't disagreeing with me,
9 but he didn't see the need for prison officers to be
10 able to write coherent papers the way that I saw that.

11 We are talking about the early/mid-1990s.

12 MS FORBES: I think you tell us that thinking about that
13 time you don't think they put enough resource into the
14 aptitude of candidates to be a prison officer, it wasn't
15 given enough priority.

16 A. We were changing the role of the prison officer. That's
17 what came out in the 1995 staffing structure review,
18 when we split the officer role in to two, into being
19 residential and operational. And quite -- there is no
20 two ways about it, it was a way of saving money, and
21 that was the objective, but it also helped us to focus
22 more on the residential officer role. And officers who
23 were working with prisoners had to have a new set of
24 skills, and they were being rewarded financially for
25 having those skills.

1 Because some staff, you realised, "Look, this new
2 world's not for me", and they opted down to being
3 operational officers. And that's fine. That was a call
4 that they made.

5 But we pushed this. But there was a lot of
6 resistance from the Union. The Union didn't like this
7 at all. They just wanted residential officers being
8 a continuation of the previous officer role.

9 And we had started initiatives at Dungavel, where we
10 had the group officer, the special unit for staff --
11 were really heavily involved in prisoner management.
12 A lot of staff were very nervous about that, nervous
13 about the accountability that came with that.

14 So we had a big challenge throughout the 1990s, and
15 arguably beyond, in changing the role of the prison
16 officer.

17 Q. So you are talking about a period a little bit later, in
18 the 1990s, when the role of the prison officer was split
19 and it became residential officer or operational
20 officer?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I think what from what you are describing, the
23 residential officer then was more prisoner focused and
24 facing, whereas the operational officer was then a lower
25 grade, lower --

1 A. Yes, either had no prisoner contact. For example, if
2 you visit a prison, the staff that you meet at the front
3 of house, they are all operational officers. The night
4 shift became operational. The escorts, the internal
5 escorts, although they did have prisoner contact, but
6 pretty minimal; you are moving a prisoner from the hall
7 to the visits or to the gym, or whatever. So those
8 were -- that was the divide that came in, in 1995. And
9 that gave us a ten per cent saving, at least on paper,
10 which satisfied Ian Lang, the then Secretary of State,
11 and he lifted the threat of market testing.

12 Where would we be today if market testing had come
13 in? I will leave that question in the air.

14 Q. I think you tell us you were only in that post for
15 a year, setting up that unit. But you enjoyed that, and
16 at the end of that you were promoted again, and I think
17 that takes us to 1988, where you became Governor at
18 Barlinnie Special Unit.

19 Was the special unit one of these units that you
20 touched upon earlier that was dealing with more
21 difficult prisoners, or was that something else?

22 A. Yes. No, absolutely, it was the trailblazer. It was
23 set up in the early 1970s on the back of various issues.
24 One was the abolition of the death penalty, 1965 and
25 then confirmed in 1969. So there was a fear of managing

1 people who would be doing a very long time in prison and
2 who would therefore have nothing to lose.

3 So there was a recognition, looking ahead, that
4 a group -- it could be a very small group because very
5 few people were hung, but particularly it reduced over
6 every decade. But it was still obviously a massive
7 issue in terms of the media.

8 There also had been the razor gangs in parts of
9 Glasgow in the 1960s. And the young men -- and they
10 were all young -- had congregated in Dumfries and were
11 proving a very difficult group to manage.

12 And then there were certain individuals, notably
13 Jimmy Boyle, [REDACTED], later Hugh Collins. But
14 certainly [REDACTED] and Boyle were proving very difficult
15 prisoners to manage at Peterhead. They were violent,
16 they were aggressive, and they were in and out of
17 segregation.

18 And there was a special segregation unit at
19 Inverness Prison, which is a tiny prison, a very small
20 prison, but they had a small segregation unit there
21 which had the very -- well, to put it mildly, the very
22 unfortunate nickname of "the cages". And Boyle and
23 [REDACTED] were in there a lot, and they attacked the
24 staff. One officer lost an eye in an incident there.

25 So that was the background for the special unit.

1 Those three factors.

2 And for once we had some very forward thinking,
3 progressive people at the time. There was
4 a psychiatrist, a civil servant, and a governor who saw
5 what was coming, and the idea was to create a special
6 unit. It was originally going to be at Perth, but the
7 ground at Perth that they had identified didn't --
8 wasn't suitable. So they took over what was then the
9 female unit in Barlinnie Prison and that became the
10 special unit.

11 One of the first mistakes was calling it "special".
12 Nobody now, in hindsight, would think that was a good
13 idea. If you call something special, then everybody in
14 that unit thinks that they are special; staff;
15 governors; prisoners.

16 LADY SMITH: And Jimmy Boyle became famous for another
17 reason while he was there, by writing a book.

18 A. Yes, and his sculpture, and they did -- brought in a lot
19 of artistic people, Joyce Laing, an incredible lady who
20 just died fairly recently, incredible lady, and one or
21 two other people.

22 So it established, very quickly, as an artistic
23 colony, for want of a better term, a therapeutic unit.

24 There was a similar mental health unit in the
25 Borders at that time, so there was a little bit of

1 cross-over in terms of thinking. Staff were all
2 volunteers. Prisoners were in effect volunteers. The
3 only person who wasn't a volunteer was the governor.
4 He -- until the very end, they were all males. We were
5 given no choice.

6 MS FORBES: Thank you. You tell us you were there for
7 three years before you were transferred to Greenock
8 Prison in 1991, which I think at that time had been
9 rebuilt and modernised, having been the female prison
10 before Cornton Vale.

11 A. Yes.

12 MS FORBES: And I think you say that had been a long-term
13 prison and then a prison for young offenders and then
14 became a local prison.

15 My Lady, I might have an issue with my computer
16 telling me it wants to restart in 15 minutes, but
17 I think I can probably continue.

18 LADY SMITH: Keep going for 15 minutes.

19 MS FORBES: I should be okay, I think. It has a countdown
20 on it.

21 LADY SMITH: This might be the threatened upgrade that will
22 just kick in. Let's keep going until it tells you you
23 can't keep going any longer, and then I think you will
24 get an opportunity to delay it. I think.

25 MS FORBES: Hopefully. We will see. I will continue.

1 LADY SMITH: Thanks.

2 MS FORBES: So you were at Greenock, then, and I think you
3 tell us, at paragraph 23 of your statement, that there
4 was an issue whilst you were there with suicides, and it
5 really caused you a bit of an issue. You say that was
6 something that scarred you.

7 They did have young offenders on remand there, like
8 some of the other prisons, but the suicides when you
9 were there were middle aged men.

10 A. Yes, it was a very difficult time. The causes were
11 different. There was no -- eventually there was
12 a theme, which was drugs, at Greenock. The drugs scene
13 in Greenock changed, and you could almost map it going
14 down the M8, from Glasgow to Greenock, but that was more
15 in my final year. And my successor had to contend with
16 that. We had a lot of drug related deaths.

17 But, in my case, we had one or two remands who died.
18 We also had two quite high profile male prisoners,
19 long-term adults, who realised, probably, they weren't
20 going to get out for a very long time, and that was
21 a sad realisation on their part. One had just
22 unbelievably -- I put him out on a special escorted
23 leave and he absconded. And the officer -- the way SELs
24 worked, it was volunteer staff who would take a prisoner
25 out without handcuffs, and just on a trusted basis. And

1 I always felt uncomfortable with that for the staff.
2 You know, I thought we were putting staff in a very
3 difficult position. However, the staff volunteered, and
4 nine times out of ten it went fine.

5 But this guy absconded and the officer was
6 distraught. The day after he was in my office and he
7 was inconsolable. And although it wasn't his fault in
8 any way, he saw it as his fault.

9 Anyway, he was recaptured within days, as invariably
10 they are, and he came back to Greenock, and he realised,
11 I think, "I have blown it". You know, "The Parole Board
12 are never going to let me out now", and he committed
13 suicide.

14 There was another chap, who again, I think,
15 realised, "I'm not going to get out any time soon". All
16 very sad and traumatic for the staff involved.

17 It can be traumatic for prisoners. A prisoner, if
18 there are two in the cell and one commits suicide, you
19 can imagine the impact on the other prisoner.

20 The other prisoners, the friends of the prisoner,
21 the family. I learned a lot at that time, how to cope
22 with the families and how to deal with the families;
23 that was very difficult and you just didn't know what
24 was coming your way. But it was important to try and
25 help the family as best one could. What that help was

1 varied from family to family. But what emerged for
2 me -- what the best approach was, finding an officer who
3 knew the prisoner very well and introducing that officer
4 to the family. And that, I think, went a long way in
5 helping the family. They realised he wasn't just
6 a number; he was a person and he was known as a person
7 in the prison. And that, to me, was vital.

8 It could be a gallery officer; it could be a works
9 officer; it could be a nurse. I used nurses
10 occasionally. And I always did it with -- and I was
11 very careful with staff, I said, "This is going to be
12 very difficult. If you don't want to do it, there's no
13 compulsion. Walk away". But I never had an officer
14 refuse to do that. They, like me, realised that they
15 could help the family come to terms with this unexpected
16 tragedy.

17 Q. I think you tell us later in your statement that you
18 made a point of just making yourself available to
19 families in that type of situation, so that if they
20 needed to speak to you, even if you weren't able to give
21 them any answers, you were there?

22 A. Yes, first thing, clear your diary. Anything the family
23 wanted. I had a family once where I said, you know,
24 "You can come up any time and I will see you", and the
25 reply was, "We will be up in half an hour". That

1 surprised me. Normally, it is later in the week. So
2 all families are different. Difficult to generalise.

3 It is not difficult, but it is dangerous to
4 generalise, and you just have to accept that every
5 situation is different. But the importance is of the
6 governor to be available and to spend time with the
7 family.

8 Q. And you tell us that you stayed at Greenock for
9 five years before you were then promoted to becoming
10 Governor of Polmont, in 1996. I think we will come on
11 to look at your time at Polmont in a little bit more
12 detail. But you stayed there for eight years before you
13 took up a post as the Deputy Director of Prisons; is
14 that at the Scottish Prison Service headquarters?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. I think you also then tell us that you became Governor
17 of Edinburgh Prison between 2006 and 2008, and then
18 requested a transfer. I think you say for the first
19 time in your career you requested a transfer, to
20 Glenochil. You were Governor there in 2008 to 2012.

21 I think you then go on to tell us that you
22 thought -- well, at that stage, I should just say that
23 Glenochil was no longer housing any young people?

24 A. Yes, they had long since gone.

25 Q. So it was only adult offenders that were there at that

1 time. I think you envisaged your time at Glenochil
2 being the time until you retired, but actually what
3 happened is you were asked to be Acting Director of
4 Prisons, and you did that, I think, between 2012 and
5 2014, when you did retire. I think it was January 2014;
6 is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I think you tell us that was the 38 years in the Prison
9 Service, starting in Perth and then going through the
10 various places that we have talked about.

11 You tell us, at paragraph 27, that you feel like you
12 had an interesting and, for the vast majority of time,
13 enjoyable career and you looked forward to going to work
14 and working with staff and colleagues?

15 A. Yes, absolutely. I was very enthusiastic about the
16 service and remain so.

17 Q. So I think you go on in your statement, paragraph 28, to
18 talk about a section on attitudes to young offenders.
19 I think this is you talking here about whether there
20 were specific training courses geared towards dealing
21 with young offenders. You tell us that back then there
22 wasn't. That in actual fact, when you joined in 1975,
23 the hierarchy was women, young offenders, long-term
24 adults, short-term adults, and then remand.

25 Then, ten years later, women and young offenders had

1 dropped way down the pecking order and really the
2 interest was all about long-term male adult prisoners
3 for quite a period of time?

4 A. Yes, that's not written down anywhere, so you will have
5 to take that as a subjective view on my part. But
6 I think most people would accept that overall
7 assessment.

8 Q. You name a couple of people that in your time you saw as
9 being individuals who prioritised young people, and had
10 come forward with some new thinking. But,
11 unfortunately, they hadn't geared anyone up to take
12 their place. So, when they went, that interest in young
13 people in the Scottish Prison Service seemed to
14 diminish?

15 A. Absolutely. And of course the numbers dropped
16 dramatically after borstal was abolished in, I think it
17 was 1981, and the detention centre as a separate
18 sentence went as well, the numbers of under 21s in
19 custody dropped considerably. And the focus very
20 quickly moved on to long-term prisoners. And of course
21 with the troubles in the mid-1980s, that was absolutely
22 reinforced.

23 But, yes, I never worked with either Charles or
24 Gordon. Well, I very briefly worked with Gordon Neave,
25 but only very briefly. That is when I did my

1 three months as an officer. So, as an officer trainee,
2 I had absolutely no contact with the governor
3 whatsoever.

4 But yes, nobody really came up behind them as
5 champions of young offenders.

6 And with women, well, Lady Martha was the champion,
7 but nobody really came in her wake, because most of the
8 women governors that did come in -- and we had a number
9 of very sort of -- I hope this doesn't sound
10 patronising, but very able and talented female
11 governors, they did not want to work with women; they
12 wanted to work with men. And it was always a struggle
13 to get people to go to Cornton Vale at every level, at
14 middle management level, at senior management level.
15 Cornton Vale was not a popular posting.

16 So the number of governors came and went at Cornton
17 Vale, a number of governors came and went at Polmont.

18 Dumfries was slightly different. But the sort of
19 intellectual interest in female offending and young
20 offender offending evaporated in the 1980s, and it came
21 back a little bit in the 1990s, when there were new
22 studies on female offending. Nancy Loucks pioneered
23 a lot of incredibly important research into female
24 offending in the mid-1990s, so some people became very
25 enthused by that, but not many.

1 And interest in female offending, as it continues,
2 comes and goes. At times you have a huge amount of
3 public interest in female offending and then it suddenly
4 evaporates and then it comes back again. This has been
5 a pattern for, I think, 30-odd years.

6 Q. You have mentioned there, Dan, that the population of
7 young offenders decreased and you talked about the
8 borstal sentence not being available any more.

9 There was a time when there were the three options
10 available. You could go to a Young Offenders Institute,
11 you could have the Glenochil Detention Centre, which was
12 a three-month sentence?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I think we have heard evidence about eight weeks, five
15 days and a breakfast or something like that for the
16 detention centre, and you had the borstal training,
17 which was a two-year sentence. But I think you tell us
18 in your statement -- and we have heard evidence about
19 this as well -- that it was invariably a lot less than
20 that, perhaps about nine months.

21 But two of those options, two out of the three
22 disappeared, and then there was only the young
23 offenders?

24 A. Yes. Sadly, we have no research on the time in the
25 1970s, and I vaguely meant to interview Charles Hills

1 and try to get his thoughts on Polmont, because he was
2 the -- historically, the longest serving governor at
3 Polmont. And for some reason, I don't know why, he
4 never wrote up his experiences on that. They would have
5 been invaluable. And nobody else did.

6 There has been a little bit of research on young
7 people, but it is often linked to suicide or mental
8 health problems, addiction problems.

9 When I went to Polmont in 1996, I realised I knew
10 very little about my population, and I did -- with the
11 support of the head of research, we did commission
12 training -- we did commission research into who our
13 young offenders were, and this was done by the
14 University of Stirling. And that was the first real
15 substantial piece of work that we had on who the young
16 people in custody were, what their backgrounds were.

17 And of course it told some people what they already
18 knew: a lot of young people had been in care; a lot had
19 truanted from school; a lot of them had poor literacy
20 levels; no work skills of any note.

21 But it was useful to have that in a formal research
22 project.

23 Q. I think you tell us in part of your statement -- that
24 you also said quite a lot of them were from the same
25 parts of Glasgow?

1 A. Yes, very much urban dominated, and a lot of tension
2 between the tribes, for want of a better term. I don't
3 know if I -- did I mention in my statement the youth
4 workers?

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. Yes. That was a really interesting way of challenging
7 this tribalism. And I sat in on one of the classes
8 because the lads had just come in and she had them in
9 a semicircle, and she asked them, just simply: what are
10 the three best things about your home area and what are
11 the three worst things about your home area?

12 Surprise, surprise, all the same. And yet they just
13 didn't realise that. You know, they thought their area
14 was special, was different, and their experiences were
15 equally special and different. So that was a way of
16 bringing young people together.

17 But I wouldn't want to exaggerate how effective that
18 was, but it was a way of addressing this underlying
19 climate of tribalism.

20 Q. Because I think you say that was something that was
21 happening in Polmont in a particular; was it one of the
22 wings? Was it the West Wing?

23 A. Yes, one wing, as they were called in Polmont when
24 I went there, wings, an English term, or a public school
25 term, perhaps. But Polmont was the only prison in

1 Scotland that had wings as opposed to halls.

2 So the wings, there was one wing called North Wing,
3 and it was seen as a Glasgow wing. And heaven help the
4 non-Glaswegians who ended up in that wing. So --

5 Q. I think later in your statement you tell us that there
6 was a particular incident that happened when quite a few
7 people from the Glasgow area in that wing were released
8 back home, and the balance of power, I think as you
9 described it, shifted and there were some issues,
10 I think?

11 A. Yes, it wasn't serious, but it was a bit of revenge on
12 the part of the non-Glaswegians. They saw
13 an opportunity and they took it. Thankfully there were
14 no serious injuries, but it was a bid for power and
15 a bid to demonstrate power, and to tell Glaswegians: you
16 are not going to rule the roost forever.

17 Q. Just before we come into some of the details about
18 Polmont, there is a part of your statement where you
19 talk about Dr Chiswick's working group on suicide
20 precautions at Glenochil. We have heard some evidence
21 about that.

22 I think, from paragraph 33 in your statement, you
23 talk about the fact that you recall that publication,
24 but the view seemed to be at that time, from your
25 recollection, that it was really specific to Glenochil

1 and didn't really have a wider application to the Prison
2 Service as a whole?

3 A. Yes, sadly, and that turned out to be completely wrong
4 and very shortsighted. But that was -- I think that was
5 the reality. There were issues, perceived to be at
6 Glenochil, issues with young people, and it didn't spark
7 off a wider debate about suicides.

8 That came later. That came about five years later
9 at Barlinnie, when Barlinnie had a spate of suicides.
10 And the then governor -- when I was the Special Unit
11 Governor, and he thought I had plenty of spare time on
12 my hands, running a unit of six, seven or eight
13 prisoners. I must have had plenty of time, when he was
14 running a jail for 1,500. So there was a slight
15 imbalance in our areas of responsibility.

16 So he, rather than get headquarters to do it -- they
17 weren't interested -- he set up a team to look at
18 suicide prevention and I chaired that team. And I had
19 a psychologist from Stirling University, I had one of
20 the doctors. They had three full time doctors at
21 Barlinnie at that time, I had one of the doctors and
22 a member of staff, and we did some serious research into
23 suicides.

24 And we went to Strangeways, in Manchester, and sadly
25 the day we arrived they had a suicide right during the

1 night. We went to Risley, which had a very bad
2 reputation for suicides. So we talked to the staff at
3 Risley and I wrote up my report, which was warmly
4 received by the governor. I don't think it was warmly
5 received at headquarters, because I received no
6 recognition and I would have been the obvious person to
7 have -- you know, to start drawing up a national policy,
8 and I was just ignored. So that slightly surprised me.
9 At the headquarters.

10 Barlinnie appreciated the report, and it was very
11 difficult to do things differently in Barlinnie,
12 certainly at that point. But the governor was very
13 focused on it and he recognised he had a problem.

14 Q. Was that report that you are talking about; was that in
15 the early 1990s?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. But, from your point of view, nothing seemed to come of
18 that?

19 A. Nothing happened. And the person who probably should
20 have taken it up at headquarters, subsequently I fell
21 out with him.

22 I don't fall out with many people, but I think he
23 fell out with me. Something to do with that report, as
24 I recall, but I can't give you -- sorry -- any detail
25 about it.

1 MS FORBES: I am about to move on to ask you some questions
2 about your time at Perth Prison. I don't know --

3 LADY SMITH: I think we should take the morning break now.
4 It will also give you a chance --

5 MS FORBES: I have dealt with the issue.

6 LADY SMITH: Well done. We will take the morning break now,
7 if that would work for you, Dan.

8 A. Thank you very much.

9 (11.28 am)

10 (A short break)

11 (11.49 am)

12 LADY SMITH: Dan, are you okay for us to carry on?

13 A. Yes, yes, absolutely.

14 LADY SMITH: Thank you. Ms Forbes, when you are ready.

15 MS FORBES: My Lady.

16 Dan, just before we had the break I was about to
17 move on to talk about your time at Perth Prison. You
18 start telling us about that in your statement, at
19 paragraph 38.

20 This is where you did your training. You were
21 an assistant governor under training and then assistant
22 governor, and so you are fully established as
23 an assistant governor in 1977. We have already talked
24 about the fact that you stayed there until 1981.

25 So this was a multi-function prison, as you have

1 said, and you were responsible for A and C Hall; is that
2 right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. In C Hall, there were four floors and I think you talked
5 about one of them, one of the floors had category A
6 prisoners, including Robert Mone, who you talked about
7 a little bit earlier.

8 The second flat was for remand prisoners of all
9 ages, which included the young offenders; is that right?

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 Q. I think you go on at paragraph 41 -- you touched on this
12 earlier in your evidence, but you said the conditions in
13 the prison were dreadful. The condition of the cells
14 were poor and there was no dining by association in
15 C Hall. So prisoners had to collect their meals on
16 a tray and take them back to their cells?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you described the young remands as having single
19 cells or shared cells, depending on the numbers. And
20 you say that you managed to get a post upgraded to
21 senior officer in charge of the second flat; that was
22 the one with the --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- young remands? Why was that? Why did you think
25 that was important?

1 A. Well, I thought looking after the remands was important,
2 and recognising that, you know, everybody comes into
3 prison for the first time once. So we tend to assume,
4 sadly, at every level in prisons that everybody has been
5 in prison several times.

6 But that can't be the case, so we need to recognise
7 that people are in for the first time. They will have
8 their own issues. Remands are a varied group. They are
9 worried about their future. They don't know how long
10 they are going to be on remand. They don't know what's
11 going to happen to them. It may be their first time
12 away from their families. So a lot of uncertainty.

13 And again, I thought there was more of a management
14 role in managing that flat than there was on the other
15 flats, and that was accepted by my governor.

16 Q. So the other flats, then, wouldn't have a senior
17 officer?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. There was only one senior officer for the whole hall,
21 and then we had one senior officer on the second flat.
22 So it was actually a big step up, having another senior
23 officer.

24 And again, it was a signal to everybody that remands
25 are important, because traditionally remands were not

1 seen as very important. And we had to, again,
2 I thought, change the culture, you know?

3 One of my colleagues -- I don't know if I mentioned
4 this elsewhere -- who you have had giving evidence,
5 Alec Spencer, he created a stir in Edinburgh when he set
6 aside the new hall, the first of the new halls in
7 Edinburgh, in Glenesk, he turned it over to remands.
8 A lot of people -- that was probably the late
9 1990s/early noughties, that was a remarkable step, and
10 I am sure -- well, we have discussed it a little bit.
11 But I am sure at the time he got a lot of criticism for
12 doing that.

13 Q. And prior to him doing that; were the remands then just
14 mixed in amongst the general population?

15 A. No, they were always kept separate. But, again, you
16 don't know the numbers. The numbers can over flow into
17 the convicted.

18 But, you know, every officer knew that the remands
19 were different, had to be treated differently.

20 Q. I think at paragraph 41, it is interesting that you say
21 there that remands were seen as the Procurator Fiscal's
22 responsibility?

23 A. Yes, it seems very curious now, looking back. But any
24 request that a remand prisoner came to me with, I had to
25 tell them: well, you have to write to the fiscal.

1 "I want a hair cut", "Write to the fiscal".

2 "I want to change my appearance", "Write to the
3 fiscal".

4 And it was just a way of avoiding responsibility,
5 and nobody really wanted to accept responsibility for
6 remands.

7 LADY SMITH: Sorry, how is it that the fiscal had the power
8 to say yes or no to, for example, a hair cut?

9 A. Well, exactly. It was just a way of delaying. There
10 could be, in the extreme case, if you are changing your
11 appearance and you are going to court and identification
12 is part of the evidence, but I would have thought that
13 would be a very unusual or remote possibility.

14 LADY SMITH: Hair grows. So, if they are on remand for
15 quite a long time, their appearance would change anyway.
16 It wasn't to do with the allocation of funding coming
17 from the Crown's budget because the person was awaiting
18 trial, rather than the prison's budget, was it?

19 A. Well, I just don't know what the thinking was. To use
20 that dreadful cliché: it was beyond my pay grade.

21 So I just accepted it. Although I did think it was
22 nonsense. But, you know, who was I, as a very junior
23 assistant governor, to change the system?

24 LADY SMITH: Was anybody allowing for the fact -- and it is
25 a fact -- that a remanded prisoner is innocent of the

1 charges they are facing? And statistically, I think
2 I am right in saying, 100 per cent of them will not be
3 convicted. A number of them will be acquitted.

4 A. Yes.

5 LADY SMITH: Was any regard given to that?

6 A. Not really, to be honest. Remands were remands, and it
7 just depended on -- certainly, when I was at Greenock,
8 we had a lot of remands and we did try education, and
9 tried to give them some access to education. And
10 health.

11 By that time, health was emerging as a huge issue
12 for prisoners. But there wasn't -- the inspectorate --
13 the chief inspector of prisons, every now and again,
14 would make the point you have just made, and would
15 comment either positively or negatively on a particular
16 prisoner -- sorry, on a particular prison's approach to
17 managing remands. It tended to vary.

18 But there is no -- if I can digress, there is no
19 pressure group or there is no organisation that looks
20 after remands or campaigns for remands. Plenty of
21 groups will campaign for certain types of offenders and
22 whatever, but there has never been an organisation that
23 has been set up to look at remands. I have made that
24 recommendation in one or two consultation exercises that
25 I have been involved in, particularly to do with the

1 numbers. Because nobody takes responsibility for the
2 numbers on remands. And through my links with SASO
3 I talk to a lot of Sheriffs and fiscals and occasionally
4 judges, and I get totally different views from them as
5 to why there are so many prisoners on remand.

6 And the attitude of the Crown, people give me
7 different analysis. But there is -- nobody is standing
8 up -- the inspectorate, maybe, would be the obvious
9 body, but they don't take a particular interest in
10 remands.

11 So, you know, my view, for what it's worth, is there
12 should be some body who has responsibility for remands,
13 for the conditions of remand prisoners. Looking at the
14 numbers, why numbers go up and down, why -- well, there
15 are lots of questions to do with managing remands, but
16 nobody sees it as their responsibility.

17 LADY SMITH: Yes. I think I know what your answer to my
18 next question is, which is whether people think about
19 the fact that being remanded pending trial is one thing,
20 but carrying on being remanded during a trial, and
21 possibly a lengthy trial, can be an increasingly
22 stressful time for the person who is remanded in
23 custody. It is very difficult; isn't that right?

24 A. Particularly if it is a high profile case.

25 LADY SMITH: Yes.

1 A. I won't mention names, but I can think of one very high
2 profile case I had at Edinburgh where the prisoners were
3 transferred from Barlinnie, and there was a lot of
4 public concern about the case, and that transmits itself
5 to the prisoners.

6 LADY SMITH: Yes.

7 A. And the last thing you want is to put a remand prisoner
8 on protection. But sometimes you have to do that
9 because you are trying to be proactive in preventing
10 trouble, but it is still a big step to take, and the
11 prisoner might accept the logic of it or he might not
12 accept the logic of it.

13 LADY SMITH: Yes. Thank you very much, Dan. Thank you.

14 Ms Forbes.

15 MS FORBES: Dan, when we are talking about remands, these
16 are people who are denied bail, remanded in custody
17 pending trial. Then, after there is a conviction,
18 whether by a trial or by at some point a plea of guilty,
19 they are no longer classed as remands; is that right?
20 They are convicted prisoners; would they be moved then,
21 if they are awaiting sentence, to the general population
22 or would they be kept in with the remands?

23 A. It probably depends on local circumstances. If you are
24 talking about those who have sentence -- are awaiting
25 sentence, in most cases they are still treated as

1 remands.

2 Q. Okay. So there are two types; yes?

3 A. But I wouldn't say that happened in every case. There
4 would be an assessment, particularly with a high profile
5 case, there might be issues. If there is co-accused,
6 you know, a judgment will have to be made about: do you
7 separate the co-accused or do you keep them together?
8 And any tensions between the co-accused.

9 One area where we have improved dramatically is
10 about intelligence and trying to gain intelligence, and
11 use that intelligence in order to prevent any assaults
12 or any incidents. And you rely a lot on the police.

13 The police want intelligence from you, but they
14 don't want to give you intelligence back. So it is
15 often a one way street, unfortunately.

16 Q. I think the differences as well about remands, that you
17 tell us about at paragraph 42, is that people on remand
18 are locked up nearly all day, so they don't normally get
19 work opportunities. So they are not then getting out of
20 the flat. And they don't go for education, or they
21 didn't at that time go for education, unlike a convicted
22 prisoner, who would be able to be allocated to a work
23 party and undertake educational courses?

24 A. Yes, it very much depends on the resources of the
25 prison. At one point in Greenock, we did have resource

1 that we could put into remands. It didn't last very
2 long.

3 And remands -- well, it is dangerous to generalise.
4 It is very easy to generalise. But I don't think many
5 remands really want to do very much out of their cell.
6 They are quite -- they just want the time to pass
7 quickly. And the health -- as I said a minute ago,
8 health is very important, and getting proper healthcare
9 for many of them, particularly if they had addiction
10 issues, and making sure that there is some ongoing
11 treatment, which is a challenge for the NHS to keep
12 track of people. So addiction issues, health issues,
13 became more and more important.

14 Q. I think at that time the health within the prison was --
15 there were prison officers who were nurse officers or
16 the like and doctors who would come in from outside the
17 prison; is that right?

18 A. Yes, the doctors were part time and from a local
19 practice. Except in Barlinnie. Barlinnie had, I think,
20 three full-time health officers, doctors, but every
21 other prison it was part time.

22 Q. Obviously, that has been a change now that the NHS have
23 taken over the provision of healthcare within the
24 Scottish Prison Service. But, at this time we are
25 talking about in Perth, that wasn't the situation?

1 A. In terms of provision of medical coverage, I don't think
2 it has changed that much.

3 What has changed is a phenomenal number of nurses,
4 and practitioner nurses, even advanced practitioner
5 nurses, in the service, and I think we led the way in
6 terms of triaging patients.

7 I think before the NHS took over, I think we were
8 well ahead in terms of triaging and we were very much
9 a nurse led service, which I think some people would
10 argue is the way society ought to be going, but that's
11 maybe another subject for another day.

12 Q. And you tell us as well that these prisoners had
13 an hour's exercise and you would try to bring recreation
14 in for them, but the facilities in that hall were much
15 worse than the other three halls, with only a small
16 recreation room?

17 A. Yes, this was in Perth. Yes, the C Hall. There was
18 a hall -- there was a room, just off the hall, where we
19 could do remands.

20 And television in those days, people had to watch
21 one television in a large room and they would have no
22 say in which programme they were -- what they were
23 watching.

24 Q. Quite a small television as well?

25 A. Well, yes.

1 Q. Compared to what we have now.

2 A. Absolutely, yes.

3 Q. And you tell us that the young remands could get visits,
4 and they could get daily weekday visits at that time,
5 but you don't think that any of them got anything near
6 daily visits. But it was available?

7 A. Yes, absolutely. But, again, I don't think anybody kept
8 any statistics at that time, so this is intuitive on my
9 part. But I don't think they would get that many
10 visits.

11 Q. And you mentioned this earlier in your evidence, Dan,
12 but you said that whilst you were in Perth a lot of your
13 day-to-day occupation involved preparing reports,
14 custody reports for remand prisoners who were under the
15 age of 21, and "prisoner orientated case work", you
16 describe it as, at paragraph 44.

17 A. Yes. I spent much of my day at Perth just writing
18 reports. And I must admit I quite enjoyed it. You are
19 interviewing a prisoner at some length. It was --
20 depending on the numbers, I would do one or two remands
21 in the morning for boss reports in the afternoon. And
22 that was my job and I enjoyed it, and I found prisoners
23 generally very open and very happy to talk about their
24 lives.

25 Q. And I think you tell us that sometimes would involve

1 sending out forms to a school, if the young person was
2 still at school or had recently left, or writing to
3 social work, if they had social work involvement. But
4 the time period involved in writing these reports was
5 quite tight, so it meant that, really, you were looking
6 to get these things back quickly and for the report to
7 be prepared in time?

8 A. Yes, it was a very tight timescale, but people by and
9 large followed it.

10 The forms were -- I thought were way out of date.
11 I remember trying to upgrade the forms and I was told,
12 you know: it's not your job, just carry on with what you
13 have got.

14 But, occasionally, you might not have a report, but
15 you would just say that in your report to the Sheriff,
16 and the Sheriff would make whatever allowance he -- and
17 I think they were all male Sheriffs at that time -- what
18 he -- whatever allowance he would make for the absence
19 of a particular report.

20 Q. And within that report you would make a recommendation,
21 and we talked about the three options, the Detention
22 Centre, the Young Offenders Institution or Borstal
23 Training?

24 A. Yes. We -- certainly at Perth we had to be very
25 careful. We generally knew which court the person was

1 going to. Sometimes the Sheriff and some -- this is all
2 very anecdotal and informal. But we were sort of led to
3 believe some Sheriffs wanted a more direct
4 recommendation than others, so you came up with forms of
5 words to avoid making a direct recommendation, in case
6 that was stepping on the toes of the Sheriff. But you
7 would make an argument for whatever disposal you thought
8 was the most appropriate.

9 I don't think I mentioned this, but once I got into
10 terrible trouble. I did slip and I said in my report
11 words to the effect that I couldn't understand why this
12 chap was in court and had been on remand. And the
13 Sheriff took a very different view to mine and
14 castigated me publicly, and my colleagues in Perth took
15 great joy in bringing to my attention the report in the
16 newspaper that the Sheriff had criticised the nameless
17 assistant governor, who had made a completely
18 inappropriate recommendation.

19 Q. And I think you tell us that your view -- and you still
20 have this view at the time of the statement in any
21 event -- was that a lot of Sheriffs, in your view, used
22 to use remand as a punishment?

23 A. Yes, I am absolutely certain of that. But I have never
24 met a Sheriff who would agree with me, and they take
25 great offence whenever I suggest that. It is complete

1 denial.

2 Q. I think, just slightly earlier in your statement as
3 well, you talk about young people on remand getting
4 a taste of prison, and throughout your career in the
5 Prison Service you came across people who believed in
6 deterrence, and that you could deter individuals from
7 doing what they would otherwise do because of the
8 consequences of their action, but you are a sceptic in
9 that regard?

10 A. Absolutely. If there is one word in the English
11 language I would like to abolish it would be
12 "deterrence". But a lot of people in politics and in
13 police and judiciary feel very strongly about
14 deterrence. But I see no evidence for deterrence, and
15 I think, well, the obvious example is smoking. You
16 know, we are down to, what, maybe 20/25 per cent of the
17 population still smoke. Now, they know full well that
18 it is going to shorten their life; it is going to make
19 their lives more painful; the end of their life will be
20 undoubtedly more painful than otherwise, but they still
21 smoke. No deterrence whatsoever.

22 I could give other examples.

23 Q. In this context, in relation to prison, your view was
24 that you didn't see prison as a deterrence from your
25 38 years in the Scottish Prison Service?

1 A. No. Prisoners, by and large -- there are exceptions,
2 particularly with sex offenders and murderers, but by
3 and large prisoners don't think they will get caught.

4 Now, the evidence may be overwhelming that they will
5 get caught whatever they do, whenever they step out of
6 line. But every single prisoner I know thinks, whenever
7 he is planning whatever crime he is planning, he won't
8 get caught. So deterrence doesn't come into it. They
9 are quite convinced that they will get away with it and
10 the idea that on a Friday night, before going out, that
11 they are going to study the Daily Record all week to see
12 what the Sheriffs have been saying and what's been
13 reported in The Sun or the Record is nonsense. But
14 people think deterrence works.

15 The two classic cases where the advocates of
16 deterrence would claim that it was successful, one was
17 the razor gangs that I mentioned earlier. That -- they
18 claim that the reason the razor gangs stopped was
19 because of very heavy sentencing.

20 Now, I think razor gangs stopped for all sorts of
21 reasons. Sentencing may have been one factor, and they
22 were given, by the standards in the 1960s, very heavy
23 sentences, but I am not convinced that deterrence really
24 played much of a part in that particular crime dying
25 out.

1 And the second case is often The Great Train
2 Robbery. That, again, the offenders there were given
3 massive sentences by any stretch of the imagination.
4 Hey-ho, no more great train robberies. But was it just
5 down to sentencing? I would suggest not. But those are
6 the two examples that I have heard advocates of
7 deterrence use.

8 LADY SMITH: Dan, I suppose you also will never know how
9 many people in the population are behaving themselves
10 and being influenced by the fact that, if they don't,
11 they could end up in prison.

12 A. Yes.

13 LADY SMITH: You can't record that, can you?

14 A. No, no. And no doubt --

15 LADY SMITH: And yet the fact of the risk of prison may
16 deter people in the wider population from committing
17 crimes.

18 A. Yes, I accept that. But I think people, if they are
19 deterred by that, they will be deterred by other things.
20 They will be deterred by the loss of their family; they
21 will be deterred by the loss of a job; they will be
22 deterred by the loss of income. It is not just the
23 thought of imprisonment. If they are seriously
24 contemplating crime, they will weigh up a lot of
25 factors.

1 LADY SMITH: Those are, of course, necessary consequences of
2 being put in custody. I am sure we could debate this --
3 A. Yes, I would be delighted to debate it in a different
4 venue.
5 LADY SMITH: Thank you.
6 MS FORBES: Dan, you talk in your statement, at
7 paragraph 48, about complaints. You say that you didn't
8 get any complaints from remand prisoners at Perth, and
9 there was next to no incidents. The under 21s and the
10 over 21s there seemed to mix quite easily, and that if
11 a prisoner wanted to make a complaint he could ask to
12 see the governor, which would be yourself. And if they
13 didn't like your response, they could petition the
14 Secretary of State.
15 The process you have described there was, you get
16 a piece of paper on which to write the complaint and it
17 would be sent to Edinburgh and would be read and
18 answered by civil servants in Edinburgh, who usually
19 gave the same response as the governor had given, but
20 complaints weren't commonplace.
21 So I think you say there wasn't really a complaints
22 culture and people weren't encouraged to complain.
23 I think you accept that description, this was something
24 that would have to be put in writing in the first
25 instance; it wasn't a verbal complaints system?

1 A. Well, no, the prisoners would complain verbally. They
2 would go on what we would call "on request" in the
3 morning and a governor, or a hall governor, would go
4 into the hall early in the morning and deal with
5 requests.

6 Now, requests, as the name suggests, could be
7 a request for an initial visit or something like that,
8 but also could be a complaint about something or other.
9 But, generally, they didn't complain very much. It was
10 a very -- for the most part, prisoners are very passive.
11 They accept their lot. As long as they feel they are
12 being treated fairly.

13 Now, "fairly" in inverted commas. But they have
14 their own perception of fairness. If the staff and the
15 management are fair, prisoners will accept almost
16 anything. But, as soon as they think management and the
17 staff are not being fair, that they have favourites or
18 the allocation of resources isn't appropriate, or maybe
19 an incident has happened that they think wasn't handled
20 properly, prisoners will show their displeasure. But,
21 as I say, for the most part, they accept their lot.

22 Q. I think this formal complaints process, though, as
23 opposed to the verbal request that you talked about,
24 that formal complaint process had to be in writing?

25 A. Yes, yes.

1 Q. And I think --

2 A. Yes, if they didn't accept the hall governor's response,
3 then they would say, "Put it in a petition", and that
4 didn't change until, I think, the early 1990s. And that
5 was a big change when we went to an Independent
6 Complaints Commissioner.

7 Q. Then you told us about the research that was done, that
8 was commissioned at Stirling University, and it talked
9 about the background to some of these young offenders.
10 One of the issues you talk about in your statement that
11 came out of that is the fact there were literacy issues.

12 So you would probably agree, for a young person who
13 had literacy issues, the fact that a complaint had to be
14 put in writing would potentially be a bar to them taking
15 that route?

16 A. Oh, absolutely, absolutely. And yes, that's without
17 doubt very true. And when Jim McManus became
18 a Complaints Commissioner, he commented regularly in his
19 annual reports how few complaints he got from women and
20 young offenders.

21 Although they were a very small percentage of the
22 population, but they were an even smaller percentage of
23 the complaints that he was dealing with, and he thought
24 that was sufficiently important to be highlighted in his
25 annual reports.

1 Q. And I think you do say in your statement that -- what
2 your view was, that these young people were sometimes
3 apathetic, and in fact those that were on remand were
4 more concerned about potentially what was going to
5 happen to them, rather than the conditions in the prison
6 at that time?

7 A. Yes, yes. Certainly at Polmont, when I would be doing
8 my rounds and talking to them, they were very reluctant
9 to make any complaint. I would try and gee them up,
10 say: look, there must be something you are annoyed
11 about. Come on, tell me, what's really bugging you?

12 And of course they would look at you in horror and
13 think you are at it in some way. Then, eventually, they
14 would accept that I am being serious, and then you would
15 get something from them, which was actually very useful
16 to know. But, by goodness, it was hard work finding
17 out.

18 Sometimes issues were very subjective, you know,
19 food. Food's a big issue. So that's very subjective.
20 The amount, the quality, the range, the variety. The
21 visits, occasionally, but they didn't complain much
22 about visits.

23 One of the issues I remember when I did push them
24 was about the quality of prison clothing that we were
25 issuing at that time. We gradually moved to more and

1 more allowing them to wear their own clothes,
2 particularly in the evenings and at the weekends. But
3 the quality of clothing we were issuing was often
4 suspect, and not the right size.

5 So I remember getting those complaints from
6 prisoners, eventually.

7 And you might get issues about the rooms, about
8 what's available in the room. Not everything that
9 should be in the room is in the room, and staff not
10 doing anything about it. So, if I worked hard enough at
11 it, I could get a few complaints. But it was hard work.
12 It was time consuming. And probably, depending on the
13 mood I was in, sometimes I probably wouldn't pursue it.

14 Q. And we have heard evidence about food having to be
15 tasted by the governor, for example, but him having to
16 make sure that the version that was available to the
17 governor was decent. But perhaps that wasn't reflected
18 when it was meted out to the prisoners in general?

19 A. Yes, a lot of cynical views about tasting. I adopted
20 different approaches in different prisons.

21 At Greenock, we created -- my deputy came up with
22 the idea, great idea -- we converted an area just
23 outside the smaller hall and we made it into a dining
24 hall, and it was directly part of the kitchen, so the
25 caterers had to be there delivering the food. That was

1 a big change. And they were very reluctant: oh, we will
2 be criticised, we will be shouted at.

3 I said, "Well, if you are happy with the quality of
4 the food you are producing, there won't be any issues".

5 So that became a seven day wonder. The staff
6 accepted it, the prisoners accepted it, and I would go
7 along and have lunch in the hall and just sit myself
8 down at a table of prisoners, and the reaction varied
9 enormously. I would have one or two prisoners who would
10 just stand up and go to another table. They would not,
11 under any circumstances, sit down and eat a meal with
12 me. Others were delighted, "Oh, yes, come on, Dan", and
13 then they would start on all their complaints about --
14 or their comments on whatever was going on at the time.

15 Some of the prisoners came from Shotts. Shotts at
16 that time was almost on semi-lockdown. Some prisoners
17 found it very hard to eat in association, and I had to
18 recognise that; that was a big step for some of them.
19 We thought: well, this is just routine. We all eat in
20 company at home.

21 Well, maybe not all prisoners eat in company at
22 home. A lot of people, I think, eat on their own at
23 home. So some of your cultural attitudes are
24 challenged.

25 Then, in Glenochil, I did that. I would choose

1 a different flat every week, and I don't think I ever
2 had any prisoner stand up and object, but I could see
3 some prisoners were very uncomfortable with me being
4 there. So you just have to play it by ear.

5 Q. Now, you did mention visits there in relation to
6 complaints. But I think you talk, at paragraph 50,
7 about the fact that there was a survey of prisoners for
8 the first time in 1990. What came out of that was
9 essentially that prisoners wanted better visits, and
10 that was the overwhelming issue.

11 A. Yes, I think -- it is a long time ago, but my
12 recollection is this was a surprise, that we were all
13 expecting complaints about conditions, but that didn't
14 feature. They wanted better visits.

15 And as I said, Alec Spencer set up a group that
16 later transformed to 'Families Outside', and there was,
17 maybe for the first time, we being the service, the
18 senior management service, we kept visits on the agenda.
19 We never -- well, at least I don't think we ever
20 said: oh, we've cracked that. We can tick the box and
21 move on.

22 There were always issues about visits, because visit
23 rooms varied.

24 Aberdeen Prison -- now thankfully closed -- had
25 a tiny visits room. Even Cornton Vale, the visits room

1 there was rather small.

2 So it was an ongoing issue about visits and what
3 made, in the prisoners' eyes, for a successful visit,
4 what did the family regard as a successful visit, and
5 the staff, what were their concerns?

6 We had to be realistic. Drugs are passed at visits.
7 I can't deny that. We got better CCTV in, trying to
8 watch. Better intelligence. You can put prisoners at
9 certain desks or certain tables, where you have better
10 CCTV. So there are steps that you can take, bringing
11 in, you know, Mothers' Union at Glenochil, they would
12 come in and run a crèche for children.

13 Prisoners greatly valued -- anybody who was
14 a volunteer coming into a prison was greatly valued by
15 prisoners, regardless of whether they benefited or not
16 from the service. Anybody that was prepared to come
17 into a prison on a voluntary basis, whether it was AA or
18 Gamblers Anonymous, or crèche facilities, or religious
19 groups coming in, prisoners would regard that as very
20 commendable and they would never -- at least I can't
21 remember any case of them abusing that.

22 A different matter if people are being paid to come
23 in. Then that's a different matter. But, if the people
24 are in as a volunteer, in the prisoners' eyes that was
25 special and they could not be maltreated in any way,

1 shape or form. That was part of the culture.

2 Q. Is that because they are seen as not being part of the
3 system?

4 A. Yes, I think so, and they appreciated that people have
5 choices. You know, if you are a volunteer and you want
6 to volunteer helping prisoners, well, there are other
7 areas you might want to volunteer in, so they appreciate
8 that you are making the commitment to come into prisons.

9 Q. I think you tell us later in your statement that in
10 relation to visiting, and visiting centres in prisons,
11 that Scotland was quite far behind England, for example,
12 in that regard, and it took a long time before the
13 visitors' centre was really set up. The funding for
14 that, as well, was having to come from voluntary,
15 charitable donations and the like?

16 A. Yes, we were very, very reluctant to embrace visitors'
17 centres. We start with a visitors' centre in Perth and
18 I was involved in that initiative for a time, and that
19 worked up to a point. And then a big change was
20 Edinburgh; that they had a visitors' centre built there
21 on the outskirts, just outside the prison, and that
22 could, and probably should have been, the model for the
23 rest of the service, but it wasn't. And there was a lot
24 of opposition, and the management view was, if I could
25 summarise it: well, if society wants visitors' centres,

1 then they can pay for them. It is not the prison
2 service's job to provide visitor's centres. So I am not
3 doing it.

4 That was, I think, dare I say, repeatedly the chief
5 executive's view.

6 I ... I had -- when I went to Edinburgh, I really
7 saw how the visitors' centre operated and it had created
8 problems. It wasn't by any means a panacea. There were
9 issues with the running of the centre. There were
10 issues with the families coming in. The fabric of the
11 building was constantly a problem. A lot of graffiti,
12 a lot of damage, a lot of petty vandalism to the centre,
13 which we just had to constantly pick up and redo.

14 But, for the most part, it worked and it worked
15 well, and I could see, undoubtedly, the benefits of
16 that. And when I went to Greenock -- sorry, when I went
17 to Glenochil -- Glenochil, like Edinburgh, was being
18 rebuilt and there was a building outside the front
19 house, front of house at Glenochil, which would have
20 been a perfect visitors' centre. And I argued for it to
21 be a visitors' centre and I got absolutely nowhere. And
22 the head of the estate said, "It doesn't fit with the
23 new build and the front of house". We are talking about
24 a prison. We are not designing something that's, you
25 know, top of its class. But I couldn't move.

1 And at that time there was a lot of controversy
2 going on at Cornton Vale. There was a building that
3 could have become a visitors' centre and the then
4 management kept changing their minds: yes, it is going
5 to be a visitors' centre -- no, it's not -- yes, it
6 is -- no, it's not.

7 One of the Visiting Committee on Cornton Vale was
8 also on the Visiting Committee at Glenochil, and I knew
9 him quite well. And he was agitating, and shall we say
10 I encouraged him to agitate, but to no effect
11 whatsoever.

12 I don't know if I mentioned this, my little joke
13 with my management team was I was going to be the first
14 governor on the roof of a building to try to protect it.
15 But, of course, the management team said: oh yes, we
16 will be right behind you.

17 As if. But, anyway, it was knocked down and we have
18 a paltry visitors' centre at Glenochil now.

19 I chair the charity that runs visitors' centre at
20 what was Cornton Vale, now Stirling and Glenochil, and
21 we have been given a phenomenal facility at Stirling and
22 we have a tiny facility at Glenochil.

23 Q. So --

24 A. The change came with the change of chief executive, when
25 Colin McConnell came in from Ireland and England, where

1 he was used to visitors' centres. He changed the policy
2 overnight and said, "Every prison should have
3 a visitors' centre. Get on with it", and the governors
4 eventually did get on with it.

5 Q. From what you are saying, Dan, there is still a way to
6 go, still work to be done in that regard?

7 A. Well, there were two prisons that didn't have visitor's
8 centres, Greenock and Dumfries. They are now getting
9 some sort of service as of -- well, I think it is
10 happening now.

11 Castle Huntly doesn't need a visitors' centre, being
12 an open prison. Grampian has a excellent facility, that
13 to my mind is the model now, is Grampian.

14 Low Moss has a different -- it has an internal
15 facility, the same at Shotts. They are all different.

16 Q. What about Polmont? We are going to come on to talk
17 about Polmont just shortly, but --

18 A. Polmont is very bizarre. They needed -- the rebuilding
19 of Polmont, nobody ever campaigned for or asked for
20 a visitors' centre. Then we had -- it was after
21 I retired, but I was embarrassed here, thinking I am
22 still part of SPS, and I still talk about SPS as
23 "we" when I am retired ten years. I should have stepped
24 away from that terminology long ago.

25 But I was embarrassed at Polmont. They came up with

1 a bus, a double decker bus that was parked in the car
2 park outside the prison, and this was a visitors'
3 centre. A bus! And then there were issues about moving
4 it and looking after it. And, oh, so I am not -- they
5 did change the visitors' centre internally at Polmont,
6 but that should have been designed in, and it wasn't.

7 Q. So, even when they were rebuilding, it wasn't factored
8 in as an important part of the prison furniture?

9 A. No. Whereas it was interesting at Grampian -- which
10 I became very involved in when I was Acting Director.
11 That became my overwhelming task, to make sure that
12 Grampian opened on time and opened on budget, and was
13 incredibly complicated on all fronts. We had no
14 visitors' centre. Then Colin said we needed a visitors'
15 centre. But then that became an addition to the
16 contract, which means that the builder calls the shots,
17 so the builder could charge us whatever he wanted to for
18 the visitors' centre, and the figures they came up with
19 were astronomic.

20 So we were not in a good position in terms of
21 bargaining with the contractor. But we did eventually
22 come to a compromise and the facility -- well, in my
23 view, the model at Grampian is first rate.

24 Q. Dan, I am going to move on now and ask you some
25 questions about your time at Polmont Young Offenders

1 Institution and you start talking about that in your
2 statement from paragraph 53.

3 We have already gone over the fact that you were
4 promoted to become Governor of Polmont in 1996 and, at
5 that time, it was Young Offenders Institution for
6 prisoners between 16 to 21, albeit you do talk about the
7 fact that there were people there younger than that on
8 unruly certificates.

9 You say that the numbers varied and started to go
10 down overall during your time there. Occasionally, you
11 went above 500, but also below 300. So there was quite
12 a range during your time. But you were very rarely
13 overcrowded when you worked there?

14 A. Yes, yes, that's a correct overview. The numbers did
15 fluctuate, sometimes seasonally. Why we had seasonal
16 differences was always a bit of a mystery, but they have
17 long since gone.

18 Q. When you say "seasonal"; what seasons are you thinking
19 of?

20 A. Spring and autumn, numbers went up dramatically. Came
21 down in December, down in January, and started going up
22 again February, March, and come down maybe after --
23 particularly if Easter was late. You would see a bit of
24 a drop in May, May onwards.

25 And in fact that analysis underpinned the planning

1 of our new house blocks, which started in 2003. That
2 they -- I think a quarter of the rooms in these new
3 house blocks were double rooms. So it was either six or
4 seven square metres, as opposed to nine square metres.
5 And the idea was that the double rooms could take more
6 prisoners and that would cope with the seasonal demand.

7 Because the prisoner population had actually gone
8 down a little bit at the end of the 1990s and the
9 beginning of the noughties. We closed a lot of prisons.
10 We closed Penninghame, Longriggend, Friarton, and later
11 Noranside. So we -- things were looking good from a
12 numbers point of view early noughties. And we had
13 worked out this seasonal peak, and this was the attempt
14 to cope with the seasonal peak; that we would build in
15 additional capacity.

16 But, as soon as we had started building these, then
17 the rooms were full all the time. The double rooms were
18 full 12 months of the year and then, at times, we
19 started doubling up the single rooms.

20 Q. Was there any view as to why the seasonal increase would
21 happen?

22 A. Well, I think it was due to the prevalence of courts,
23 and gradually, as the courts became more efficient and
24 more -- probably more courts and running more often, and
25 the pressure on the courts, holidays became less -- more

1 courts were running more of the time. So that's my
2 understanding of why that --

3 LADY SMITH: That would fit with that era, Dan, and your
4 peaks and troughs may well have been broadly in line
5 with the peaks and troughs in court disposals, but I am
6 not sure anybody was looking at whether there was any
7 symbiosis between them.

8 You are right about getting to a stage that criminal
9 courts just sat continually, began to sit continually
10 without breaks, without having circuits and gaps in
11 between.

12 Ms Forbes.

13 MS FORBES: My Lady.

14 I think you tell us a little bit about the layout of
15 Polmont at that time, and we can read that. We have
16 heard some evidence about that, too.

17 I think you tell us as well, at paragraph 53, that
18 there were residential units within Polmont, and they
19 were named and numbered in different ways. In
20 particular, there was A Wing, which was known as
21 Ally-Cally, and we have heard quite a lot of evidence
22 about that term being used, which was the Assessment
23 unit. So it was A Wing, Alley Cally, and Assessment
24 were the three names. You say there was North Wing,
25 C Wing, East, West and South Wings, and then there was

1 this External Training for Freedom Unit outwith the
2 prison.

3 A. Yes, yes. So all sorts of names. Just maybe out of
4 interest, that term "assessment", that was a hangover
5 from borstal, that was the hall where the assessment
6 took place. So it is interesting that that term "the
7 Assessment Wing" or "A Wing" that had lingered on for,
8 you know, 10/15 years.

9 Q. Yes, I think we have heard that at the time of the
10 borstal training, you would arrive at Polmont and you
11 would be put in the assessment part for a while, before
12 they decided whether you were getting to go to an open
13 borstal or a closed --

14 A. Yes, yes.

15 Q. Or would you stay in the closed.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You tell us that when you took up your post as Governor
18 at Polmont, you were told some time afterwards that they
19 needed someone with some vision, they needed a shake up?

20 A. Yes, my then line manager, who, funnily enough, was one
21 of the assistant governors that had in effect recruited
22 me, way back in 1975, he was one of the two that spoke.
23 He was very enthusiastic about me going to Polmont. He
24 said, you know, playing up to my ego: you are just the
25 person that Polmont needs and we need. It is a very

1 expensive prison. It is poor in all sorts of areas.

2 You know, go for it.

3 But that was as far as he went. He didn't give me
4 any steers as to what I could be doing or should be
5 doing; he just said, "Look, you know, it needs a shake
6 up".

7 And then my other -- my new line manager, he gave me
8 a totally different message. And he was saying -- he
9 summoned me through from Greenock to Edinburgh, and
10 I thought: oh, this is great, I am going to get
11 a briefing Polmont.

12 And he just said, "Look, don't ask for anything.
13 I don't know how you've got so much at Greenock, given
14 it was a new prison, and you managed to get all these
15 extras for Greenock. I don't know how you did it, but
16 don't bother trying it with Polmont, got it?"

17 You know, that was my induction for Polmont.

18 Q. I think you tell us about your first impressions of the
19 prison estate when you got there was that -- I think you
20 described the conditions in the two halls as being
21 absolutely appalling?

22 A. Yes, the slopping out was awful, and I wish, again, with
23 hindsight I had done more on that front. One of the
24 chaplains, she spoke to me, and the chaplaincy centre in
25 Polmont was just next to one of the vilest smelling

1 areas in the A Wing, in the Assessment Wing, and she
2 didn't exactly complain. But she said, "Are you aware
3 of what the situation is there?", and I said I was, "But
4 there is nothing I can really do about it", which she
5 accepted. She wasn't expecting me to have some sort of
6 magic cure. But she just wanted to make sure that
7 I knew what she knew.

8 But the conditions were pretty poor. And having
9 come from what was then Scotland's best prison, in
10 Greenock, to -- and there were good wings in Polmont.
11 Strange design in two of them that -- I couldn't imagine
12 how anybody approved that design. But, anyway, that was
13 a long time ago, because there was no -- what we are
14 very aware of in prison is visibility and line of sight,
15 and you didn't have that in these two relatively modern
16 wings. It seemed very odd.

17 But the conditions in the two oldest wings were
18 poor. But -- and I think as I said, the young people
19 didn't complain. Did I give the anecdote? I invited
20 the head of estates through -- did I mention this?

21 LADY SMITH: What is it that you are thinking of? I might
22 recognise it.

23 MS FORBES: Yes.

24 LADY SMITH: This is the head of estate from SPS, is it?

25 A. Yes.

1 Anyway, just very quickly, I invited the head of
2 estates through to Polmont because I suspected he didn't
3 know how bad the conditions were, and he brought his
4 deputy with him. And I took him to the top flat of
5 A Wing, and my deputy took the deputy to the other wing,
6 and as it happened a young offender recognised me from
7 Greenock days. And we were chatting, and I said --
8 I introduced the head of estates and said, "You know,
9 tell him, how would you compare conditions at Greenock
10 compared to here?" And he said, "Oh, they are terrible
11 here, they are awful".

12 Then, almost in the same breath he said, "But we
13 don't deserve anything better. We don't deserve
14 anything better".

15 And he wasn't -- there was no angle. That was just
16 a straightforward comment that came out of his mouth.
17 And I always remember that. That was a very telling
18 comment.

19 And I couldn't have -- if I had tried to stage it,
20 I am sure I couldn't have done it in a better way. It
21 was completely spontaneous, and I think it had an impact
22 on my colleague.

23 MS FORBES: Was anything done then about --

24 A. Well, then I think we did get on the agenda for a new
25 build, and we moved on the new build. And it was going

1 ahead and then it came to a grinding halt, sadly,
2 because of devolution. And the first government, or
3 executive as it was called then, they decided to put
4 money into a new police agency, the drug -- I can't
5 remember what it was called. The Drug Agency. And the
6 money was pulled absolutely from my new build into this
7 new Drug Agency, and end of dream for Polmont.

8 But it was only temporary, because then, after the
9 court case in 2002, when we were found guilty of
10 breaching a prisoner's human rights, that set in train
11 a huge investment programme in the prison, so -- and
12 Polmont was the first, so we were top of the list, and
13 then the programme expanded and changed over the next
14 ten years.

15 But -- and it was a different hall. The one we
16 ended up building was different to the one we had
17 envisaged in 1998. But, nevertheless, things moved on.

18 And it was a lot more expensive. The cost, as
19 I remember, of the 1998 hall was 8 million, and the cost
20 of the new -- the first house block in Polmont was
21 17 million. So in the space of five years.

22 LADY SMITH: Ms Forbes.

23 MS FORBES: My Lady.

24 So, having been derailed then by devolution, it
25 wasn't until the courts got involved in relation to

1 a human rights issue?

2 A. Yes, for which I and many others are extremely grateful.

3 Q. You tell us about C Wing, at that time in Polmont, which
4 was known also as Carrick House, and you described that
5 as housing young people who were referred to by terms
6 such as "vulnerables" and "bruisables", and these were
7 people, young people, with pretty extreme, you say,
8 behavioural problems.

9 There was a psychiatrist who spent a lot of his time
10 there, but your impression of it was it was a very
11 caring unit, a sort of therapeutic community, quite
12 small, housing about 18 to 20 prisoners?

13 A. Yes, that's my recollection. I never visited
14 Carrick House when it was in that situation, so this is
15 very much secondhand information.

16 LADY SMITH: I take it you must have heard somebody
17 referring to the young people there by these terms,
18 "vulnerables" and "bruisables"; is that right?

19 A. Well, these were terms that staff still used when I went
20 there in 1996. We had moved to -- South Wing had become
21 the wing for vulnerables, and there was a wide variety
22 of vulnerables in South Wing.

23 LADY SMITH: To be classed as vulnerable; what did the
24 prisoner have to be, or what characteristics did the
25 prisoner have to show?

1 A. Possible mental health issues. Learning disabilities.
2 Learning difficulties. Poor social skills. Not coping
3 with others very easily. Not able to make decisions for
4 himself.

5 LADY SMITH: Yes, I can see that all makes sense.

6 A. Yes.

7 LADY SMITH: You keep them away from the main body of
8 youngsters?

9 A. And often they were at the mercy of gangs outside. They
10 would be the stooges that the gangs would use, and they
11 are the guys that get caught at the end of the day.

12 LADY SMITH: Of course.

13 A. The leaders are nowhere to be seen. But those who, you
14 know, aren't quick enough on their feet, literally and
15 metaphorically, they get caught.

16 LADY SMITH: Yes.
17 Ms Forbes.

18 MS FORBES: My Lady. I think you tell us as well that when
19 you were there the culture at Polmont was that surnames
20 were still being used for prisoners and staff, whereas
21 the first names had become the norm in other prisons.
22 I think you tell us later in your statement that that
23 was something that you had a strong view about and
24 something that you brought in, with resistance from some
25 of the staff whilst you were in Polmont; is that right?

1 A. Absolutely. Polmont had been completely untouched by
2 all the changes in the adult establishments after the
3 incidents, and with opportunity and responsibility, and
4 changes to the role of the prison officer that we have
5 discussed. None of that had percolated Polmont, for
6 reasons I know not. They just -- if Polmont had
7 geographically been Peterhead or Inverness, perhaps you
8 could explain it. But Polmont, next door to the
9 college, young people, potential for change, for growth,
10 there is no -- absolutely no discussion going on about
11 ambition for Polmont or what could we do to help the
12 young people avoid becoming habitual criminals. Very
13 few who had a lot of convictions.

14 There were a few that had been through secure units
15 and whatever, but a relatively small percentage.
16 Although a percentage that were very obvious in many
17 respects. But it started, the first addressing offender
18 programme, the cognitive skills, that had just started,
19 two officers doing that, but under resourced for it.

20 Education turned out, I thought, to be very poor,
21 which -- I was expecting the reverse. I thought
22 education at Polmont would be wonderful, and a standard
23 of its own. That was not my experience.

24 So there were a lot of surprises for me at Polmont.

25 Q. I think you comment that it was as if Polmont had

1 an iron curtain around it, particularly with the -- as
2 you say, the training unit, the college was right beside
3 it. But none of these things that were being taught
4 there seemed to have permeated the walls of Polmont.

5 A. Yes, I had been used to Greenock. There had been a lot
6 of debate going on. We changed the regime. Even when
7 I was there, we had built the new hall. We had taken
8 the long termers. A lot of debate about the regime for
9 top end prisoners.

10 Staff were very comfortable with the prisoners.
11 Very good face to face relationships. And that was what
12 I was picking up was happening elsewhere, and even
13 Shotts didn't have any serious incidents at that time.
14 Perth --

15 LADY SMITH: But not in Polmont?

16 A. Not at Polmont.

17 LADY SMITH: This wasn't happening at Polmont?

18 A. No.

19 LADY SMITH: And Polmont seemed to have allowed the change
20 in policy, such as was reflected in the 'Custody and
21 Care' and 'Opportunity and Responsibility' documents
22 pass them by.

23 A. Yes, absolutely. And it is impossible to explain; it is
24 even more impossible to justify. Governors came,
25 governors went. Nobody stayed long enough to try to

1 address the issues at Polmont and it just continued to
2 be an operational prison. In the old speak: get through
3 the day.

4 That was the objective of everybody at Polmont: get
5 through the day without any incident, and that's
6 success.

7 MS FORBES: I think you tell us, at first, when you tried to
8 bring in some changes that there was this resistance,
9 and then things changed slightly when it was realised
10 that you weren't actually going anywhere, and when
11 a promotion opportunity came up you didn't take it and
12 you stayed at Polmont, and then you were able to make
13 some headway; is that right?

14 A. Yes, I think when staff switched on to some of the ideas
15 that I had and changes I wanted to make, they were
16 really just humouring me. They thought, "Oh, he will be
17 off soon. We will nod politely and ignore everything".

18 And it wasn't a promotion, but when another I band
19 post came up, I didn't go for it.

20 Q. Transfer?

21 A. And there was a bit of surprise at this. I was trying
22 to get over the conviction: I am here to stay and I am
23 going to drive these changes, and preferably get on
24 board. If not, there may be consequences.

25 And that was a very difficult message to convey, and

1 a very difficult message to implement.

2 LADY SMITH: Ms Forbes, it is now 1 o'clock. I normally
3 take the lunch break at this stage. I am sure you are
4 ready for a rest, Dan.

5 A. Thank you.

6 LADY SMITH: I will rise now, and I will sit again at
7 2 o'clock. Thank you.

8 (1.00 pm)

9 (The luncheon adjournment)

10 (2.00 pm)

11 LADY SMITH: Welcome back, Dan. Are you okay to carry on?

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

14 Ms Forbes, when you are ready.

15 MS FORBES: My Lady.

16 Good afternoon, Dan. Before we broke for lunch
17 I was asking you some questions about some changes you
18 had made in Polmont and your impressions when you were
19 there.

20 Just at paragraph 63 of your statement, you comment
21 that you observed a basic desire just to lock up, if not
22 everybody, then the majority; and that's by staff?

23 A. Yes, there was a culture of just keep them behind their
24 door. As the phrase was, behind the door, and out of
25 harm's way and out of the staff's way. So it was hard

1 to engage the staff that the young people should be out
2 of their rooms and hopefully engaged in meaningful
3 activity during the day. Whatever that activity was.

4 We didn't have enough activity in Polmont. We had
5 a reasonable amount.

6 Our biggest day-to-day problem was court appearances
7 that -- a lot of the young people had outstanding
8 charges and the fiscals kept insisting that they had to
9 come to court. So I think, when there was
10 an investigation, something like 30 per cent of all
11 court appearances were from young offenders from
12 Polmont. We were only about, what, 5 to 7 per cent of
13 the prisoner population. And we weren't staffed to have
14 that number of escorts on a regular basis.

15 And there were peaks and troughs. There were some
16 days there would be next to no court appearances, and
17 a couple of days later there would be loads. We would
18 have to close sheds to free up staff to do court
19 escorts. So that was very frustrating and annoyed me,
20 and eventually we did follow England and outsource
21 escorting to -- primarily to courts, but also to
22 hospitals and families. So that helped matters.

23 But I was only in Polmont for a year to benefit from
24 that change.

25 But we did manage to expand health. We expanded

1 education, and we did change our focus on some of the
2 work parties.

3 Q. You say, I think at paragraph 64, and later at 66 and
4 67, that there was an issue about prisoner numbers.
5 There was two problems with that: there was a difficulty
6 at any one time to know who was in work parties and,
7 separately, as a separate issue, regarding hall
8 security, it was difficult to know who was on a hall at
9 any one time, because the figures sometimes just didn't
10 add up?

11 A. Yes, as I say in paragraph 64, this was embarrassing
12 when we had the inspectors out, because what we were
13 telling them was not what they were encountering. So it
14 didn't look good on any -- in any way. And some of the
15 young people would move around from work party to the
16 gym to visits, and we didn't have good enough systems to
17 know exactly where everybody was at any one time. But
18 I felt we should have, and -- but there was a lot of
19 collusion going on; that was why we were struggling.

20 The first line managers and even one or two of the
21 unit managers were colluding with the staff and were
22 allowing young offenders to stay in the halls when they
23 shouldn't have been, and that was very difficult to
24 address, far less eradicate.

25 My deputy governor used to have brought in an end of

1 day meeting, you know, 4.30, for all managers: what are
2 your numbers? How many were out at work parties today?

3 That was his desperation to try to get accurate
4 numbers, and also to keep the pressure on the managers:
5 we want the young people out. We want them out doing
6 things. We don't want them sitting behind their doors
7 all day.

8 That was a perennial problem, and I think it is
9 still a problem at Polmont.

10 LADY SMITH: I suppose you are dealing with youngsters who
11 are easily tempted to be lazy if they get the chance, in
12 circumstances where they don't see the point anyway and,
13 for the staff, it might be easier just to go along with
14 what they want --

15 A. Absolutely.

16 LADY SMITH: -- because it is not causing any trouble.

17 A. It is a pact between the staff and the prisoners: if you
18 don't bother me, I won't bother you, sort of thing.

19 And that's true in adult prisons as well, but it was
20 a particularly irksome issue at Polmont. Of all the
21 jails I worked at, it was -- this was the issue that was
22 most prevalent.

23 It wasn't an issue at Greenock. It wasn't an issue
24 at Glenochil. It occasionally was an issue at
25 Edinburgh, but it was primarily an issue at Polmont.

1 MS FORBES: You touched there upon the progress you made
2 with education, and I think you mentioned youth workers
3 as well. That is in your statement for us to read.
4 I am not going to go through that in detail with you.

5 But I think it is safe to say that the situation
6 that you had managed to cultivate in Greenock was far
7 superior to what you found when you got to Polmont, and
8 you tried to improve that. But there were some hurdles
9 along the way. I think by the end you felt you had made
10 some progress in improving education?

11 A. Yes, I think unequivocally we improved education at
12 every level at Polmont. There are still issues around
13 literacy, and we were always looking for additional ways
14 to address literacy, because it was certainly the case
15 that no one approach fitted everybody. So we had to
16 have some one-to-one issues -- sorry, some one-to-one
17 teaching. We had groups.

18 But I found it difficult with teachers to -- you
19 know, this may sound strange, but very few teachers
20 would focus solely on literacy. They all wanted to do
21 other things. Much as I tried to bring them back to
22 literacy, they would find ways of doing other things.

23 And there was a balance to strike. And you are
24 trying to be all things to all people, in education.
25 Those who wanted to -- and there were a few who were

1 doing Highers and had possibilities of going to college
2 or even university, others who couldn't read or write.
3 If you got limited resources -- you always have
4 a limited resource, which group do you prioritise?

5 You might have more impact on the guys that are
6 going to do Highers and go to university. On the other
7 hand, on a human rights basis, surely it is a human
8 right to be able to read and write? So there are
9 tensions and balances to be struck.

10 But, in a wider sense, I am very critical of the
11 education profession, and particularly with the young
12 people that were in my care had been sorely let down by
13 schools, and nobody was really interested. There is no
14 accountability in education. None whatsoever.

15 Whereas I felt I was accountable to my line manager,
16 to my chief executive, to all the various agencies and
17 individuals that came into my prison. I think -- maybe
18 I am being a bit naive, but my view was I am accountable
19 and I should be accountable and I want to be
20 accountable.

21 Try to find anybody in education that is accountable
22 for anything, I think you will be looking for a long,
23 long time. Nobody takes responsibility for children
24 leaving school that can't read and write; nobody takes
25 responsibility for truancy; nobody takes responsibility

1 for anything. It is always somebody else's problem.

2 And wearing my SASO hat, we tried constantly to get
3 schools and the education profession to engage in
4 conferences on youth crime and anti-social behaviour.
5 Hardly ever could you get a teacher, or head of
6 department, far less head of school to come, and they
7 would never come as attendees at a conference. They
8 might -- and only might -- speak for 20 minutes, but
9 that was it. And I just despaired of trying to work
10 with education.

11 Q. I think you are talking about culture and ethos in your
12 statement, Dan. You say there are two phrases you kept
13 coming across in your early days at Polmont -- this is
14 paragraph 69 -- and they were "It is only young
15 offenders" and "It is only Polmont".

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I think you say later in your statement that those were
18 the two phrases you were trying to fight against the
19 whole time you were at Polmont?

20 A. Yes. And I would like to claim that nobody was saying
21 that when I left Polmont. That the reputation of
22 Polmont had changed and we were an attractive
23 establishment in terms of the buildings. We had rebuilt
24 a lot of the prison. Staff wanted to come to Polmont.
25 Managers wanted to come. The image of young people,

1 I think, had definitely changed.

2 Although, having said that, there was beginning to
3 be a drop off in interest in youth crime. The real
4 interest in youth crime was the late 1990s/early
5 noughties. As I understand it, the Scottish Executive,
6 Donald Dewar's first Cabinet, their first subject for
7 discussion was youth crime. So that was how important
8 it was for an incoming Government.

9 I think that began to tail off in the mid-noughties.
10 But there was a lot of pressure, there was a lot of
11 anti-social behaviour. You will remember ASBOs coming
12 in, Junior ASBOs came in. A lot of attempts to address
13 anti-social behaviour, youth crime, and eventually the
14 holistic approach came in.

15 You know, I think if you take the first 20 years of
16 this century, I think it is a great success story for
17 Scottish society and for all the agencies involved in
18 managing young people.

19 Okay, we are dealing with the extreme end, but the
20 number of referrals to the children's hearing system,
21 the numbers in custody, the numbers on remand,
22 phenomenally down. And there is no absolute agreement
23 as to why this should be, but there are a lot of
24 suggestions, suppositions, but there is no -- I don't
25 think there is any hard evidence of that. And maybe,

1 heaven forbid, but with the impact of Covid beginning to
2 emerge, you know, maybe we are going to go back in time.
3 Maybe there is a lot of pent up frustration among young
4 people that's beginning to come out in one or two
5 examples. Hopefully, they are isolated and not part of
6 a trend, but I think we should be potentially concerned.

7 And it may be that the reasons why we have reduced
8 anti-social youth crime, a lot of the steps taken,
9 perhaps, have not so much been reversed, but not been
10 built on, and there is a lot of complacency set in. And
11 there will be a lot of youth workers and social workers
12 and prison staff who don't remember what it was like
13 20 years ago, and what we see now as the norm is the
14 norm to them. And they are not aware there was a very
15 different norm 20 years ago.

16 Q. I think this Inquiry has heard that there is
17 a commitment from the Scottish Government that going
18 forward the plan is that there will be no under 18s in
19 the Scottish Prison Service. And we have heard evidence
20 that recent figures were there are only five, I think,
21 under 18s throughout Scotland that are being held in
22 Scottish Prison Service Estates. So the trend has
23 certainly gone down.

24 A. It is an amazing change. I started off with the
25 replacement for Carrick for first offender under 18s,

1 and then I moved all the under 18s to West Wing. That
2 was 78 places, and most of that time it was full.

3 Q. I think there was a part you mentioned, at paragraph 93
4 of your statement, where you talked about a psychologist
5 that you worked with who said something to you that
6 remained with you, you said, for the rest of your
7 career. That was:

8 "He said that we had to create a safe environment
9 and we could forget any semblance of initiating personal
10 change if a person did not feel safe."

11 And that was something that you say stuck with
12 you --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- throughout your time?

15 A. Because there was a lot of, shall we say -- and I don't
16 want to sound as if I am treating this as not important,
17 but there was a lot of low level -- what I considered
18 low level violence at Polmont. And it was very rare to
19 have weapons. If there were weapons, they were home
20 made weapons, home made, ie as in Polmont. And a lot of
21 the violence was impetuous behaviours that somehow
22 escalated.

23 But, in terms of our statistics, our statistics
24 didn't look good and, from 1992, when the SPS became
25 an executive agency, we started having performance

1 measures and key performance targets, and all that was
2 involved in that. And we started counting violent
3 incidents, and we had definitions for different
4 categories of violence. And Polmont was undoubtedly
5 a problem, and my line manager was saying to me, "You
6 know, you need to cut down on the number of incidents",
7 and I would say, "Well, I can only do that if I lock
8 them all up. I don't want to lock them up".

9 He wasn't terribly sympathetic. He said, "Look, it
10 is your problem, get on with it and do what you can",
11 and that was fine. I was okay with that. And trying to
12 make the staff think about violence and what they could
13 do in terms of preventing violence; that they weren't
14 just bystanders. Where they stood, the level of
15 interest they were showing when they were standing
16 watching young people, looking at movement between young
17 people, finding out who wasn't talking to whom and why.

18 So it was a coordinated approach, but we did get our
19 violence numbers down a lot.

20 Q. I think one of the issues that you were concerned about
21 was suicide prevention strategies. If we go to
22 paragraph 101 of your statement, you talk about the fact
23 that part of the strategy was to try to identify risk
24 factors from the beginning. As part of that you saw the
25 kind of check list that was done at reception as being

1 quite important. I think you go on later to talk about
2 the fact that the reception officer position was
3 downgraded to operational officer, but that was
4 something that you felt wasn't right, because that was
5 quite an important part of the process, with this young
6 person appearing with very little information or no
7 information into the prison, and then the concern about
8 what risk they might pose going forward?

9 A. Yes. Well, a lot of issues there in what you have just
10 said.

11 And of course coming from Greenock, where I'd had
12 a lot of suicides, I was very aware of the issues at
13 Polmont, and I'm trying to -- I had a very good nursing
14 team at Polmont. We worked together on measures to try
15 to highlight suicide prevention.

16 It is not easy, because you don't want to put ideas
17 into people's minds and you don't want to be going back.
18 In the past, if people had moved on, there was a great
19 tendency: oh, you were unwell five years ago; well, do
20 you really want to talk about what was happening
21 five years ago? Is the past the best guide to the
22 future or not?

23 You know, that's not a simple matter.

24 So I thought we were doing reasonably well in
25 suicide prevention, and I think we had very, very few

1 suicides in my time at Polmont.

2 The reception is an interesting matter, maybe
3 a philosophical matter, but worth highlighting.

4 My generation, we were brought up on Goffman, and he
5 was a famous American 1950s sociologist. And a lot of
6 his writing was about total institutions and about
7 de-stripping people of their personality, and I thought
8 there was quite a lot of merit in that. You can over do
9 it like you can over do anything.

10 But, fundamentally, somebody coming into a prison,
11 there is a danger he becomes a number as opposed to
12 a name. He is using -- he is wearing institutional
13 clothing, and in the 1950s and 1960s, they didn't have
14 any personal clothing; it was all institutional
15 clothing. So you are depersonalising people.

16 Because there is a generation after the war, people
17 compared institutions to being in the Army, to being in
18 the armed forces, that similar processes went on. So
19 there was quite a strong debate about that. And over
20 time it reduced and Goffman, you know, became a bit
21 passé and other sociologists took prominence. But
22 I always thought there is value in people working in
23 prisons remembering this debate about: how do we handle
24 people? And in essence the reception process is taking
25 somebody in one door and putting them out the other door

1 as quickly as possible.

2 And prison staff, the reception staff are usually
3 quite busy, particularly in the big jails. Barlinnie,
4 huge numbers coming in, often late at night. They are
5 under huge pressure from the halls to get the prisoners
6 through. They are not going to have time to stop and
7 think: oh, what's going on here?

8 But I felt that by downgrading the post of reception
9 officer we were downplaying what was going on in
10 reception, and we should have in fact been specialising.
11 We should create a post of reception officer and we
12 should train them, separately, or in addition, and make
13 them aware of what's going on under the surface: what
14 you see is not what's happening.

15 And prison officers are trained to see what they are
16 seeing.

17 The then head of training I knew shared my view
18 about this, absolutely, if not more so, and we lost the
19 argument. They were looking for savings, and this was
20 deemed to be a post that could be downgraded. Nobody,
21 other than a few of us, were fighting the battle, so to
22 speak. And I don't know whether my argument was right
23 or wrong, but I thought it was an important issue. And
24 I still think it's important, and we forget what's going
25 on under the surface.

1 You know, to digress, when I had visitors coming
2 round a prison, I would talk to them before they went
3 round, and one of the messages I would say to
4 people: look at what's going on. Look at what you see.
5 What you see may not be what is actually happening. Try
6 and get a sense of what is actually going on, wherever
7 you are going. You know, where are the staff? Where
8 are the positions? What are the staff doing? What are
9 the prisoners doing? How many prisoners are about?
10 What are they doing?

11 So people aren't just taking in what they are
12 visibly seeing, but actually trying to think beyond what
13 they are seeing. What are the underlying issues in the
14 hall or wherever it is in the prison?

15 LADY SMITH: Dan, I don't know if you have read, for
16 example, Primo Levi's book, "Is this a man" --

17 A. No.

18 LADY SMITH: -- on the dismantling of the human being, if
19 you like, on arrival in one of the camps. He was
20 Jewish, during the second world war. Or indeed the
21 findings I have made in relation to the child migration
22 programmes, when children were being migrated from
23 Scotland and, at the other end, everything was taken
24 away from them, possibly their name was changed, they
25 were told they had no parents when they had parents,

1 they would have their hair cut off, et cetera,
2 et cetera.

3 Even in the use of some of the boarding schools, the
4 use of the surname, the number, having your number, the
5 needing to conform.

6 It is not just in prisons. But I think the point
7 you are making is you must be aware of the risk of
8 losing the human being amongst all this; is that right?

9 A. Yes, absolutely. You have put it much better than
10 I did. I think that is a danger, and we need to be
11 aware of it.

12 And just because we have, for example, telephones in
13 reception and prisoners are wearing their own clothes
14 part of the time, we have made -- we made changes along
15 the road. And now of course they have their own phones
16 and whatever, but we shouldn't forget the fundamentals.

17 LADY SMITH: Yes.

18 Ms Forbes.

19 MS FORBES: My Lady.

20 I think there is a part later in your statement, at
21 196, just to mention it, that you say:

22 "I think the challenge in prisons is to treat people
23 as individuals in an institutional setting. So you
24 don't lose sight of the fact that they are individuals,
25 they are just in an institutional setting."

1 A. Absolutely. That may sound a bit OTT, but I think
2 fundamentally that's my approach, and many others. That
3 prisoners, all they have in common is that they are in
4 prison. Other than that, they are all different.
5 Similarly with staff, they are all different. We should
6 treat people as individuals. Although all the pressures
7 are towards conformity and uniformity, but it doesn't
8 mean to say we have to give in to that, to these
9 pressures, all the time.

10 And prisoners are very clever. They -- you know,
11 when they want something, they will argue that it is
12 policy, and I am not enacting policy properly. And when
13 that doesn't work, they will argue, "I'm a special case
14 and I should get this because of reason A, B and C".

15 So I don't know if you are aware of the 'Prisoner's
16 Week' initiative? That's an initiative by the churches
17 and the chaplains, and every year it is held in the
18 third week of November. And there is a theme or
19 slogan every year, and I think most of them, if not all
20 of them, have been very good and very apposite. But
21 there was one year which was "Prisoners are people, not
22 numbers", and I think that is helpful, to keep that
23 message.

24 Q. Just going back to the issue of the suicide strategy,
25 I think you say one of the hurdles you have to

1 overcome -- this is paragraph 104 -- was this prison
2 norm of individuals, young people, not wanting to be
3 seen to be grassing on each other and trying to hammer
4 home the fact that telling -- raising a concern about
5 a fellow young person was not grassing; it was looking
6 out for their welfare.

7 A. Yes, that is so fundamental and so difficult. But all
8 I can say is I tried to do that when I went to induction
9 sessions at various prisons, just in a sort of as
10 relaxed a way as I could, to try to get that message --
11 a lot of the prisoners, they had never heard the message
12 before. I could see the sense of surprise on their
13 faces, and the reasons I was giving them to challenge
14 what they just took as a basic feature of institutional
15 life.

16 So I can't give you an example where prisoners did,
17 but I am sure -- I am sure it did happen; that prisoners
18 would quietly have a word with the officer on a gallery
19 or in a work party, and just say, "Look, keep an eye on
20 so and so, I think he's a bit down". I would like to
21 think, anyway, that that would go on. Probably quietly,
22 rather than in any up front way.

23 But, equally, you mustn't underestimate the culture,
24 which is, you know: don't grass on a fellow prisoner.

25 It would be wrong to underestimate that in any way.

1 Q. And you say as well that in trying to prevent suicides,
2 if someone was at risk, one of the options which
3 sometimes had to be resorted to was the segregation
4 cells. But your view was to try to limit that as much
5 as possible, given it wasn't really a solution; it was
6 just taking someone out of an environment where they
7 could harm themselves and taking away their means to do
8 so?

9 A. Yes. It's just a horrific option, to put somebody in
10 a silent cell. They were very -- you know, in fact most
11 silent cells -- you have maybe had some evidence about
12 this, but my reckoning would be most silent cells were
13 taken out of use over the decades, and even where they
14 existed they were never used.

15 But the extreme measures to keep somebody alive were
16 very troubling and horrific.

17 At Glenochil, just before I left, we had a really
18 extreme, bizarre case of a young man who kept cutting
19 himself, and his aim was -- [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]. And that was just his motivation. There was no
22 more motivation than that. And he was constantly being
23 transferred between Glenochil and A&E at what was then
24 Stirling and he was an ex-young offender who we took
25 from Polmont, I think just before his 21st birthday,

1 because he was behaving bizarrely at Polmont. So the
2 dangers of life to him were enormous, but he didn't
3 care. Just didn't care. And this was his way of
4 amusing himself, and we couldn't find anyway in to
5 distract him or to find other avenues that he might be
6 interested in with the doctor, the psychologist, the
7 social worker. Everybody was trying their level best,
8 because it couldn't go on. Disaster was looming. But
9 between all the different disciplines we were really
10 struggling.

11 Q. I just want to move forward, Dan, to part of your
12 statement that talks about under 16 year olds being in
13 Polmont and what used to be the Unruly Certificate.
14 This is starting at 112 in your statement. That system
15 doesn't exist anymore. It has been abolished. But,
16 back in the timeframe we are talking about, there were
17 occasions where you would have at Polmont those who were
18 under 16 on an Unruly Certificate. But you say that
19 that was pretty rare in the 1990s, or by the mid-1990s,
20 and it was getting rarer?

21 A. Yes, the -- difficult to generalise. But my view was
22 most prisons would have one or two Unruly Certificates
23 a year. That would be in the 1980s into the 1990s.
24 They were rare, but not unique, if I could put it like
25 that.

1 Q. I think you say that there was a time where there were
2 actually six or seven that came to you over a Christmas
3 period.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. About 2001/2002. And you had written to your chief
6 executive about that. We can see that at paragraph 114.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I think it did the rounds, your email did the rounds of
9 the Scottish Executive, which it was at the time, and
10 I think one of the issues you had was a civil servant
11 made a comment, something like, "Tell the governor to
12 manage".

13 A. Yes, I was -- it takes a lot to get me angry, but I was
14 really incandescent when I read that. It was just
15 an extreme set of circumstances, and all these under
16 16s, I couldn't do anything about it. They didn't stay
17 with me for very long, but I was concerned about where
18 I could manage them safely; what sort of regime I could
19 offer them; how they were reacting; was there any mental
20 health dimension? Far less any self-harming to come.

21 And I thought if something did get out, even just
22 the numbers, or some family was very unhappy about it
23 and would raise it with the press, then I thought
24 the chief executive and my line manager should at least
25 know about it, just on the basis of no surprises. And

1 I was interested when the chief executive did send it
2 round a number of people in the Scottish Executive and
3 the last comment was, "Tell the governor to get on with
4 it", which I didn't find very helpful.

5 Q. I think in the same vein you had a concern about the
6 transfer of young people from secure units back then,
7 and I think you talk about that from paragraph 122.

8 You tell us when you would get a phone call from
9 a secure unit, like Rossie, Geilsland School, Kerelaw,
10 or St Mary's, that you weren't happy about that and you
11 would be wanting to phone around other secure units just
12 to see if they had exhausted all other possibilities?

13 A. Well, not quite. The phone call would come from
14 St Andrew's House, would come from a civil servant
15 telling me to take so and so tomorrow. That would be
16 the starting point, and that would be it.

17 It didn't happen very often, but it did happen, and
18 regardless of their age. And I kept saying: well, why
19 are they suddenly unmanageable? They surely haven't
20 just, overnight, become unmanageable. What steps are
21 being taken? Have they tried a transfer to a different
22 secure unit?

23 I could never get any information. They wouldn't
24 tell me anything. When the young person turned up at
25 Polmont, I didn't get any records. Nothing came with

1 him. So we had no idea what his particular problems
2 were. We just had to start from the beginning.

3 And I tried to -- with my line manager's very active
4 support, we started having regular meetings, quarterly
5 meetings, with the secure units and Cornton Vale, and
6 part of my objective was for them to identify, "Well, we
7 are having a particular problem with Jimmy Smith, and we
8 may think he is coming your way", in which case I would
9 say, "Well, let me know early on and I will send
10 a officer out and a manager out to speak to him, and we
11 will see what we can do to plan the transfer, mitigate
12 the worst aspects of the transfer". I don't know if
13 that ever worked, but there was certainly some buy in
14 from the secure units. But they were a law unto
15 themselves, and they barely spoke to each other, far
16 less me, and they didn't really want to have anything to
17 do with SPS.

18 Q. Was one of the difficulties the fact that they were run
19 by different organisations, Councils, they weren't all
20 dealt with by the same overarching sort of organisation?

21 A. Organisationally, they were all very different, run by
22 different charities or voluntary associations.
23 Management differed greatly, but they all had the
24 fundamental structure: 50 per cent residential workers
25 and 50 per cent teachers.

1 That, I think, was there throughout. And I didn't
2 know, really, how they integrated the staff and what the
3 young people did. By my standards, they had a huge
4 staff for the number of young people and I couldn't work
5 out what they were trying to do with the young people.
6 It didn't seem to me there was any strategy, just treat
7 each individual as an individual with -- not just as
8 a means to an end, but that was the end.

9 And -- of course they had young people there for all
10 sorts of different reasons; they weren't all there for
11 criminal behaviour or anti-social behaviour. All sorts
12 of reasons. But different strategies to family
13 involvement, to visits, and they didn't seem to be
14 accountable to anybody. They all had sort of boards of
15 trustees, but I couldn't find out what happened.

16 Just to digress, just a few weeks ago, one of my
17 former senior colleagues contacted me and asked me if
18 I would consider being a trustee on a secure unit board,
19 and I was very tempted, but I thought: I don't need
20 anything more at my age of life.

21 Five years ago, I would have jumped at the chance
22 and been very interested in how they ran. But they
23 charged a fortune, and that was a model -- again, at
24 some conferences I would offer this as a model,
25 an alternative to how we fund imprisonment. There were,

1 locally, an incredible number of steps that the Local
2 Authority had to go through to get somebody to go to
3 a List D school or a secure unit, there were. And the
4 point of the process was to limit, to cut down to the
5 absolute bare minimum, referrals, and that worked. The
6 referrals did come down.

7 And of course the Local Authority knew they would
8 have to pay a huge amount for somebody in care, so it
9 was another disincentive to send somebody to care.

10 So, you know, in my dream of dreams could you have
11 Local Authorities handling prisoners in the same way
12 that the courts suggest somebody goes to prison for
13 12 months and the Local Authority says, "Well, I'm not
14 sure if I have the budget for that", and put the budget
15 on to the council tax, that might bring about a change
16 of thinking towards the value of imprisonment.

17 I will leave that thought with you.

18 LADY SMITH: I don't think that is within my remit, but it
19 is a very interesting suggestion.

20 A. That's for part two.

21 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

22 MS FORBES: Dan, just moving on to the question of
23 discipline and reports, prisoners being put on reports.
24 At paragraph 142 of your statement, you talk about
25 a prisoner being put on report and being taken before

1 the governor. I think you comment that there was
2 an assumption of guilt and that the governor was going
3 to impose a punishment. There was no presumption of
4 innocence. But, during your time at Polmont, you did
5 move to a more in-depth assessment of the charge which
6 was at times adversarial and to try to hammer home that
7 the primary purpose of being there was to stop whatever
8 had allegedly happened from happening again and wasn't
9 necessarily about punishment.

10 A. Yes, that was my approach. A lot of similarities with
11 the complaints system that needed to change, and the use
12 of the Orderly Room had to change. And with human
13 rights, there was no way you could argue that our
14 procedures in the Orderly Room were compatible with any
15 possible interpretation of the ECHR.

16 So there were national changes made to punishment.
17 But locally, at Polmont, it was clear there was
18 an expectation the governor would do the Orderly Room.
19 That was a set time in the day, 11 o'clock, and
20 everything stopped for the Orderly Room. And the
21 governor marched down the corridor and would do the
22 Orderly Room, and would mete out justice and would
23 disappear again. And I started delegating that task to
24 other unit managers and deputy governors, because there
25 is no reason why the governor had to do it; it was just

1 tradition. And in many other prisons the governor had
2 stopped doing the Orderly Room, but this is another
3 example of Polmont being behind the times.

4 There was a lot of resentment to this, a lot of
5 resentment about the punishments coming out of the
6 Orderly Room, that they didn't seem to meet the crime.
7 And I think every unit manager who did the Orderly Room
8 would have an experience of an irate officer berating
9 him or her afterwards, saying: why did you not do this?
10 And why did you not punish so and so?

11 And so it was another part of changing the culture
12 at Polmont, and I think undoubtedly that did work. But
13 I was helped by the changes in the national system.

14 Q. I think you go on to tell us about the kind of
15 investigations into staff misconduct and complaints,
16 from paragraph 146. And I think you say that you had
17 a concern in certain situations that perhaps officers
18 weren't acting appropriately. But your view was that
19 all you could do, really -- because sometimes there
20 wouldn't be the evidence -- was to just ensure that
21 every allegation was investigated, and --

22 A. Yes, that became my approach. The situations varied
23 a lot. Timing varied, sometimes you didn't hear about
24 the incident until some time afterwards and you are only
25 getting a partial story of what happened, or what was

1 alleged to have happened.

2 But I took the view that every allegation should be
3 reported, and often, at gross misconduct, we had
4 different categories for investigations. But if it
5 involved allegations of assault or intimidation, or
6 bullying, then, to my mind, that was gross misconduct,
7 and it would be investigated at gross misconduct level.
8 That brought a lot of opposition from the Union, who
9 often didn't want to investigate it. Or if it did,
10 wanted it investigated informally or at a very low
11 formal level. So we had to work through that as well.

12 So there were a number of issues, and there were,
13 sadly, some problematic staff, who I was very unsure
14 about.

15 Q. Yes, I think you talk about that at paragraphs 150 and
16 151. But one of the issues really was, from your point
17 of view, getting enough evidence to proceed with
18 anything. But you thought it was important that the
19 matter be investigated as far as it could be?

20 A. Yes, and sending out a message to staff that if they
21 crossed the line, they will be investigated. And
22 whatever may or may not have happened in the past,
23 allegations would be taken seriously. It doesn't say
24 that we agree with the allegations, we are investigating
25 and there is no cover up and we will take whatever

1 steps -- it is very difficult to bring the police in.
2 If it was an assault, the obvious thing to do was to
3 bring the police in, and sometimes we did, but it was
4 just a non-starter. Nobody would talk to the police,
5 the police thought it was a waste of their time, and it
6 was just not getting anywhere. So we had to do it
7 ourselves.

8 Of course, the young people making the allegations
9 are probably not the most credible young people, with
10 troubled backgrounds. But, nevertheless, we took the
11 line, and I think consistently, allegations will be
12 investigated. And certainly two staff -- one member of
13 staff resigned, and one -- well, two resigned who were
14 on the point of being dismissed.

15 Q. And I think just going forward into your statement,
16 I think later on, just going down to paragraph 180,
17 I think you say that you hope that there was no abuse
18 going on during your time at Polmont, but you can't be
19 certain and that you had doubts about various staff and
20 doubts about certain situations. And you had lots of
21 issues about getting evidence.

22 A. Yes, the other side of human rights is, of course, you
23 have to be evidence led, and you can have all of the
24 powerful policies in place and good, clear, coherent
25 policies. But, at the end of the day, you need

1 political will to do the necessary, or management will
2 to investigate, and you need evidence.

3 You can't just say to somebody, "Oh, I think you are
4 up to no good, I think you should resign". Well, you
5 can't say that to an officer. But I think the officers
6 whose behaviour I had doubts about, I think they got the
7 message. I am pretty sure that they realised that the
8 way they had been working could not continue, and they
9 had to start engaging. The days of shouting at
10 prisoners, just because I have a different uniform to
11 you and you will do what I tell you to do, and if I tell
12 you to jump, the only question is: how high?

13 That had gone.

14 Q. And I think, Dan, you talk about engaging there. When
15 you are telling us about lessons you think should be
16 learned, at paragraph 190, you say:

17 "I think the most important way to protect young
18 people is to find ways to engage with them. We need to
19 do things with young people, rather than doing things to
20 them."

21 A. Yes, absolutely. Listen, listen, listen. If there is
22 one thing that you will hear regularly from children,
23 from young people, from young adults in trouble, they
24 will tell you sooner or later, "Nobody listened to me.
25 Nobody listened. Everybody in an authority position,

1 they do things to me, and nobody is interested in my
2 point of view". That may or may not be true, and there
3 will be lots of evidence for and against, but that's
4 their perception of how they have gone through their
5 adolescence: nobody listens.

6 That was the feature of good staff. They created
7 time to listen and to engage with young people. It was
8 a slightly less -- well, a slightly different stage.
9 But what I was saying earlier about trying to get
10 complaints out of the young people, I had to really talk
11 long and hard to some of them before they would
12 eventually give me something that was negative about
13 Polmont. They just won't tell you naturally. They are
14 not used to people actively listening. And if you are
15 actively listening, you are actively interested. And
16 the two go together.

17 And that's what we want, I think, in an ideal world.
18 Whatever the ideal world might look like. But you want
19 people working with young people who will listen to
20 them. You will still have to tell them to do things
21 they don't want to do and they will have to exercise
22 some degree of discipline and authority, I accept all
23 that. But it is the way you do it, and try to engage
24 with them however difficult -- and it will be difficult,
25 however difficult it is.

1 Q. And I think, Dan, you say -- you talk about that more at
2 paragraph 195, where you are talking about thinking
3 about who are the right people to work with young
4 offenders, and young people. I think you say:

5 "Time and time again, my management team at Polmont
6 tried to identify the qualities that characterised
7 a member of staff who was good at working with young
8 people."

9 And you talk about -- one of your strategic
10 objectives was to design a training module for staff at
11 Polmont and you ended up with qualities that any
12 governor would want in any prison officer, but you say:

13 "The additional factors seemed to be a simple
14 genuine interest in young people."

15 A. Yes, we -- I don't know how many half days we did a bit
16 of brainstorming, my various management teams at Polmont
17 and, you know, there must be a training package around
18 or can we invent one? More money was going into
19 training at the college, and we were to some extent
20 knocking at an open door at the college. But they were
21 saying to us, "Well, you tell us what you want us to do.
22 You tell us what training you want us to deliver. We
23 will deliver it, but you need -- you are the contractor,
24 you need to tell us what you want", and we never cracked
25 this.

1 And I don't know, you have perhaps had evidence from
2 other organisations that will give a different message,
3 and maybe a more optimistic message, and I hope there
4 are some models of good practice out there. But we
5 tried and tried and tried without success, and just kept
6 coming back to the skills that I would want in any
7 prison officer.

8 Q. But just this added factor that they had a genuine
9 interest in young people?

10 A. Yes, because a lot of the staff at Polmont were only
11 working at Polmont because it was the nearest prison to
12 where they lived. They didn't ask to work with young
13 people.

14 A few -- I took a few from when Glenochil Young
15 Offenders closed. I took some staff from Glenochil who
16 said they wanted to work with young people. I took some
17 staff from Dumfries when it closed -- sorry, when it
18 closed to young offenders. Same with Longriggend when
19 it closed. Some were genuine, they did want to work
20 with young people. Some were not genuine and they saw
21 working with young people as an easy option compared to
22 working with adult males.

23 MS FORBES: Well, Dan, that's all the questions I have for
24 you. Thank you very much for answering my questions
25 today. I know we have kept you for quite a long time.

1 LADY SMITH: Dan, let me add my thanks. Thank you again for
2 everything you have given us, both in terms of your
3 detailed statement, which has so much -- not just the
4 information of your long career in the Prison Service,
5 but your valuable reflections looking back. Much to be
6 proud of. I know there are still things that you are
7 very honest about feeling could be better, but it is
8 plain you achieved a lot in your 38 years;
9 I congratulate you for that.

10 Thank you for bearing with us today, despite
11 whatever is the latest cold going round being determined
12 to try to stop you doing that. Please feel free to go
13 and rest for the rest of the day.

14 A. Thank you.

15 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

16 Well, we could take the afternoon break now, then,
17 and perhaps we could do a read-in after that, finish off
18 the day. Thank you.

19 (3.00 pm)

20 (A short break)

21 (3.15 pm)

22 LADY SMITH: Good afternoon. Now, finally, a read-in.

23 Mr Peoples.

24 MR PEOPLES: Yes, a read-in, next. The read-in is from
25 a statement provided by a person whose pseudonym is

1 'Donald'.

2 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

3 MR PEOPLES: And the reference is WIT-1-000000856.

4 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

5 'Donald' (read)

6 MR PEOPLES: My Lady, 'Donald' was born in 1970 and, just by
7 way of introduction, he was born in Greenock. Really,
8 what he tells us about is that between, perhaps, the
9 ages of around 5 until around 20 in all he was in
10 something -- I think it is nine institutions. He
11 experienced abuse, I think, based on what's contained in
12 his statement, in seven of them, and that consisted of
13 a variety of forms of abuse; physical abuse; sexual
14 abuse; emotional abuse.

15 And while the nine institutions include SPS
16 institutions, it is clear from his statement that he
17 experienced abuse in a number of institutions before
18 going into an SPS establishment. It is a familiar
19 pattern, as before. It just happens that his birth is
20 the start of the 1970s, another decade, rather than the
21 start of the 1960s. So we are slightly further on in
22 time. But, to some extent, the story is the statement.

23 If I could start just by looking briefly at the
24 section headed "Life before ... care", which I think is
25 paragraphs 2 to 10 of 'Donald's' statement.

1 As I have said, he was born in Greenock. He says he
2 was one of six children. He had two older siblings and
3 three younger siblings. He says, in paragraph 3, that
4 his dad worked away and travelled all over the world.

5 On page 2, at paragraph 5, he's --

6 LADY SMITH: Just in passing, I note he is puzzled about how
7 his mother could have caught, as he puts it, pleural
8 plaque from the asbestos, but if at any time she did the
9 laundry for somebody working with asbestos on the [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED], that's a likely explanation for her suffering.

11 MR PEOPLES: Yes, I think we now know it wasn't just those
12 who worked on the construction of ships. Yes, you are
13 right, I should have said his mother did work as well,
14 when 'Donald' was younger.

15 LADY SMITH: Yes.

16 MR PEOPLES: However, continuing about his mother in
17 paragraph 5, he does say that for as long as he could
18 remember his mother was an alcoholic, and he really
19 can't remember occasions when she was sober.

20 I am told there is a problem with WebEx. I have
21 a message that at least one person on WebEx is having
22 difficulty hearing.

23 LADY SMITH: Just one?

24 MR PEOPLES: It is Ms Rattray. But I'm wondering if anyone
25 else is having problems.

1 LADY SMITH: Could you check if it is okay now with her?

2 MR PEOPLES: Can those out there hear me? Perhaps

3 Ms Rattray could see if she can now hear.

4 It should be on now.

5 LADY SMITH: Should be on?

6 MR PEOPLES: Perhaps I will continue in the hope that the

7 problem has been resolved.

8 LADY SMITH: Yes, I think we should.

9 MR PEOPLES: I don't think I need to repeat what --

10 LADY SMITH: If anyone is very troubled by this, perhaps

11 they could get in touch with us and we will see what we

12 can do.

13 MR PEOPLES: I won't repeat what I have just said.

14 LADY SMITH: No, there is no need.

15 MR PEOPLES: I think I am getting a positive sign that the

16 problem has been resolved.

17 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

18 MR PEOPLES: If I could continue, he speaks about his mother

19 at paragraph 5, and how she was, and why she was like

20 she was.

21 He says, at paragraph 6, that he remembers a lot of

22 fighting and screaming in his home, and when his mother

23 and father were together there were constant arguments.

24 Indeed, he says they ended up splitting up. It seems

25 that the consequences were that his mother ended up

1 losing her house, and he went with, I think, a sister,
2 to his granny with his mother. It was a small house
3 with four people sharing the accommodation. He says it
4 was tight living conditions and there was always
5 fighting because of his mother's drinking, which his
6 granny couldn't put up with.

7 He tells us, at paragraph 8, that social work ended
8 up intervening and he and his younger sister were taken
9 to a children's home, while the older siblings remained
10 at home.

11 The first care setting he was in was a children's
12 home. It was Nazareth House in Cardonald, and he deals
13 with his experiences there between paragraphs 11 and 74.

14 I will not go through that section, but he clearly
15 does provide evidence of abuse occurring during his stay
16 there.

17 LADY SMITH: Yes.

18 MR PEOPLES: I think in particular he deals with that at
19 paragraph 56 and following, about the types of abuse
20 that he experienced in that care setting. He does say
21 what happened there, and he did run away from time to
22 time, and says he would tell an uncle what was
23 happening.

24 He then tells us that he left his first placement
25 and there was a period when he was back at home, and he

1 deals with that period at 75 to 79 of his signed
2 statement, at page 15, starting. I think he reckons he
3 was about 8 at that time, so he was still pretty young,
4 and he attended a local school.

5 Then he says, on page 16, if I could just flag this
6 up, when he got out of his first placement things were
7 never the same:

8 "I couldn't settle back in to life. The damage was
9 already done. I started experimenting and sniffing
10 petrol."

11 He also says in this section:

12 "I wouldn't let anyone pick on me and I was always
13 fighting."

14 That's paragraph 79.

15 Then he ended up in some trouble and the police were
16 involved and he appeared before a Children's Panel. He
17 was sent to Newfield for a period of assessment, and he
18 says he was there around six weeks. I think that would
19 be around 1979 or 1980, or thereabouts.

20 LADY SMITH: Yes.

21 MR PEOPLES: He seems to have been in Newfield several
22 times, but he deals with his first occasion there, at
23 paragraphs 80 through to 97. He says he ran away from
24 there as he did in his previous placement. He does say
25 that he got the odd slap there, but he describes it as

1 "par for the course" and "normal back then". That's
2 paragraph 90. Which I think is something that a number
3 of people have said over the years --

4 LADY SMITH: Indeed, yes.

5 MR PEOPLES: -- a slap seems to have been the norm and
6 treated as the norm by those who received it.

7 LADY SMITH: Yes.

8 MR PEOPLES: He has a section about abuse at Newfield, which
9 I will just -- it is 91 he starts that. Although he
10 describes it as not a bad place, but he mentioned two
11 staff who he describes as creepy. Although one of the
12 people he names, he said, didn't in fact do anything to
13 him, and describes more a situation of mental abuse,
14 where certain things would be -- they would be asked to
15 do certain things, like stand for hours in the corner,
16 or have them running in the gym at night in circles. So
17 that's really what he says about Newfield at that stage.

18 He said, after the assessment period, he went back
19 to the panel.

20 At page 20, on paragraph 95, he was told he would be
21 going to St Ninian's, Gartmore, although he had to stay
22 a further couple of weeks at Newfield until a place
23 became available. And he says he was told by a couple
24 of boys what to watch out for at St Ninian's.

25 It does seem there is a pattern sometimes, although

1 there is a placement or a panel decision, that it is not
2 always possible to implement it immediately, and
3 sometimes it is a case of waiting to see what comes up.
4 So I don't think that's a unique situation.

5 LADY SMITH: No, we have seen it before. It is
6 understandable.

7 MR PEOPLES: Oh yes.

8 LADY SMITH: Hard to plan for.

9 MR PEOPLES: Yes. And then St Ninian's, Gartmore, and again
10 I am not going to deal with this in detail, he
11 has a section dealing with his experience there, at
12 paragraph 98 through to 140, and reckons he was 9 or 10
13 when he went to St Ninian's. That is, again, around
14 1979 or 1980 or thereabouts.

15 LADY SMITH: Yes.

16 MR PEOPLES: He tells us a bit about the people that were
17 there.

18 I will mention in passing that he does mention one
19 of the people was a Mr Greg Dougal, and he has been
20 recently convicted of certain offences.

21 LADY SMITH: Oh yes.

22 MR PEOPLES: He tells us about what happened there, and he
23 does describe, in that section, physical abuse and
24 concerns of being scared because screams heard in the
25 night; that's one of the things he describes.

1 He also describes, apart from physical abuse, that
2 there was also sexual abuse, and he has a section about
3 that, starting at 127. He describes various incidents
4 that occurred, including one involving two names that
5 are persons who are convicted, I think in the first
6 trial involving Brother Benedict, James McKinstry and
7 Charles McKenna are names who were both also convicted
8 in that first trial.

9 LADY SMITH: Oh yes, yes.

10 MR PEOPLES: So he has evidence about that in his signed
11 statement.

12 He then says that he thinks he left St Ninian's when
13 he was around 11 or 12, which again would put it around
14 1981 or 1982, thereabouts. He says that he did go back
15 home and start -- or resume primary school in his
16 community.

17 At 137, he says that he wasn't home very long and he
18 was starting sniffing glue, but he was also wetting the
19 bed and found it hard to settle back at home.

20 Then he talks about moving to a high school from
21 Port Glasgow and he started missing school because he
22 seems to have been running around with some of the boys
23 there, some of the older boys that he had met in
24 Newfield.

25 At page 30, in paragraph 140, he says that really

1 the school, the high school, had enough of him, he says,
2 but there was a social worker involved. He says the
3 police knew he was involved in various activities and he
4 ultimately -- he says a club was done over and he and
5 others, who were over 16 at that stage, were caught, but
6 he took the blame because he considered they would have
7 gone to jail.

8 The matter was disposed of, he tells us, by
9 a reference back to the panel. And it seems that he
10 then spent a further period at Newfield. This is his
11 second time there. That is paragraphs 141 through 147,
12 and I think he reckons he was there about eight or nine
13 weeks in all.

14 He doesn't say a huge amount about this time, but he
15 does say that he was starting to get more out of
16 control. That's at paragraph 142.

17 And he was sniffing glue. Indeed, he speaks of
18 an occasion when he and other boys carried out a rooftop
19 protest, at 143, and indeed were sniffing glue on the
20 roof. And he also goes back to referring to some of the
21 staff he had concerns about. The same people, I think.

22 He says after he was there for about 8 or 9 weeks,
23 he was sent to what appears to be a children's home in
24 Glasgow, and he deals with his experience there at 148
25 through 157. Now, this will be about 1982, I think.

1 LADY SMITH: Yes.

2 MR PEOPLES: Probably around then.

3 LADY SMITH: Yes.

4 Secondary Institutions - to be published later

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15 then he says that from there he seems to have been given
16 a chance to go back home and go back to school, but he
17 didn't settle and went back to what he describes as "old
18 ways"; going out and breaking into premises.

19 He was only at home for a few months when he was
20 then put back into another children's home, this time in
21 Port Glasgow. And he tells us about that at 158 through
22 to 168. And he says he reckons he was there around
23 seven or eight months.

24 Secondary Institutions - to be published later

25

1 He said he ended
2 up getting charged, along with two boys over 16, in
3 connection with a serious assault, and he says that he
4 was held in Newfield until the case went to court. He
5 says he was there perhaps about six months, although he
6 tells us, at 165, that the case ended up being dropped
7 and so he was in Newfield, but then went back home.

8 However, at 167, he says that subsequently he was
9 charged with wilful fire-raising, being already on bail
10 for housebreaking. So he was back in court again, and
11 this time he was fully committed and went back to
12 Newfield.

13 At 167, he tells us he was there for another
14 six months. He says he took the blame for the
15 housebreaking and was given three years residential
16 training. He says that the wilful fire-raising seems to
17 be something that -- the sentence was deferred,
18 according to his recollection.

19 The placement that he went to was Balrossie School,
20 which is obviously a List D school by then. He tells us
21 about his experiences at Balrossie between paragraphs
22 169 to 198, starting on page 36.

23 LADY SMITH: He is about 13 when he goes into Balrossie.

24 MR PEOPLES: Yes, that would be 1983/84, aged 13, and he
25 reckons he was there for the full three-year period.

1 He does say, at 170, that he got on well with most
2 of the staff there. He mentions ones that he remembers,
3 including SNR [REDACTED]. He tells us about the
4 routine, which I will pass over.

5 He says, at 184, that he would be going home for
6 weekends when he was at Balrossie, and he said he was
7 finished with glue sniffing by that stage, but he was
8 drinking a lot and smoking cannabis. He says that's
9 when he started taking drugs, when he was on home leave
10 at the age of 15. So we are into about 1985 by now.

11 He has a section headed "Abuse at Balrossie", and
12 that starts at 187. I am not going to go through it,
13 but he describes physical abuse in the paragraphs that
14 follow, by a number of staff.

15 He tells us about leaving Balrossie, starting at
16 197, where he was going home at night and attending
17 Balrossie during the day, and then had to go back to
18 court, he says, every six months for some of the
19 deferred sentence on wilful fire-raising.

20 LADY SMITH: Yes.

21 MR PEOPLES: He seems to have come out of Balrossie, I think
22 around the age of 15, but he then seems to have been
23 intended to go to St Mary's Kenmure at Bishopbriggs. He
24 only has a short section about this.

25 LADY SMITH: Yes.

1 MR PEOPLES: Because it looks as if what happened was, he
2 went there and immediately escaped or absconded, and was
3 on the run for four months. So he didn't really have
4 any time at that particular place. His dates would
5 suggest it was about 1986, and that ended up -- when he
6 was caught, he says it was just before he was 16 years
7 old and he was taken to Longriggend from court. So
8 I can maybe pick that up there, Longriggend, which is
9 page 44, paragraph 200.

10 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

11 MR PEOPLES: "Longriggend was a remand unit. I was there
12 until the courts decided what to do with me.
13 Longriggend felt like any other adult jail. I was
14 locked up and given a piss pot in the corner. I had to
15 slop out. I would wake up, slop out, and have
16 breakfast.

17 "At 9:00 am they would try and take me to school,
18 but I wouldn't go. I asked them to leave me in my bed.
19 I was locked in my cell and would stay in my bed all
20 day. I did a lot of reading at Longriggend. I got
21 books from the library and from other boys.

22 "Meals were brought to our cells in steel trays with
23 compartments. The food was horrendous, I couldn't
24 describe it, but there was no choice. I was never
25 disciplined or restrained at Longriggend. I was there

1 for about two weeks before going back to court. I was
2 then recalled on my parole. I didn't go back to
3 Approved School, but was sent straight to Glenochil."

4 Then he has a section, starting at 203, where he
5 describes Glenochil, and I think what he is describing
6 there is a spell in the young offenders part, not
7 a detention centre.

8 LADY SMITH: Yes, because he later ends up in the detention
9 centre.

10 MR PEOPLES: Yes, that's right.

11 LADY SMITH: Well, not that much later.

12 MR PEOPLES: No, you are right. But I think he starts the
13 other way round, which is perhaps odd. I think the plan
14 was you started in one and you shouldn't go to the next
15 one if it works.

16 But, anyway, he tells us that he was there for
17 around six months as a convicted young prisoner, and he
18 says he was only 15 when he went there:

19 "I was a couple of months away from my 16th
20 birthday."

21 That's at 203: "It was for prisoners up to the age
22 of 21. There were about 24 boys in each section.
23 Twelve cells up each side." He says he can't remember
24 the names of any prison officers there:

25 "The cell had a bed, a wee table, a chair and a sink

1 in it. We were allowed to have a radio in our cells.
2 I didn't have to slop out at Glenochil. When the
3 section was shut, you pressed a buzzer. Your door would
4 open and you could go out to use the toilet. Only one
5 person was allowed out at a time. We had to make our
6 beds and keep ourselves clean, but it wasn't very
7 strict. We got locked up in our cells at night.
8 I would read in my cell. After the lights went out,
9 I would talk to other boys out the window. We would
10 torment the sex offenders and howl at them.

11 "I got up in the morning and had my breakfast. We
12 went down to the dining hall for our meals. We were
13 locked up in our cells less than I had been in
14 Longriggend. The food was all right. After breakfast,
15 I went to work in the sheds.

16 "We wore denims and a red and white shirt. We were
17 allowed to wear our own trainers.

18 "I worked in textiles. Because I had escaped from
19 St Mary's I was classed as a category A prisoner.
20 I didn't have a choice in where I worked because
21 textiles was in the security shed. I would do the
22 brushing up because I couldn't use a sewing machine.
23 I was just a pest. We'd go back for our dinner and then
24 we got outside for our exercise. We then went back to
25 the sheds.

1 "We got out for recreation at night. We could play
2 pool, table tennis or watch the telly. Weekends were
3 much the same, but we didn't go to work and we were
4 locked up in our cells earlier. The screws would go
5 home earlier at the weekend, just like in adult prisons.

6 "My family would come up and visit me at Glenochil.
7 After I turned 16 I didn't get any visits from social
8 workers. I wasn't given any kind of support when I was
9 sentenced.

10 "The screws couldn't do anything worse to me than
11 what had already been done. I just took it all in my
12 stride. There was a gang of boys called the Glenochil
13 Wolves. As part of your initiation, you had to do
14 something to one of the sex offenders. There was no
15 such thing as protection for the sex offenders. They
16 were put into the textile workshop with the general
17 population. When the screws' backs were turned, I put
18 an industrial sewing machine right over one of the sex
19 offender's heads.

20 "If you did anything wrong you would be restrained
21 and carted off in locks. That happened to me when
22 I assaulted the sex offender. They would bend your
23 wrists right back to cause maximum pain. The pain was
24 terrible. When I was being restrained there would be
25 one screw at each arm, one at each leg, and one at my

1 head. Considering what I'd done, they weren't too hard
2 on me.

3 "I was taken into the Digger, which was a punishment
4 cell. It was a lot smaller than the normal cells. It
5 had a cardboard table and a cardboard chair in it.
6 There was a concrete floor with a mattress on it. I was
7 there for 14 days. My meals were brought to me in the
8 cell. I only got out for an hour exercise each day.
9 I pressed the buzzer whenever I needed the toilet during
10 the day and I had a piss pot in my cell if I needed to
11 go to the toilet at night."

12 And then he does come to his experience at the
13 detention centre, at 213, page 46 of his signed
14 statement, and he says:

15 "After I was released from my first sentence at
16 Glenochil I got another three months' detention for
17 something stupid. It was the first sentence I got after
18 I turned 16."

19 So that would be late in 1986 that he turned 16.

20 LADY SMITH: Yes, 16. Mm-hm.

21 MR PEOPLES: "Glenochil Detention Centre was a different
22 part of the building than I had been in the first time.
23 It was the same staff. The detention centre was part of
24 Maggie Thatcher's 'short sharp shock treatment'. It was
25 all based on training for Army recruits. They called it

1 square bashing. We were supposed to make bed blocks,
2 bull our boots, bull the floors and march. It was all
3 heavy and strict. We wore black jaggy trousers,
4 a similar jacket and a red and white shirt. We had
5 shoes and boots that were supposed to bull up, but
6 I never learned how to do that.

7 "We were supposed to march everywhere we went. When
8 they told me to march, I told them to jog on. If I had
9 wanted to march I would have joined the Army. When
10 I didn't march, they told me that I had to have my shoes
11 in order. If I didn't do that, they said I would have
12 to go to my cell. I told them I would be in my cell
13 until I got out, which I was.

14 "For every day I refused to march I lost a day's
15 remission of my sentence. I was only doing 3 months.
16 At that time had you to serve at least two-thirds of
17 your sentence. I had to do two months, so they could
18 only keep me in for another month if I refused to
19 comply. I was kept in the punishment cell for my whole
20 sentence and got an hour's exercise every day. I spent
21 a lot of my time reading. They brought a trolley round
22 with books on it and I could pick from it. I didn't get
23 restrained when I was in the detention centre. I was
24 already in the punishment cells, so they couldn't take
25 me anywhere else.

1 "The 'short sharp shock treatment' didn't work for
2 me. I don't think it worked for anybody. At that time,
3 I don't know what would have helped me. I just had to
4 get out. I didn't realise at the time how things had
5 affected me and where it was all coming from. It might
6 have helped if I had had some kind of counsellor or
7 someone had asked me why I was wetting the bed or
8 sniffing glue, but I don't think anybody cared.

9 "I was still 16 when I finished my three-month
10 sentence. When I was released from Glenochil they ran
11 me down to Stirling train station. You got a liberation
12 grant, which was a week's brew money. Back then, it was
13 about £24. They gave you a train ticket to wherever you
14 came from as well. I went back to my mum's in Greenock,
15 but I got a house of my own as soon as possible."

16 And he also says he ended up staying with an older
17 sister and also an aunt quite a lot. He goes on:

18 "After I left Glenochil I was taking a lot of drugs.
19 At that time I started to take a lot of tablets. It
20 wasn't long after that I started taking heroin. I got
21 into trouble with the police again, but I never went
22 back to Glenochil because the detention centre wouldn't
23 have me."

24 And then he has a section describing some
25 experiences in Polmont, where he does say he was in

1 several times. But I will read --

2 LADY SMITH: Yes, of course.

3 MR PEOPLES: At paragraph 220, on page 48, he says:

4 "When I was 17 I was sent to Polmont for the first
5 time. I was in and out of Polmont quite a lot until
6 I turned 20. It was there that I was first introduced
7 to heroin. Polmont was just another jail. I have been
8 in prison a lot as an adult and it was just the same.
9 I was definitely institutionalised, there was no doubt
10 about it.

11 "You could be put on report for 101 different
12 things, like being abusive to the screws, fighting, or
13 something else. If you were on report for something and
14 you got put on report again, you would be removed to the
15 cells. That happened to me quite a lot.

16 "The way they took you to the cells and the locks
17 they put on you should only have been done in extreme
18 circumstances. They could just as easily have a screw
19 on each side of you and walk you down to the cell.
20 Instead, they got you on the ground and put you in
21 a lock. Every ten steps they would stop and put you
22 down to check all the locks. When they checked whether
23 their lock holds were secure, they bent your wrists back
24 and you screamed in pain. They caused maximum pain and
25 made sure everyone in the halls heard you scream."

1 Then he has a section on life after care. I will
2 just pick out one or two things.

3 LADY SMITH: That's fine.

4 MR PEOPLES: He says, at 223, he was in and out of Polmont,
5 as he said, quite a few times between the ages of 18 and
6 20, and he says until about four years prior to the
7 statement he was in and out of prison on a regular
8 basis, and he says there has been a lot of drug abuse in
9 his life.

10 He says, at 225, that he has never worked. He says
11 he has never been out of prison long enough to get
12 a job. And his life after leaving care, he describes as
13 chaos and one of crime and drugs.

14 He says that as far as impact is concerned, at 226,
15 he started taking heroin when he was 17 and in Polmont.
16 He said that went on for years and years, and again he
17 says his life was one of crime and drugs.

18 At 227, he says this:

19 "The abuse in care is all planted in my head. It
20 has been with me for the last 40-odd years. Since
21 I have uploaded it and spoken about it I feel totally
22 different. Years ago I didn't see it as abuse. If
23 I did something wrong, I got a whack. The way I see it
24 now is that if I went out on the street and punched
25 a 10-year-old boy full force on the face, it wouldn't be

1 acceptable. I try not dwell on what happened when I was
2 in care. It's happened and no matter what I say or do,
3 nothing is going to change it."

4 He talks about having bad dreams. Some of these
5 are, I think, connected to things that happened at
6 St Ninian's. He does say, at 230, that he has a very
7 large number of previous convictions.

8 LADY SMITH: Yes.

9 MR PEOPLES: And indeed I think he seems to say at times to
10 save himself he actually did something to go back to
11 jail.

12 LADY SMITH: Yes, for the nourishment not the punishment, as
13 a way of life.

14 MR PEOPLES: Perhaps that, and also to make sure he didn't
15 do something in the community that might have very
16 serious consequences. That is certainly the way, I
17 think, he is describing it.

18 LADY SMITH: I think that's right. It took him until
19 certainly late 40s to ease off --

20 MR PEOPLES: Yes.

21 LADY SMITH: -- his offending lifestyle.

22 MR PEOPLES: That's right. And then, at 232, just to see
23 how he puts the matter, at page 51:

24 "I am a product of the 1970s care system. They
25 basically stole not just my childhood, but my whole

1 life. Luckily I am still here and I have survived.
2 A lot of people that I was in care with are no longer
3 here."

4 I think that's something we have heard from other
5 people, too.

6 LADY SMITH: Yes.

7 MR PEOPLES: He says on reporting:

8 "Nobody ever asked me why I was wetting the bed or
9 why I was glue sniffing. I don't think I would have
10 been able to come out with it and talk about the abuse.
11 I didn't see the beatings as abuse."

12 And he says, again a familiar theme:

13 "I still don't have any trust in the system."

14 But he does, on reflection, say it is a shame it has
15 taken him 40 years to get to this point. But he then
16 describes that he has, in recent years, given
17 information to the police about things that have
18 happened to him in his care settings, including
19 incidents involving Mr Dougal, he says that at 236, and
20 indeed he refers to, I think, what probably was the
21 matter that has resulted in his trial and conviction.

22 On lessons to be learned, finally, if I could just
23 refer to paragraph 240.

24 LADY SMITH: Certainly.

25 MR PEOPLES: He says staff should have been vetted:

1 "I know that gets done now, but they should have
2 been thoroughly vetted. I don't think nuns and people
3 who aren't maternal should be allowed to look after
4 children. They didn't have a clue about children. They
5 had made a vow not to have any. I can't remember any
6 inspections of any of the places I was in."

7 He goes back to restraints and just refers to the
8 pain of having your wrists bent back in restraints was
9 terrible.

10 LADY SMITH: He is not the only applicant who has told us
11 that.

12 MR PEOPLES: No, no.

13 LADY SMITH: We heard about the system of bending the thumbs
14 back just yesterday from a prison officer.

15 MR PEOPLES: Indeed, a member of staff said it would be
16 extremely painful, albeit not long lasting in terms of
17 injurious effects.

18 LADY SMITH: Yes, an effective way of controlling somebody.

19 MR PEOPLES: It seems to be. And then he says, at 242:

20 "They need to try to get out of children why they
21 are in care in the first place. If children are there
22 for causing trouble, I don't think they are doing it for
23 no reason. It's a cry for help. They need someone to
24 talk to. Children might be scared to come out with what
25 the catalyst is. Everybody's case is different."

1 Well, there is a bit of a flavour of that from our
2 last witness as well, in a sense, albeit from
3 a different perspective.

4 LADY SMITH: Yes.

5 MR PEOPLES: And he says at 243:

6 "I have no objection to my witness statement being
7 published as part of the evidence to the Inquiry.

8 I believe the facts stated in this statement are true."

9 And he signed his statement on 15 November 2021.

10 LADY SMITH: Thank you very much.

11 MR PEOPLES: That's my contribution for today. I don't know
12 what your Ladyship wants to do at this stage.

13 LADY SMITH: I have just been scanning the length of the
14 read-ins still to go and the amount of time available,
15 and noting it is 3.52 on a Friday afternoon and we might
16 have done enough.

17 MR PEOPLES: Well, yes. I am quite happy to call it a day.

18 LADY SMITH: I am grateful to you for all your efforts this
19 week. Can we have a quick preview of Tuesday, please?

20 MR PEOPLES: Yes, there is a live witness on Tuesday
21 morning, and I would hope, along with that witness, we
22 can make some further progress with the read-ins as
23 well.

24 LADY SMITH: Great. Very well. I will rise now until
25 Tuesday morning and wish you all a good weekend. Thank

I N D E X

1	
2	
3	
4	Dan Gunn (sworn)1
5	Questions from Ms Forbes2
6	'Donald' (read)129
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

